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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 0 / 0 0 7 ~ 1 D  
SP 0 &-- ZANE JACK FIELDS, 1 Case No. 
Petitioner, 1 
1 PETITION FOR POST-CON?'ICTION 
1 RELIEF OR WRIT OF HABEAS 
V 1 CORPUS 
) 





STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff 1 Case No. 16259 
V. 1 MOTIONS TO CORRECT ILLEGAL 
SENTENCES, TO VACATE 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 1 SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR 
Defendant. ) NEW SENTENCING TRIAL 
Petitioner, Zane Jack Fields, by and through his attorney, Joan M. Fisher of the Capital 
Habeas Unit of the Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho, files this Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus and his Motion to Correct an Illegal 
Sentence, to Vacate the Sentence of Death and For New Sentencing Trial. This petition is filed 
PFXITIOIL FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIE6 A\D/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 
MOTION TO CORRECT ~I.LEGAL SENTENCES, 
V ~ C A T E  SENTEWES OF DEATH, AND FOR NEW SENTENCI~G TRIAL - 1 
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 19- 27 19 and- 4901 et sey., Idaho Criminal Rulcs 35 and 57. 
The relief requested must be granted to avoid a nlanifest injustice and violations of the United 
States Constitution Amendments 5, 6, 8, and 14 and Idaho Constitution, Article I, Sections 1,2, 
3, 5 , 6 ,  7,8, 13, 18 and 21. 
Overview of Grounds for Relief 
On June 24, 2002, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Ring v. Arizorzn, 
536 U.S. -, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (June 24, 2002), which clearly establishes that petitioner's death 
sentence is unconstitutional. In Ring, the Court held that the fundamental constitutional principle 
it had made clear three years earlier, in Jones v. United States, 1 19 S.Gt. 12 15, 1224 n.6 (1 999) 
applies to capital cases like all others. That constitutional principle is this: "under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth 
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a 
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Ikid 
The King decision has immediate, obvious and profound implications for this case. Most 
obviously, it means that petitioner's death sentence is unconstitutional because he was not given a 
jury trial on the statutory aggravating factors that made him eligible for a death sentence under 
Idaho law--the very reason the Court in Ring held the death sentence imposed by the State of 
Arizona in that case was unconstitutional. It also means that petitioner's death sentence is 
unconstitutional because the procedures by which it was imposed disregarded the Jones principle 
in a number of other ways, ways that were not immediately at issue in Ring itself. Ln addition, 
P E r l  r lON FOR POST-C'O~L ICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OI. HABEAS CORPLS; 
MOTIOY 1 0  CORRLCT ILI~EGAL S E N T ~ T C ~ S ,  
V A C ~ T E  SENTE~CLS OF DEATH, A h D  FOR Nh% ~ E N T E ~ c I N G  TRIAL - 2 
the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer in Rirzg reopens a related constitutional issue which is 
presented by this case, an issue previously thought to be foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent: 
whether the jury sentencing in capital cases, that the vast majority of death petialty states 
afford, is required by the Eighth Amelidment. And the principles set forth and applied in Ring 
and . ln~es call into question the coritinued validity of the Idaho Supreme Court's previous 
decisions rejecting claims that jury trials on capital eligibility and sentence are required by 
Idaho's constitution. 
The decision in Rirtg is thus a truly extraordinary legal development which compels this 
Court's reconsideration of the constitutionality of Petitioner's death sentence under both the 
United States' and Idaho's constitutional protections. This petition is being filed so that this 
Court can give this ease that reconsideration. 
The specific grounds for relief it raises are as follows: 
I. Custody Status of Petitioner 
Petitioner is incarcerated on death row in solitary confinement at the Idaho Maximum 
Security Lnstitute at Boise, Idaho. 
11. Course of Proceedings 
A. Judgment and Sentence 
Judgment and sentence were imposed by then District Judge Gerald F. Sehroeder, 
Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, County of Ada, Boise, Idaho on March 7, 199 1. Stute of 
Idaha v. Zune Jack Fields, Ada County Case No. 16259. 
B. Sentences for Which Relief Is Sought 
PE FITION EOK POSI-COP~\.ICTION Rhil.IEF 4n(D/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 
MOTION TO CORRECT ILI.ECAL SENTE~CES, 
VACAI E S E N T ~ P ~ C ~ S  OF DEATH, AND FOR NEW SENTENCI~G TRIAL - 3 
The sentence ignposed for which relief is sought is a sentcnce of death for one count of 
murder in the first degree. 
C. Jury Verdict 
The jury in Petitioner's case returned a verdict of guilty on one count of murder in the 
first degree for murder in the perpetration of a robbery. Tlie infomation under which petitioner 
was tried did not allege any aggravating circumstances making petitioner eligible for the death 
penalty and no aggravating circumstances were submitted to the jusy. 
D. Direct Appeal 
Petitioner appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment and Conviction, the 
imposition of sentence, and the denial of post-conviction relief. The conviction and sentence of 
death were affirmed. State v. Fields, 908 P.2d 12 1 1, 127 Idaho 904 (1 999 ,  rehearing denied 
May 17, 1995, eert. Ilerzied, 1 16 S .Ct. 3 19 (October 10, 1995). 
On direct appeal Petitioner challenged Idaho's sentencing scheme for depriving him of a 
jury detemination of specific intent to kill in connection with the felony murder aggravating 
circumstance in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. State v. Fields, Nos. 191 85 & 19809, Brief of Appellant at 57-58 (Idaho Supreme 
Court, filed January 27, 1994). In rejecting this argument, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that it 
"was not necessary for the jury to find specific intent to Kill in order to convict Fields of that 
offense [first degree felony murder]." Fields, 908 P.2d at 1223. 
E. Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings 
PETITION FOR POST-CONLICI ION RELILT AND/OR WRIT OF H.IBEAS CORPUS; 
MOTION TO CORRLCT ILLEGAL S E R l  ENCLS, 
VACATE S E % ~  ENCES OF DEA'I H, AVD FOR NER SENTENCI~~~G T m h ~  - 4
Following the denial of his appeal and affimiance of the denial of his initial 
postca~lviction petition, Petitioner filed another petition for post-conviction relief, raising the 
issue of jury finding of facts necessary for aggravating circumstances, which was denied by the 
District Court and affirmed on appeal. Fields v. Stute, 17 P.3d 230, 135 Idaho 286 (2000). On 
rehearing Petitioner raised the issue of jury determination of aggravating factors as requirements 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, Appre~zLlti v. New Jerseey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and 
Jones v. Ur1iti.d States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). The Idaho Supreme Court denied rehearing on 
January 25,2001. 
F. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings 
Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief, including a determination that he was 
denied his right to have a jury determine the existence of aggravating circumstances. Fields v. 
Kluuser, No. 95-0422-S-EJL, Amended Petition for Writ of I-iabeas Corpus, Claim 36 at 76-77 
(D. Idaho, Oct. 1, 200 1). The petition is pending in the federal district court. 
111, Due Diligence 
Petitioner brings this post-conviction relief petition less than 42 days after the decision in 
Ring V. Arizona. Although Petitioner raised on both direct appeal and federal habeas proceedings 
the constitutionality of the Judge determining the aggravating circumstances and the sentence 
(see brief on direct appeal, p. 124 et. seq.) he could not have prevailed earlier because of the 
erroneous constitutional analysis applied by the Idaho Supreme Court until the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that only a jury may make the factual findings which make a 
defendant eligible for the death penalty. Petitioner's other claims herein, including the 
PFTITION FOR POST-CCJYLIC~ION RELIEF AND/OR N R I T  OF HABEAS CORPUS; 
M O r l O N  TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCES, 
VACATE SENTEPICES 01. DEATH, AND FOR Nk U SE~TE\CIUG TRIAL - 5 
constitutional right to notice in the infomation of the aggavating circumstances, the right to a 
preliminary hearing on the existence of such circumstances, and the violation of his right to be 
free from cruel and unusual punishment due to excessive delay could also not have been raised 
earlier as they arise directly from the co~sstitutional parameters of Kirzg v. Arizoiza. 
V. Grounds for Relief 
A. Factual Background 
Petitioner was charged with an information which contained no notice of any of the 
statutory aggravating circulnstances ultimately found by the sentencing judge. Exhibit 1 
(Lnfomation); Exhibit 2 (Findings of Judge). No preliminary hearing was held to determine 
probable cause respecting any aggravating circumstances. At trial the jury was not required to 
determine the Petitioner's mens rea as constitutionally required under Etzmund v. FIori~Iu, 458 
U.S. 782 (1982). 
The jury which tried petitioner was not instructed on and did not determine any of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances. In fact, the jury was explicitly instructed that it could not 
consider punishment in its deliberations. Exhibit 3. 
B. Claims 
1. The death penalty statute under which petitioner was tried and sentenced (Idaho Code 
5 19-25 15) denied petitioner his right under the United States and Idaho Constitutions to have the 
aggravating circumstances which made him eligible for the death penalty determined only by a 
jury. United States Constitution, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, Idaho Constitution 
Article I, Sections I, 2, 7, 13, 18, Idaho Code 19- 1902; Ring v. Arizona, supra; Apprendi v. New 
P E T I T I O ~  FOR POST-C'ORVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WKlT 01. HABEAS CORPUS; 
MOTION TO CORWC r ILLEGAL SENI LFVCLS, 
VACATE SENTENC~X OF DEATH, AND FOR NEW SLNTENCI~G TRIAL - 6 
Jersey, 5330 U. S, 466 (2000); Sullzvurz tt. Lozcisianu, 508 U.S. 275 ( 1  993); 111 re Winslzip, 397 
U.S. 358 (1972); Dutlcun v. l,oulsianu, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
2. The death penalty statute under which petitioner was tried and sentenced denied 
petitioner his right to notice in the charging doculnent of the aggravating circumstances which 
would make bin1 eligible to be sentenced to death. United States Constitutio~i, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth hendments ;  Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1, 8, and 13, ldaho Code 19- 
1 02; Ring v. Arizotla, supra; Jones v. Ui;t~ted States, 526 U.S. 227 ( 1999). 
3. The death penalty statute under which petitioner was tried and sentenced to death 
deprived petitioner of his right under Idaho law and the Idaho Constitution of a preliminary 
exmiination on the existence of aggravating circumstances which would make petitioner eligible 
for the death penalty, denial of which violates the due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States; Idaho Constitution Article I, Sections 1, 7, 13, 18; ldabo Code 
19-1308; Hzcb v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S.343 (1980). 
4. The death penalty statute under which petitioner was tried and sentenced denied 
petitioner his right to have a jury determine his sentence. United States Constitution, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, Idaho Constitution, Article I, Sections 1, 6, 7 and 13, Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. at --, 122 S .Ct. at 2446 (Breyer J., colzcurring in the judgtnent); Furmun v. Ceorgzu, 
408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
5. A jury did not determine whether Petitioner acted with requisite mens rea as required 
under E~ztnund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 477 (1981), in violation of Petitioner's rights under the Sixth, 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RhL.IEF AND/OR WRIT 01. HABEAS COKPUS; 
MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCES, 
VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH, AND FOR NEW sENTEhClNG TRIAL - 7 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Anlendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1, 
7, 13, and 18 of the Idaho Constitution. 
6. The death penalty statute under which petitioner was tried and sentenced denied 
petitioner his right to have the factual question whether all of the mitigating circumstances 
outweighed each of the aggravating circumstances. United States Constitution, Fifth, Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, Idaho Constitution, Article I, sections 1, 7, 13, and 18, Ring v. Arzzor~a, 
supra; State v. Charhsneau, 1 16 Idaho 129, 773 P.2d 293 (1989). 
7. The 11 years under which petitioner has been confined under a sentence of death 
obtained through an unconstitutional process despite petitioner cosnplaining at the trial, direct 
appeal and habeas stages of the unconstitutionality of the sentencing scheme used to secure his 
death sentence has subjected petitioner to cruel and unusual punishment under both the federal 
and Idaho state constitutions. United States Constitution, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; 
Idaho Constitution, Article I, sections 1, 6, 13, and 18; State v. Faiiz, 116 Idaho 82, 113, 774 
P.2d 242, 283 (1989) (Bistline, J ,  corzcurrzng and dissenting); State v. Osborrz, 104 Idaho 
809,82 I, 663 P.2d 1 1 l 1, 1 123 (1 983) Bistline, J., concurrirzg and dissenting.) 
8. To execute petitioner despite the clear unconstitutionality of the procedures by which 
his death sentence was imposed, despite the fact that he made timely objection to those 
procedures, and despite the fact that most or all other similarly situated and tried capital 
defendants in Idaho will not be put to death without being afforded those constitutional 
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protections, would constitute a gross and unjustifiable denial of the equal protection of ihe law 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth h e n d m e n t  to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, 
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and the arbitrary imposition of death in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the Uslited States and Article I, Section 6 or the Idaho 
Constitution. firnturt v. C;eoug~u, 408 U.S .  238 (1972); DougEus v. Cui@vtzzu, 372 U.S. 353, 
357 ( I  963); S ~ l z ~ t h  v. Beaneft, 365 U.S. 708,7 13-14 (1 961). 
This Petition and Motions are based on the files and records of the State o f h l z o  v. Zane 
Jack Fields, Ada County Case No. 16259, and the prior post-conviction proceedings held 
thereon, judicial notice of which is requested, the Verification of Petitioner herein below and the 
Affidavit of Counsel filed in Support hereof. 
Wherelbre, Petitioner seeks from this Court: 
1. An order vacating petitioner's sentences of death and setting the same for re- 
sentencing with instructions that death may not be imposed; and 
2. Any and all other relief which the court deems necessary in the interests of justice. 
DATED this 1 " day of August, 2002. 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTIO~\~ RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 
M O T I O ~  TO CORRECT ILI-ECAI, SEYTENCES, 
VAChTh SENTENCES OF DEATH, AYD FOR &EW SENTENCIYC TR14L - 9 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Ada 1 
Zane Jack Fields, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and says as follows: 
That he is the Petitioner in the above-entitled action; that he has read the above and 
foregoing Petition For Post-Conviction Relief andor Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to 
Concct Illegal Sentence, Vacate Sentence of Death and for New Sentencing Trial, that he knows 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this b d a y  of August, 2002. 
State of Idaho, residing at 
, therein. 
PLTITION FOR POST-CO~VICTIO"~ K ~ X I E F  AF~D/OR URI F 01. IIABEAS CORPUS; 
M O T I O ~  TO CORRECT 11 LEGAL SENTENCES, 
VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATR, AhD FOR ?JDU SENTEM I ~ G T I U A L  - 10 
EXHIBIT #I 
INFO ATION 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Room 103 Courthouse 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAICO, 1 




ZANE JACK FIELDS, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
GREG H. BOWER, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, who in the name and by the 
authority of the State, prosecutes in its behalf, comes now into 
District Court of the County of Ada, and states that Zane Jack 
Fields is/are accused by this Information of the crime(s) of: 
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, FELONY, I.C. 18-4001, 02, 03(d) which 
crime(s) was committed as follows: 
That the defendant, ZANE JACK FIELDS, on or about 11th day 
of February, 1988, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did, 
INFORMATION, Filed Aug. 4 ,  1 9 8 9  
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w i l l f u l l y ,  un l awfu l ly ,  and wi th  mal ice  a fo re though t ,  k i l l  Mary 
C a t h e r i n e  Vanderford,  a human be ing ,  by s t a b b i n g  h e r  i n  t h e  neck,  
c h e s t ,  and back from which she  d i e d  on February 11, 1988,  which 
murder was committed i n  t h e  p e r p r e t a t i o n  of a robbery  and/or  
b u r g l a r y .  
A 1 1  of which is c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  form, f o r c e  and e f f e c t  of 
t h e  s t a t u t e  i n  such c a s e  and a g a i n s t  t h e  peace and d i g n i t y  of t h e  
S t a t e  of Idaho.  
Ada Cou t y  P rosecu t ing  At torney  / 
INFORMATION, - 
EXHIBIT #2 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN 
CONSIDERING THE DEATH 
PENALTY UNDER SECTION 
19-2515, IDAHO CODE 
MAR 0 7 1991 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT GF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
3 THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
1 1  THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 
Defendant. 
J Case No. 16259 
) 
) FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN 
) CONSIDERING DEATH PENALTY I 
) UNDER SECTION 19-2515, I 
) IDAHO CODE. 
) 
I 
The above-named defendant having been found guilty by a jury 
of the criminal offense of Murder in the First Degree which under 
! 
law authorizes imposition of the death penalty; and the court 1 
having ordered a presentence investigation of the defendant and 
thereafter held a sentencing hearing for the purpose of hearing I 
16 / all relevant evidence and argument of counsel in aggravation and i 
17 / mitigation of the offense. 
NOW THEREFORE the court makes the following findings: 
1 I 
19 ' ;  1. Conviction. The defendant while represented by counsel 
was found guilty of the offense of Murder in the First Degree by 
j ury verdict. 
22 I 2. Presentence Report. A presentence report was prepared by 
23 . ,  order of the court and a copy delivered to the defendant or his 
! 
24 counsel at least seven (7) days prior to the sentencing hearing 
pursuant to section 19-2515, Idaho Code, and the Idaho Criminal 
Filed Mar. 7, 1991 
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Rules. The defendant objected to portions of the presentence 
report, and the court has ruled on those objections in a separate 
memorandum. The court has excised those portions of the report to 
which an objection was sustained, 
3, Sentencing Hearing. A sentencing hearing was held on 
January 14, 1991, pursuant to notice to counsel for the defendant; 
and that at the hearing, in the presence of the defendant, the 
court heard the arguments of counsel, Evidence was not submitted 
by either the prosecutor or the defendant, but each had previously 
submitted sentencing memoranda. 
4. Facts Found in Mitigation. The mitigating factors that 
appear to the court are as follows: 
The defendant was abandoned by his father when he was two 
years old. 
Apparently he was oppressed by a dominant female figure early 
in life which has contributed to the aggressive attitude he has 
displayed toward women. 
There is some indication that he suffered childhood 
convulsions and that he reacted poorly under stress. 
The defendant has relative low intelligence. As a teenager 
he was evaluated in the area of borderline retardation. However, 
he has completed a GED program. 
The defendant has been a drug and alcohol abuser for many 
years, commencing at an early age. As a teenager he indicated 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN - 
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that he used "all kinds of alcohol" and "as much as possible, The : 
use of alcohol and drugs has impaired his ability to conform his 
conduct to legal and social standards. I I 
i 
As an inmate in the penal system he has been able to conform ; 
his conduct institutional standards for substantial periods 
time. A Department of Corrections report dated June 6, 1981, 
indicates that he volunteered to help and seemed willing to work. 
I 
A progress report dated September 1, 1981, indicates that he was 
1 
I 
"manageable within the protective custody unit at the ISMF, having 
I 
received no disciplinary reports and generally receiving above 0 I 
average on his work evaluations." A report November 11, 1984, 
indicates that he completed a high school course in the 
penitentiary. On January 20, 1986, he was evaluated as a good 
worker and on August 6, 1986, he was noted to be polite to staff, i 
friendly with other inmates and generally to follow the rules. 
5. Statutory Aggravating Circumstance Considered But Not i 
Found Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. Idaho Code § 19-2515(q)(5). The 
state seeks a determination that the aggravating circumstance set 
forth in Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(5) exists, asserting that, "The 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting 
exceptional depravity." In ordinary language it might appear that 
this killing falls within those words. The victim was a 69 year 
old woman who was stabbed numerous times and left to die by a 
large, young man. However,'to find this aggravating circumstance 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN - 
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1 1  - "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily 
1 
tortuous to the victim." Clearly this crime was conscienceless , I 
the court must find that the killing was accompanied by additional 
acts which set the crime apart. from the norm of capital felonies - 
5 ( /  and pitiless to the victim. However, the court cannot find beyond ' 
6 / I  a reasonable doubt that it was more tortuous than other killings. 1 
I 
i 7 1 The killing was not accomplished with surgical precision. It was 1 
I 
I 
8 ( 1  cruel, as virtually all murders are, but the victim was not 
I i 6. Statutory Aggravating Circumstances Found Beyond a I i as 
9 
10 
Reasonable Doubt. I ~ - r  
a. Idaho Code 5 19-2515(q) ( 6 1 .  The state seeks a determination j 
I 
tortured or put to pain beyond the infliction of the wounds, one 
CI3 
of which was fatal. I 0  
that the aggravating circumstance set forth in Idaho Code 5 19- 1 
2515(g)(6) exists in that, "By the murder, or circupstances 
I 
I / I  surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter 1 
disregard for human life." This element requires a showing of 1 : 
acts or circumstances "which exhibit the highest, the utmost, 
I I callous disregard for human life, i.e. the cold-blooded, pitiless 1 1  slayer." This aggravating circumstance has been proved beyond a 
/ I  reasonable doubt. The defendant stabbed a 69 year old woman 
i I 
multiple times. She posed no physical threat to him. He left her 
I I 
I /  to die. He stabbed her to complete a small value property crime 
1 1  1 1  or to avoid detection for that crime. In any use of language, he 
/ I 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN - 
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1 
2 
2515(g)(7) has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt in that the 
displayed utter disregard for hman life which was callous, cold- 
blooded, pitiless. 
3 1 
6 / murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery and/or I 1 
b. . The state seeks a determination 
l l  burglary and was accompanied by an intent to cause death. The 
that the aggravating circumstances set forth in Idaho Code § 19- 
jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder, that is, murder 
committed in the perpetration of a robbery and/or a burglary. In 
this case the court gave a more restrictive instruction on the 
element of intent than may be necessary for felony murder, 
instructing the jury on the elements of malice aforethought. 
l 3  I /  Express malice involves an intention to kill. Implied malice 
j4  I /  involves conduct with a wanton disregard for human life. To be a 
I /  statutory aggravating circumstance under I.C. § 19-2515(g)(7) the 
/ I  court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was 
I /  specific intent to cause death has been established beyond a 
17 
18 
20 / I  reasonable doubt. 
with a specific intent to cause death, not the wanton disregard I 
i 
for human life of implied malice. The element of a killing with a 
21 I /  The state relies upon the number and savagery of the wounds 
22 l l  as evidence of an intention to kill. It is powerful evidence of 
23 1 1  that intention, but by itself is also consistent with a wanton 
24 1 1  disregard far human life. However, additional facts support the 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN - 
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i i  
finding that the wounds were inflicted with an intention to kill. 
2 1 If the defendant had merely sought escape when confronted by Mrs. 
3 Vanderford, he could have overpowered her easily without the 
l l  infliction of a lethal wound. The only reason to use a knife was 
I 
to silence her forever. As Scott Bianchi testified, echoing the i 
defendant's words, he, the defendant, needed "to finish the job. " I 
I 
I !  
i 
The fact that she was still alive when he left does not weigh 
I 
8 significantly against the finding that he intended to kill her. : 
9 
10 
2515(g)(8) exists in that, "The defendant, by prior conduct or I 
i 
I 1 The number and extent of the wounds would have left no reasonable w 
doubt as to the outcome. We intended to "finish the job" - to I 0  I 
12 
13 




kill her - and he did. / 
i I CI 
/ c. Idaho Code 19-2515(q)(8). The state seeks a determination rr;E 
i 00 
that the aggravating circumstance set forth in Idaho Code 5 19- I I 
propensity to commit murder which will constitute a continuing 1 
I 
I 
threat to society." ! 
18 1 1  A 1974 report by Ira Nadler a psychiatrist at State Hospital 
19 / South has a chilling forecast of this case, noting of Zane Fields I 
I I 
20 ' 1  that, "He also denies any actual rape of people and denies ever i I 
21 1 having used a knife in order to commit assault on a lady." The 
1 ! 
22 l j  report continues to state the following: "He does not show any 
I I 
23 appropriate concern about the acts he has committed and does not 
I i 
24 1 '  look at all upset about the accusation of having raped a three 
I 
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year old." Dr. Nadler diagnosed him as antisocial personality, 
borderline mental retardation. 
The clinical record from State Hospital South in 1975 notes 
another instance of inappropriate sexual behavior that required 
his removal from the facility for the safety of other patients. 
The presentence report dated December 12, 1976, for his first 
adult felony notes the following: 
"The subject's commitment to the Youth 
Training Center in St. Anthony, Idaho, began 
in 1972. This commitment occurred when the 
subject violated curfew and made threatening 
gestures with a knife toward a girl. During 
that same year, the subject was granted an 
extended leave to Idaho Falls. June 14, 1973, 
Zane was returned to the Youth Training Center 
after being charged with assaulting a woman in 
an Idaho Falls laundromat. According to YTC 
records, this charge was subsequently dropped. 
In June of 1974, another incident involving 
attempted rape reportedly occurred in a park 
in the area. 
The presentence investigator noted in the 1976 report that, 
I "The subject's behavioral problems were not altered significantly , 
by either hospitalization or commitment to the Youth Training 
Center. Zane's performance under probation as a juvenile was 
poor. '' 
Clinical records from State Hospital South in Blackfoot from 
January, 1975, reveal the following comments from Richard Grow, 
Ed. D., Psychologist 111: 
"Zane has not internalized the values and norms of our 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN - 
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I 
! 
society. He is impulsive and has a low frustration i 
tolerance. He is prone to be suspicious of others and I 
tends to blame others for his mistakes. He seems unable 1 
to learn from experience and, thus, modify his behavior. I I 
Finally, I deeply fear that Zane is incapable of 
significant loyalty and tends to perceive people as 
objects. His views of sexuality are distorted, and he 
has felt downtrodden by some important female sexual 1 




While he is not actively psychotic, there are hints of a 1 
thought disorder which will increase in proportions in time. I I 
In a psychiatric sense, there is nothing about Zane that I 
should excuse him from criminal responsibility for his I I 
behavior. In my judgment this is not the last that the I 
criminal justice system will hear from this individual, i 
and he will be a habitual offender of a progressive 





In 1978 Fred Kirn, a psychologist at the Idaho Security 
Medical Facility, reported as follows: "In summary unless Mr. 
Fields changes, his present thought patterns and decreases his 






17 1 1  forgery while on bond for delivery of marijuana. By August, 1982, 1 
alcoholic consumption there is a strong likelihood that he will 
continue to act out criminally, violently and ~exually.~~ 
18 1 Mr. Fields developed a plan to become a private detective, but 
/ I 
I 
I according to the progress report of August 5, 1982, had made 
I 
! little progress towards rehabilitation. 
1 The 120 day jurisdiction evaluation dated September 21, 1983, 
I 
22 I noted that Mr. Fields was free of disciplinary violations, but the i 1 
23 l l  social workers rated him as a poor candidate for successful 
24 completion of probation. The concerns were accurate. On April 
/ 1 
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10, 1984, he was declared a probation violator. 
In general the defendant has not been a discipline problem in 
the penitentiary, but he has consistently violated laws when 
released. The following is a s m a r y  o f  the defendant's criminal 
record: 1) a 1976 conviction for grand larceny, resulting in a 
five year commitment with a 120 day retained jurisdiction; 2) a 
1977 conviction from Bonneville County for unlawful possession of 
controlled substance, resulting in a suspended sentence and 
probation; 3 )  a 1977 probation violation in Bonneville County, 
resulting in revocation of probation and commitment to the Idaho 
6 3  
C 
State Correctional Institution for the indeterminate three year 
period that was previously suspended; 4) a 1980 misdemeanor CI 
Go 
conviction in Bonneville County for petit theft, resulting in a ' W  
$60.00 fine, plus a jail sentence; 5) two felony convictions in j 
I Bonneville County in 1980 for forgery and delivery of a controlled 
I 
substance resulting in indeterminate five year sentences to the 
Idaho State Correctional Institution. Additionally, at that time 
there was a probation violation; 6) a 1984 felony conviction for 
second degree burglary, accompanied by a probation violation for 
the burglary, resulting in concurrent sentences to the Idaho State 
Correctional Institution for terms not to exceed five years; 7) a 
1986 felony conviction in Bannock County for grand larceny, 
resulting in a jail sentence; 8) a 1987 conviction in Ada County 
(Boise) for pedestrian under the influence, resulting in a fine 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN - 
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and costs; 1988 felony conviction in Ada County for 
2 
I 
aggravated assault, resulting in a sentence of five years to the 
Idaho State Correctional Institution and at the same time a 
misdemeanor conviction for petit theft, resulting in a 127 day 
5 
6 
lo  / I  I found to have committed shoplifting, "car prowl," and auto theft. i O 
jail sentence. The aggravated assault and the petit theft 




In addition to the adult criminal record, the defendant's 
juvenile record began in 1968 with a finding under the Youth 










A dichotomy exists in this case. The record establishes , , 
I t i 
21 : beyond a reasonable doubt that in free society the defendant has 1 
I 
I 
In 1972 he committed assault. In 1973 he was charged with assault / 
' w  
counselling, was committed to the Youth Training Center, to a 
Harbor House and to the Idaho Youth Ranch. He also was in State 
Hospital South in Blackfoot on two occasions. 
18 
l 9  
22 
I 
exhibited a propensity to commit crimes which will constitute a 
with intent to commit rape. In 1974 another incident involving 
assault with intent to commit rape occurred. As a juvenile he was 
1 Sworn testimony from pre-trial proceedings in this case 
I 
1 
indicates that he is volatile and threatening. ! 
I 
continuing threat to society. He views people as objects. He is 1 
t.r 
00 
24 fascinated with weapons, particularly knives. 
placed on probation, was ordered to undergo psychological I 
In commission of 
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' the murder at hand he killed when his property crime was detected. ' l i  1 
I 
In free society he would constitute a continuing threat to kill ! 
1 
1 




I when others interfere with his desires, as occurred in this case. 
On the other hand much of the defendant's institutional I , 
El I /  harmful acts he will not commit harmful acts. However, the court 
6 
7 
institutionalization would take away the continuing threat, 
Obviously if one is isolated from the opportunity to commit 
l 1  I /  if the opportunity arose. The fact that, hypothetically the 
9 
10 
l2 / I  defendant can be prevented from committing acts by isolation does / i 00 
is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that if frustration or 1 
aggravation confronted the defendant in confinement he would kill 0 I 
13 1 not mean he does not constitute a continuing threat to society to 1 W 
14 / /  commit murder if the occasion arises. 1 




' I I 18 7 .  Additional Fact in Aggravation. Eleven days after 
The aggravating factor of a propensity to commit murder which 
will be a continuing threat to society has been proved beyond a 
19 murdering Mrs. Vanderford the defendant committed a petit theft at 
20 Shopko in Boise, Idaho. When an attempt to apprehend him occurred 
I 
2 1 he drew a handgun on store personnel, resulting in a conviction 
I 
22 following jury trial for aggravated assault and petit theft. The 
23 murder and the aggravated assault occurred within approximately 
24 two months of his release from the penitentiary. The fact that he i 
25 FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN - 
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26 
committing another theft, carrying a weapon and threatening use of 1 
I 
I1 the weapon. The number of witnesses present eliminated the 
I1 practicality of killing to avoid detection. 
I1 circumstance, but the reference to "prior c o n d u ~ t ~ ~  precludes its 
5 
6 
8 1 consideration under that statutory provision, since it occurred 1 
This is a factor that would logically seem to fall within the 
consideration of I.G. S 19-2515(g)(8) as an aggravating 
g 1 subsequent to the murder. Therefore, the court sets it forth I w 
i C3 
l a  1 1  separately as a factor considered in understanding the defendant. / 
11 / /  Imposition of the death penalty upon this circumstance would not 
12 1 be proper. 
l3  / I  8. Weighing the Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in 
I Determining the Penalty. The court is required to weigh a11 





i i  defendant's life, but the cumulative effect of all mitigating 20 1 ,  
I '  
i 
mitigating factors against each aggravating circumstance. 
The aggravating circumstance in I.C. 2515(g)(6) that, !!By the 
murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant 
I 
exhibited utter disregard for human life" outweighs all mitigating / 
I 
21 i l  factors pales in the face of the aggravating circumstance of utter 
I I I 
I '  disregard for Mrs. Vanderford's life. The mitigating factors do 1 22 1 1  I I I 
23 1 not outweigh the aggravating circumstance and do not make I1 
I 
i 
24 1 1  imposition of death unjust. 




Siniilarly the mitigating factors do not outweigh or balance I 
the aggravating circumstance in I.C. D 19-2515(g)(7) that in the 1 
cnmission of felony murder the defendant had a specific intent to 
I I 
, kill. The cumulative mitigating circumstances are insubstantial I 
I 
I 
5 in comparison to the magnitude of the act of intending to kill in 
I 
6 I ,  the commission of a felony. Again, the mitigating factors do not 
I 
I /  
7 , outweigh the aggravating circumstance and do not make imposition 
I 
8 of death unjust. 
I 
The cumulative effect of the mitigating circumstances does I 
10 not outweigh the propensity to commit murder as a continuing I O 
14 : the defendant are insubstantial in comparison to the danger he 
I 
11 j threat to society so as to make imposition of death unjust. There 
12 have been some sad events in the defendant's life and a limited / I 
I I 









13 number of positive factors. The limited positive traits shown by , U1 
9. The Factor of Guilt. A jury has found the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That finding was based in 
significant part on inmate testimony implicating the defendant. 
Before considering imposition of a death penalty the court feels a 
legal and moral obligation to test whether there is sufficient 
certainty in the evidence to dictate that a person die when inmate 
testimony constitutes a substantial part of the evidence leading 
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to the conviction. If the court harbors doubts about imposing a 
death penalty based on the inmate testimony, apart from any other 
weighing process, individual conscience would dictate against the 
imposition of death. The only barrier that might stand between / 
the defendant and the ultimate criminal penalty is if the quality 
of evidence were such that the death penalty would be too final 
in light of that evidence. There is no such barrier. No doubts 
of conscience shield the defendant. It is the court's conclusion 
- 
that the appropriate penalty is death. 
25 1 1  FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN - 
I 1  
CONSIDERING DEATH PEXALTY 
26 : I  
1 I 
/ 1 
' District Judge 
EXHIBIT #3 
JURY INSTRUCTION N0.23 
-*%*, 
&$&y .., %",yX* ,v ,@ ., 
INSTRUCTION NO. % 3 - 
It .is not within your province to concern yourselves with 
the question of penalty or punishment. That feature of the case 
is solely for the Court. Therefore, I instruct you not to 
concern yourselves with it at all. Your duty as jurors is solely 
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and upon that 
question and that question alone you, as jurors, are to vote and 
return your verdict. 






JOAN r\%. FISHER 
ldsbo State Bar 2854 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
201 N. Main 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-01 80 
IN THE DLSTIUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) 

















ZANE JACK FIELDS, 1 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF' 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF OR WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS 
Case No. 16259 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE, TO VACATE 
SENTENCE OF DEATH AND FOR 
NEW SENTENCING TIUAL 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Latah 1 
I, Joan M. Fisher, counsel for the Petitioner, a person over eighteen years of age and 
competent to testify, and mindful of the penalties of perjury, and in compliance with Idaho Code 
$19-27 19(5)(a) say and declare as follows: 
AFFLDAF IT tN SUPPORT OF PETITIOIh FOR POST-CONVICTION RELEI& OR \* RIT OE HABEAS COKPUS, 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPOR1 OF MOTION TO CORKECT ILLEGAL SEnlTEhCE, TO VACATE SENTEhCE OF DLATII, iLniD FOR YE% SLN 1 ENCING TIUAL 1 
1 .  I an1 and have been the courl-appointed counsel for Petitioner sirzce 1996 and as such am 
fully fmiliar with the facts and circumstances surrounding Petitioner's conviction a11d 
sentence which are challenged herein. 
2. That I an fmiliar with the record of the case and law surrounding the issues raised 
herein. 
3. The doeumcnts attached to the Petition are true and correct copies of the original 
documents filed in the underlying conviction, &ate of I~iaho vs. Zuiw Jack Fields. Ada 
County Case No. 16259. 
4. The facts raised in the Petition for Post-conviction Relief, and Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence and For New Sentencing are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
DATED this of August, 2002. 
efore me this I day of August, 2002. 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada Cotmty Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar #2127 
200 Mr. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) 
Petitioner, 
VS. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
Respondent. 
Case No. SPOT020071 1D 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF, MOTION 
TO CORRECT ILLEGAL 
SENTENCES, TO VACATE 
SENTENCES OF DEATH AND 
FOR NEW SENTENCING TRIAL 
AND STATE'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for 
the County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the State's Response to the 
above-described motion for new sentencing. 
This defendant should not be resentenced. The U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion in R i n ~  v. Arizona does not apply retroactively for the reasons set out 
below. Additionally, even if the Ring holding were to be applied, the jury that 
found FIELDS guilty of First Degree Murder also found the statutory 
aggravating circumstance that Judge Schroeder relied on in sentencing the 
defendant t o  death. Both issues will be discussed below. 
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parts, or appendages may not by themselves constitute deadly weapons under 
the aggravated assault and aggravated battery statutes.)) 
In his dissent from the Ring decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated 
his belief that many death row inmates would challenge their convictions 
based on the decision. He stated: 
'? believe many of these challenges will ultimately be 
unsuccessful, either because the prisoners will be unable to 
satisfy the standards of harmless error or plain error review, or 
because, having completed their direct appeals, they will be 
barred from taking advantage of today's holding on federal 
collateral review. See 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(2)(A), 2254(d)(1); 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 
(1989). 
The Teague case clearly holds that new rules announced by the 
Supreme Court do not apply retroactively to defendants whose conviction is 
final in state court and who is only collaterally attacking the conviction in 
federal court. Fields' conviction in state court was final in 1995. State v. 
Fields, 127 Idaho 904 (1995). The denial of Fields'successive petition for post 
conviction relief was affirmed in Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286 (S. Ct. 2000). 
The Ring holding is a new rule that does not apply to Fields. 
I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(c) also expressly prohibits successive post-conviction 
petitions seeking the retroactive application of new rules of law. Fields' 
successive post-conviction petition must be dismissed. 
Jurv Found The Statutory Aggravator 
The defendant was convicted of First Degree Murder for the killing of 
Mary Catherine Vanderford by stabbing her in the neck, chest and back from 
which she died, on February 11, 1988. It was charged that the murder was 
done willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought, and was committed 
in the perpetration of a robbery andlor burglary. 
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The jury was instructed on the elements of the crime of murder. 
Instruction #13, which is attached to this response, was given to the jury. 
Instruction #13 told the jury that the crime of murder required the jury to 
find an unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. The jury 
was given the definition of malice as follows in Jury Instruction #13, which is 
attached: 
The crime of murder is the unlawful killing of a human being 
with malice aforethought. Malice is express where the evidence 
manifests or shows an  unlawful and deliberate intent to take 
away the life of a human being without just cause or excuse. 
Malice is implied if the evidence shows no considerable 
provocation for the killing. Malice is also implied where 
the evidence or circumstances surrounding the killing shows 
the presence of an  abandoned and malignant heart, which 
means a condition of heart and mind which has no regard 
for social or moral obligation. 
Thus, malice is implied when the evidence shows that a 
killing resulted for any act andfor acts involving a high degree of 
probability that death would result, when such act andlor acts 
have been committed for a base, anti-social purpose, and with a 
wanton disregard for human life. 
The jury was instructed that to find the defendant guilty of murder, 
they must find that the defendant either had the specific intent to cause 
death or that the defendant's conduct showed a wanton disregard for human 
life. The jury found the defendant; guilty of First Degree Murder for the 
killing of Catherine Vanderford during the commission of a robbery or 
burglary and was done with malice. That combination satisfied Idaho Code 
§19-2515(g)(7). That being that the murder was committed during the 
perpetration of an enumerated felony and was done with an intent to kill. 
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Idaho Code 8 19-2515(~)(7) 
"The murder was one defined as  murder of the first degree by 
section 18-4003, Idaho Code, subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), or (0, 
and it was accompanied with the specific intent to cause the 
death of a human being." 
Idaho Code $18-4003(d) was then as  follows: 
"Any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or 
mayhem is murder of the first degree." 
As Judge, now Justice, Schroeder stated in his Findings of the Court in 
Considering Death Penalty under Section 19-2515, Idaho Code, the jury was 
thoroughly instructed on the element of intent to kill as  an element of 
murder. Justice Schroeder stated the following: 
b. Idaho Code Section 19-2515(g)(7). The State seeks a 
determination that the aggravating circumstances set forth 
in I.C. § 19-2515(~)(7) has been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt in that the murder was committed in the perpetration 
of a robbery and/or burglary and was accompanied by an 
intent to cause death. The jury found the defendant guilty of 
felony murder, that is, murder committed in the perpetration 
of a robbery and/or burglary. In this case, the court gave 
a more restrictive instruction on the element of intent that may 
be necessary for felony murder, instructing the jury on the 
elements of malice aforethought. Express malice involves 
an intention to kill. Implied malice involves conduct with a 
wanton disregard for human life. 
To be a statutory aggravating circumstance under I.C. $19- 
2515(~)(7), the court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the killing was with a specific intent to cause death, not the 
wanton disregard for human life of implied malice. The element 
of a killing with a specific ntent to cause death has been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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The State relies upon the number and savagery of the 
wounds as evidence of an intention to kill. It is powerful 
evidence of that intention, but by itself is also consistent 
with the wanton disregard for human life. However, additional 
facts support the finding that the wounds were inflicted with 
an. intention to kill. If the defendant had merely sought escape 
when confronted by Mrs. Vanderford, he could have overpowered 
her easily without the infliction of a lethal wound. The only 
reason he used a knife was to silence her forever. As Scott 
Beianchi testified, echoing the defendant's words, he, the 
defendant, needed '%o finish the job." The fact that she was 
still alive when he left is not weighed significantly against the 
finding that he intended to kill her. The number and extent of 
the wounds would have left no reasonable doubt as to the 
outcome. I-Ie intended to "finish the job" - to kill her - and he did. 
Judge Schroeder left no doubt that in his view the jury found that the 
murder was done with malice and occurred during the perpetration of a 
robbery or burglary. Express malice is the specific intent to kill. Implied 
malice is the intent t o  kill as shown by a wanton disregard for human life. 
While the jury wasn't given a specific interrogatory as to which type of malice 
they found, the evidence certainly supports a specific intent to kill. In other 
words, Judge Schroeder relied upon the same evidence that the jury found as 
supporting the aggravating circumstance. That is all that R i n ~  v. Arizona 
requires. 
Justice Scalia stated the following in his concurrence in the Ring case: 
While I am, as always, pleased to travel in Justice Breyer's 
company, the unfortunate fact is that today's judgment has 
nothing to do with jury sentencing. What today's decision 
says is that the jury must find the existence of the fact that 
an aggravating factor existed. Those states that leave the 
ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue 
to do s e b y  requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating . 
factor in the sentencing phase, or more simply, by placing 
the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically 
belongs anyway) in the guilt phase. 
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Harmless Error 
The defendant Ring had been charged with and convicted of shooting 
the driver of an armored car and then stealing the money from the car. The 
State evidently argued that the agpavating factor of murder for pecuniary 
gain was implicit in the jury's guilty verdict and as such was a jury finding of 
a statutory aggravating circumstance. The State apparently argued that 
sentencing by the court with those facts was harmless error. The Supreme 
Court made this notation in footnote 7. 
We do not reach the State's assertion that any error was 
harmless because a pecuniary gain finding was implicit 
in the jury's guilty verdict. See Neder v. United States, 
227 US 1, 144 L. Ed 2d 35, 119 Sp. Ct. 1827 (1999) 
(This court ordinarily leaves it to lower courts to pass on 
the harmlessness of error in the first instance). 
The petitioner has argued that it was error for Judge Schroeder to 
make the finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of a statutory 
aggravating factor supporting the death penalty for the petitioner. The 
State's view is that the jury did find the statutory aggravator as described by 
Judge Schroeder. However, at most, this is error subject to a harmless error 
analysis. 
In the Neder case, supra, the facts were that the District Court had 
failed to properly instruct the jury on "the materiality" element of the crime of 
tax evasion. The government did not dispute that the District Court erred in 
deciding the materiality element itself rather than submitting the issue to the 
jury. The court stated the following at p. 1833: 
We have recognized that "most constitutional errors can 
be harmless." Fulminante, supra, at 306, 111 Sup. Ct. 
1246." If the defendant had counsel and was tried by an 
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that 
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any other constitutional errors that may have occurred 
are subject to harmless error analysis." Rase v. Clark, 
487 US 570,579, 106 Sup. Ct. 3101,922 L.Ed 2d 460 (1986). 
Indeed, we have found an error to be "structural," and thus 
subject to automatic reversal, only in an "very limited class 
of cases." 
The Supreme Court went on to list certain structural defects that were 
subject to automatic reversal. The list was as follows, a complete denial of 
counsel; biased trial judge; racial discrimination in selection of grand jury; 
denial of self-representation at trial; denial of public trial; defective 
reasonable doubt instruction. 
The Supreme Court then went on to state the following about the jury 
instruction in Neder at p. 1833: 
The error at issue here-a jury instruction that omits 
an element of the offense-differs markedly from 
the constitutional violations we have found to defy 
harmless error review. Those cases, we have explained, 
contain a "defect affecting the frame work within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in 
the trial process itself." 
Fulminante, supra, at 3 10, 11 1 Sup. Ct. 1246. Such errors "infect 
the entire trial process," Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 630, 
113 Sup. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (19931, and "necessarily 
render a trial fundamentally unfair," Rose, 478 US, at 577, 106 
Sup. Ct. 3 101. Put another way, these errors deprive defendants 
of "basic protections" without which "a criminal trial cannot 
reliable serve its function as a vehicle for determination of 
guilt or innocence.. .and no criminal punishment may be 
regarded as fundamentally fair." Id., at 577-578, 106 Sup. 
Ct. 3101. 
The Court went on to hold that this omission in a jury instruction was 
subject to a harmless error analysis and was in fact harmless error because 
the evidence of the existence of materiality was overwhelming. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Riag holding is not retroactive. Nonetheless, the facts supported a 
finding of express malice. As Judge Schroeder pointed out, the evidence left 
no reasonable doubt of the intended outcome. At most, the sentencing 
procedure was harmless error. 
For the reasons stated above, The Defendant's Motion for Resente~~cing 
and Post-Conviction Relief should be denied. The State moves for dismissal. 
\a 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9 day of August, 2002. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be me t h i s L g  day o 02. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERmCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this =day of August, 2002, I served a 
true and correct copy of the furegoing ANSWER TO PETITION FOR POST- 
CTION BELIEF to Joan M. Fisher, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal 
Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho, 201 N. Main, Moscow ID 83843, 
the following person(s) by depositing in t 
x_- 
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CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
Federal Defenders of 
Eastern Washington and Idaho 
Joan M. Fisher, ID Bar ff2854 
201 North Main 
Moscow ID 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-081 0 
Facsimile: 208-883-1472 
SEP 0 6 a02 
IN THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) 
) CASE NO. SP OT 0200711D 
Petitioner, ) 
1 
VS. ) NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE 
1 OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) MEMOMNDUM, AND 
) =QUEST FOR HEARING 
Respondent. ) 
PLEASE T A m  NOTICE that in this action, Mr. Zane Fields, Petitioner, intends to 
exercise his statutory and constitutional rights by filing an opposition to Respondent's State's 
Response to Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, Motion To Correct Illegal Sentences of Death 
and For New Sentencinp 'Trial and State's Motion to Dismiss, which was filed on or about 
August 30,2002, and a copy of which undersigned counsel first received today, September 5, 
2002. Additionally, Petitioner requests oral argument on the matters at issue. This Notice of 
1 is brought 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITlON AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 1 
pursuant to the Idaho Code $3 19-27 19(5) [Special Appellate and Postconviction Proceedings in 
Capital Gases], 19-4907(a) [Applicability of civil statutes and rules of procedure], Idaho 
Criminal Rule 57(b) [post conviction proceedings governed by Rules of Civil Procedwe] and 
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure [Motion for Summw Judgment and 
Proceedings thereon]. It is also brought p u r s w t  to Mr. Fields's right to due process as 
guarateed by the Idaho Constitution art. 1, $13, and the United States Constitution, amend. XIV. 
It is, as well, brought pursuant to Mr. Fields's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right against 
cruel and unusual punishment which mandates that greater safeguards be applied to capital than 
non-capital guilt-imocence and sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280,305 (1976) ("because death is qualitatively different from imprisoment, "there is 
a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment in a specific case"), and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,638 
(1 980)("To insure that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the basis of 'reason rather than 
caprice or emotion,' we have invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability 
of the sentencing determination. The same reasoning must apply to rules that diminish the 






NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSlTION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 2 
9- 
DATED this j$- day of September, 2002. 
NSPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
3c. I hereby certify that on t h e L  day of September, 2002,I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing docwent by h 
se$ to: 
Roger Bourne 
Ada GomQ Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
Federdl Defenders of 
Eastern Washington and Idaho 
Joan M. Fisher, ID Bar itt2854 
201 North Main 
Moscow ID 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-08 10 
Facsimile: 208-883 -1 472 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) /4w0 
) CASE NO. 16259 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
VS. 1 NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE 
) OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) MEMOMNDUM, AND 
) =QUEST FOR HEARING 
Defendant. ) 
PLEASE TAI(E NOTICE that in this action, Mr. Zane Fields, Defendant, intends to 
exercise his statutory and constitutional rights by filing an opposition to Plaintiffs State's 
Response to Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, Motion To Correct Illegal Sentences of Death 
and For New Sentencing Trial and State's Motion to Dismiss to the extent that that pleading is 
considered a response to Mr. Fields's Motions To Correct I l le~al  Sentences, To Vacate Sentences 
of Death and For New Sentencing Trial in the above captioned case. Notably, Plaintiff filed its 
State's Response in Case No. SP OT 020071 lD, not in the above-captioned case. Plaintiff filed 
NOTICE O F  INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 1 
its on or about August 30,2002, and undersigned counsel first received a copy 
today, September 5,2002. Additionally, Defendant requests oral argment on the matters at 
issue. This 
Wearing is brought pursuant to the Idaho Code $5 19-2719(5) [Special Appellate and 
Postconviction Proceedings in Capital Gases], 19-4907(a) [Applicability of civil statutes and 
rules of procedure], Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) [post conviction proceedings governed by Rules 
of Civil Procedure] and Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure [Motion for Sunlmary 
Judgment and Proceedings thereon]. It is also brought pursuant to Mr. Fields's right to due 
process as guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution art. 1, tj 13, and the United States Constitution, 
amend. XIV. It is, as well, brought pursuant to Mr. Fields's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
right against cruel and unusual punishment which mandates that greater safeguards be applied to 
capital than non-capital guilt-innocence and sentencing proceedings. See, s, Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976) ("because death is qualitatively different from 
imprisonment, "there is a conesponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination 
that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"), and Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625,638 (1980)("To insure that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the basis of 'reason 
rather than caprice or emotion,' we have invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the 
reliability of the sentencing determination. The same reasoning must apply to rules that diminish 
the reliability of the guilt determination."). 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 2 
DATED this kkY of September, 2002. 
ESPECTFULLYT SUBMITTED, 
I 
Attorney for Defendmt 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify t h a  on the k%ay o 
and correct copy of the foregoing docment by 
to: 
Greg Z-I. Bower 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITlON AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 4 
JOAN M. FISHER 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
201 N. Main 
Moscotv. ID 83833 
(208) 883-01 80 
Attorney for Petitioner Zane Fields 
IN THE DISTMCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE FIELDS, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
1 Case Nos. SPOT02-00711D 
) 
) PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN 
) OPPOSITION TO REQUEST TO 
1 SUMMARILY DISMISS OR IN THE 
1 ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
1 S U M m R Y  DISMISSAL 
1 
Petitioner Zane Jack Fields responds in opposition to Respondent's Response to Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief, Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Death and 
State's Motion to Dismiss ("State's Response"), and in support of Petitioner's claim for 
sentencing relief under Ring v. Arizo~a. Respondent contends that Fields should not be re- 
sentenced because Ring is not retroactive, Idaho Code section 19-27 19(5)(c) prohibits retroactive 
application of a new rule of law, the jury found the statutory aggravating circumstance in Fields' 
case, and even if the jury failed to find the statutory aggravating circumstance, the error is 
harmless. For the reasons set forth below Respondent's motion should be denied and Petitioner's 
petition should be granted. 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 1 
1. PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO TNAL BY JURY ON 
STATUTORY AGGUVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Xing v. Arizona clearly establishes that petitioner's death sentence is unconstitutional. 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. -, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (June 24,2002). In Ring, the Supreme Corn of 
the United States held that "[cjapital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants ... are 
entitled to a jury d e t e ~ n a t i o n  of my fact on whch the legislature conditions an increase in their 
maimurn punishment." 122 S. Ct. at 2432. In Ring, the Court held that the fundmental 
constitutional principle it had made clear thee  years earlier, in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 
227, 243 n.6 (1999), applies to capital cases. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2438-43. That constitutional 
principle is this: "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury 
tsial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the 
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6, quoted in, Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2438-39. 
The imedia te  effect of Ring v. Arizona, szdpra, has been "to invalidate the death penalty 
scheme in Idaho." State v. Fetterly, - Idaho -, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (Idaho August 6, 2002) 
(rehearing denied Aug. 22, 2002). As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Fetteulj~, Ring 
requires a jury to rnake "the factual findings of the aggravating factors necessary to the 
imposition of a death sentence." Id. 
Ring and Fetterly constitute a dramatic and unprecedented reversal of constitutional 
precedent, by the Supreme Court of the United States, and by the Idaho Supreme Court. Relying 
on now-overruled U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly 
rejected the federal constitutional argument that Ring accepted, and that Ring now requires this 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 2 
court to accept. The line of Idaho Supreme Court decisions ovemled by Ring and Fetterly 
traces back to State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900,904,674 P.2d 396,400 (1983), and State v. Creech, 
105 Idaho 362, 372-373,670 P.2d 463,474 (1983). That line of case law was most thoroughly 
s u m a ~ z e d  in an oft-cited passage in State v. Charboneuu, 1 16 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1 989): 
[The Appellant] asserts that the imposition of the death penalty with no pafiicipation by 
the jury in the sentencing process violates the sixth, eighth, and fourleenth miendments to 
the Gonstitudon of the United States. He also contends that the sentence was 
unconstitutional because he was denied a jury determination of the aggravating 
clrcmstances enumerated in I.C. $ 19-25 15(g). 
In 1983 this Court held "that here is no federal constitutional requirenient of jury 
parlicipation in the sentencing process and that the decision to have jury participation in 
the sentencing process, as contrasted with judicial discretion sentencing, is within the 
policy determination of the individual states." State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 373, 670 
P.2d 463,474 (1983) cert. den. 465 U.S. 105 1, 104 S.Ct. 1327,79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984). 
See also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900,902,674 P.2d 396,398 (1983) eert. den. 468 U.S. 
1220, 104 S.Ct. 3591, 82 L.Ed.2d 887 (1984); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 
1202 (1985) cert. den. 479 U.S. 870, 107 S.Ct 239,93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986). In 1984 the 
United States Supreme Court upheld death sentencing by trial judges. Spaziano v. 
Horidu, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154,82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). 
This Court has also held "that Art. 1, 5 7, of the Idaho Constitution does not require the 
participation of a jury in the sentencing process in a capital case." Sivak, 105 Idaho at 
904,674 P.2d at 400. See also State v. Fain, 1 16 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989). 
To accept [Appellant's] argument that the jury must be involved in determining whether 
aggravating circumstances exist, we would have to conclude that the aggravating 
circumstances listed in I.C. 5 19-2515(g) are elements of first degree murder. We are 
unable to reach that conclusion. The circumstances listed in the statute are clearly 
circumstances to be considered in sentencing and not elements of first degree 
murder. It is not unconstitutional for a judge, instead of a jury, to determine whether any 
of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute exist. 
Our opinion in this aspect of the case is not changed by the decision of the Ninth Circuit 
in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1 0 1 1 (9th Cir. 1 988). In Adamson the Ninth Circuit held 
Arizona's death penalty sentencing statutes to be in violation of the sixth amendment. 
During reargument of this case to determine what impact Adamson might have on our 
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opinion here, the solicitor general -For the state of Idaho acknowledged that there is no 
signif cant difference beween the h z o n a  death penalty sentencing statutes and those of 
Idaho. Nevertheless, we are not convinced that Adanzson cowectly states the requirements 
of the sixth mendment on this issue. 
Charboneau, 774 P.2d at 3 15-17 (emphasis added); see also State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,795- 
96,948 P.2d 127, 150-5 1 (19971, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1 126 (1 998); State v. Pizzuto, 1 19 Idaho 
742,769,810 P.2d 680,707 (1991) cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908 (1992); State v. Card, 121 Idallo 
425, 430, 825 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1991) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 91 5 (1992); State v. Paz, 11 8 Idaho 
542, 552-53, 798 P.2d 1, 11-12 (19901, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (19911, overruled an other 
grounds b - ~  State v. Cad ,  supra; State v. Fain, 1 19 Idaho 670, 675, 809 P.2d 1 149, 1 154 (1 991) 
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987 (1992); State v. Lanvord, 116 Idaho 860, 868, 781 P.2d 197, 205 
(19891, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032 (1990). 
Ring and Fetterly hold that the Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning was incorrect at every 
step. Aggravating circumstances necessary to impose a death sentence are elements of the 
offense, for constitutional purposes; Adamsozz v. Ricketts was right on this point, and the 
Supreme Court decision that effectively overruled it,' kl/alton v. Arizona, 487 U.S. 639, 648 
(1990), was wrong. The dissenting Justices of the Idaho Supreme Court who have repeatedly 
and passionately argued that the ldaho statute is unconstitutional on this ground, have turned out 
to be right. See State v. Lanword, 1 16 Idaho 860, 880-84, 78 1 P.2d 197 (1989) (Huntley, J., 
dissenting); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 784, 810 P.2d 680, 722 (1991) (Bistline, J., 
' The Ninth Circuit's decision in Adurnson has never actually been overruled. See 
Adamson v. Lewis, 955 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). However, the court has assumed that 
the en banc decision on this point is superseded by the seemingly irreconcilable Supreme Court 
authority of Wulton. See id. at 6 19. 
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dissenting), cert. devzierl: 503 U.S. 908 (1992); Sitate v. Charboneazd, 1 16 Idaho 129, 169, 774 
P.2d 299,339 (1 989) (Bistline, I., dissenting), cerr. clrenied 493 U.S. 922 (1989) and 493 U.S. 
923 (1989); State r). Creech, 105 Idaho 362,375404,670 P.2d 463,476-505 (1983) (Huntley 
and Bistline, JJ., dissenting), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 105 1 (1984); State v. Szvak, 105 Idaho 900, 
908- 09,674 P.2d 396,404-05 (1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting), cerf. denied, 468 U.S. 1220 
(1984). "It is high time to comply with our Idaho Constitution and put the awesome decision of 
life or death back in the hands of twelve tried and true jurors." State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 
814, 820 P.2d 665, 684 (1991) (Bistlinc, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987 (1992). 
It is therefore clear that defendant Zane Fields' death sentence was imposed in a 
hdamentally unconstitutional proceeding, a proceeding in which he was denied a right that our 
state constitution says must be "inviolate." Idaho Constitution Article I, $ 7. That denial plainly 
made a difference in his case for his death sentence was based on a judge-made determination 
that the "the killing was with a specific intent to cause death, not the wanton disregard of human 
life for implied malice," Findings of the Court in Considering the Death Penalty ("Findings" j, 
Clerk's Record ("CR") at 168, while the jury was instructed that it could convict Fields of felony 
murder based on finding either express or implied malice. Jury Instruction # 13. Thus, it is 
apparent that the body that was constitutionally required to make the findings that made Mr. 
Fields eligible for a death sentence did not make the finding of specific intent that Judge 
Schroeder did in his sentencing findings. Yet, Zane Fields stands condemned by the decision of a 
judge alone, a decision that a judge had no power to make -- an argument that the Idaho Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Court of the United States rejected, but which both courts have now 
acknowledged was correct all along. 
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Fortunately, that death sentence has not been carried out, and this grave constitutional 
error is not inevocable. The interests of this state in the review of its own state judgments, 
protection of its citizens and application of its Constitution require this court to answer the 
critical questions now raised by Ring and grant Petitioner the relief masrdated by Ritig and the 
Idaho and United States Constitutions. 
A. STATUTORY AGGK4VATING CIRCUMSTANCES ELEMENTS 
OF THE CRIME OF CAPITAL MIJWER WHICH MUST BE FOUND BY 
A JURY BEYOND A =ASONABLE DOUBT FOLLOWING PRETRIAL 
NOTICE AND APPROPMATE JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
There is no question in Idaho that a defendant has a right to a jury trial on all the elements 
of the offense. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 594, 600, 873 P.2d 848, 854 (Idaho 1994). "The rule in 
Idaho has always been that a criminal defendant cannot be convicted of a crime unless the 
factfinder finds the defendant guilty of committing every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citing State v. Hofman, 123 Idaho 638, 693, 851 P.2d 934, 939 
(Idaho 1993); State v. Seymour, 7 Idaho 257,260, 61 P. 1033, 1034 (Idaho 1900)). 
The question that had not been answered correctly in Wuiton, and which was 
fundamentally misunderstood by the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, 
was whether the statutory aggravating "circumstances" which rendered a person death-eligible 
were elements of a greater offense of "capital murder" as opposed to mere sentencing factors of 
first degree murder. The answer, we now know, is that the aggravating circumstances are 
elements of a greater death eligible crime, of which first degree murder is a lesser included 
offense. See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (under Arizona's sentencing structure, [which is 
essentially identical to Idaho's], "aggravating factors operate as 'the hnctional equivalent of an 
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element of a greater offense"', quoting Apprendi). We now know that "those facts setting the 
outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are elements of the crime for the 
purposes of the constitutional analysis," Harris v. Utzited States, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2409 
(2002), and that aggravatsng circmstances necessarily constitute elements of a "greater offense." 
As Justice Thomas clearly stated, " m e n  a fact exposes a defendant to greater punishent  than 
what is otherwise legally presc~bed, that fact is "by definition [an] 'elernen[tIr of a separate legal 
offense." I-luuris v. United Stutes, 122 S. Ct. at 2426 (Thomas, J, dissenting) (quoting Apprendi 
v. NewJemey, 530 U.S. at 483 n.lO). 
There is no question that Idaho Code 5 19-25 15 sets out facts which if found to be true 
beyond a reasonable doubt expose the defendant to a greater punishment, namely death, than he 
could otherwise be exposed. I. C. $9 18-4004, 19-25 15(c). As in Arizona, those facts are 
elements of the crime and must be found by a jury. 
Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to die under a statutory scheme which required 
the finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before 
he could be sentenced to death. The statutory aggravating circumstances were elements of the 
greater offense of "capital" murder and thus required a jury verdict. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. at 
2443. Because no jury made the findings of aggravating circumstances, Petitioner was only 
convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of first degree murder, and his death sentence 
must be vacated under Ring v. Arizona and State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d at 875.2 
2 It is this verdict of the lesser included offense that Petitioner's Rule 35 Motion to 
Correct the Sentence is based. Having been convicted of murder in the first degree by jury 
verdict, the maximum penalty for which is life imprisonment, the matter before the court is not a 
"capital case" and thus, not governed by Idaho Code fi 19-271 9. Thus a Rule 35 Motion to 
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B. THE MGHT TO TRIAL BY JUrtU IS NOT A NEW RULE BUT IS AN 
ANCIENT, FUNDMENTAL RIGHT. 
Ring's requirement that juries, not judges, find the elements of the charge is derived from 
ancient principles of law: 
The principle that the jury were the judges of fact and the judges the deciders of law was 
stated as an established principle as early as 1628 by Coke. See 1 E. Coke, Institutes of 
the Laws of England 155b (1628) ("ad questionem facti non respondent judices; ad 
questionem juris non respondent juratores "). See ulso Langbein, The English Criminal 
Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in The Trial Jury in England, France, 
Germany 1700- 1900, [(A. Schioppa ed. 1987)j at 34, n. 60. 
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. at 247. 
Walton v. Arizona, 487 U.S. 639 (1990), did not contravene those principles but simply 
misread the Arizona statute to which it was applying them. Tlie United States Supreme Court 
enfeebled the institution of the jury through its ruling in Wulton v. Arizona, as did the Idaho 
Supreme Court in its original rejection of right to a jury trial on the aggravating circumstances in 
Creech and Sivak. 
Before the United States Supreme Court's incorrect rejection of the jury trial issue in 
FYalton, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Adamson v. Ricketts found otherwise, correctly 
emphasizing the historical, longstanding basis for finding aggravating circumstances to be 
elements of the offense in Arizona's nearly identical capital statute: 
The historic roots of the right to jury trial provide an essential backdrop to this 
discussion. The Framers of the Bill of Rights included the Sixth Amendment's 
guarantee of a right to jury trial as an essential protection against government 
oppression. "Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal 
correct the illegal sentences (of death) imposed can and must be heard and granted. Any 
argument that the motion to correct illegal sentence cannot be heard in this capital case violates 
equal protection and suspends the writ, as set forth in section IV, in@. 
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Govem~ents  in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this 
insistence upon community pmicipation in the delemination of guilt or 
innocence." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,156,823 S.Ct. 1444, 145 1,20 
L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The cornerstone of this protection is the right to have the 
jury detemine the existence of the facts necessary to detemine guilt or imocence 
of a given crime. Only by maintaining the integ~ty of the factfinding fulction 
does the jury "stand behveen the accused and a potentially arbitrary or abusive 
Govement  that is in command of the criminal sanction." United States v. 
h4arlin Linen Szrpplt. Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1355, 5 1 L.Ed.2d 642 
(1977). 
The Court has recognized that the defendant's right to a jury trial and the 
concomitant facf~nding responsibilities of the jury merit greater protection as the 
potential punishment increases. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160-61, 88 S.Ct. 
at 1453 (jury trial not constitutionally mandated for petty offenses; seriousness of 
punishent determines when right attaches). As we have previously stated, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the death penalty is qualitatively different 
from all other punishments and that heightened scrutiny of death sentencing 
decisions is required. Thus, when the death penalty is implicated courts must be 
particularly careful to prevent the infringement of Sixth Amendment rights. 
To avoid the dangers of government oppression recognized in Duncan and 
reaffirmed in later cases, there must be strict separation of determinations of guilt 
or innocence (factfinding) and determinations of the appropriate punishment 
(sentencing). To otherwise blur the distinctions between those concepts would 
result in the ultimate tyranny feared by the Founders and condemned by Duncan: 
the unchecked power of the government to execute at will. 
Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F .  2d at 1023. The Court noted W h e r  the attributes of the legal 
landscape in effect at the time of petitioner's conviction and sentence: 
The Constitution requires that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt all 
elements of the offense with which the defendant is charged. In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358,361, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Yet the parameters 
of what constitutes an "elementw--so as to fall within the jury's factfinding 
responsibility--remain elusive. A line of due process cases considering such 
contours has failed to produce concrete guidelines. Cf: McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 241 1,2417, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (Court 
has "never attempted to define precisely the constitutional limits [ofl the extent to 
which due process forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in 
criminal cases, and do[esj not do so today...."); see also Patterson v. New York, 
432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 
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U.S. 684,95 S.Ct. 1881,44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,90 
S.Ct. 1068,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1969). We find, however, that a framework for 
analysis emerges from these cases. Thus, in assessing Adason 's  claim, we 
examine (1) the legislative history of Arizona's death penalty statutes; (2) the 
actual role played by aggravating circmstmces under Arizona's revised statute $ 
13- 703; and (3) the application of AfcMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme 
Court's most recent pronouncement on the distinction bet-ween elements and 
sentencing factors, to this case. 
Ring expressly rejected Walton's enoneous conclusion, contrary to Adamson, that 
statutory aggravating factors were not elements of the greater offense of "capital" murder. By 
returning the right to jury trial, notice of elements of the offense charged, and due process to their 
ancient moorings, it is now clear that petitioner's claim of entitlement to jury involvement in the 
finding of aggravating circumstances is correct, and that his sentence violated his right to notice, 
a jury trial and appropriate instructions on all the elements of the offense required under the 
United States Constitution Amendments 5, 6 and 14 and the Idaho Constitution, articles I, $5 7, 
8, and 13. 
The Supreme Court's retraction of the Walton ruling in Ring restores a right to jury trial 
that is neither trivial nor transitory but "the most transcendent privilege which any subject can 
enjoy." Blackstone's Commentaries, quoted in Lewis Powell, Jury Trial ofCrimes, 23 
Washington & Lee L. Rev. 1, 3 n.7 (1966). See also, e.g., United States v. Battiste, 24 Fed Cas. 
1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass.) (No. 14,545), 2 S m e r  240 (1835) (Justice Story): "I hold it the 
most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that the jury should respond as 
to the facts, and the court as to the law." 2 S m e r  240,243 (1835). Petitioner should not be 
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denied the jury rights restored in Ring simply because the state and federal supreme courts 
temporarily overlooked the point before finally getting it right. 
C. UNDER THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION THE FUGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
IS INVIOLATE AND PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO 
JURY DETEMINATION OF THE 5 19-2515 ELEMENTS OF THE 
OFFENSE. 
Under R~ng  v. Arizona, Hamis v h i t e d  States, Appm~di v. New Jersey and Jones v. 
United S t a m ,  petitioner has a right to a jury trial on the factual elemenls under Idaho law that are 
necessary to increase the maximm sentence for first degree murder to death, i.e., facts necessary 
to prove the elements of the greater crime of "capital" murder. Petitioner's jury never convicted 
him of com~itt ing a statutory aggravating circumstance under 5 19-25 15, a necessary element 
for death eligibility. Therefore, petitioner has only been convicted of the lesser included offense 
of first degree murder. The Supreme Court of the United States corrected the mistake announced 
in R7aEto~z v. Arizona and recognized that aggravating circumstances are facts that must be found 
by a jury. With that clarification in the law, the longstanding, "sacred," fundamental right under 
the Idaho Constitution to the sight to trial by jury mandates the vacation of petitioner's death 
sentence. 
The Idaho Constitution sanctifies and defends the right to trial by jury as one of the 
Eundannental protections inherent in the state constitution. The right is protected in not one but 
hvo explicit sections of the state constitution. See Idaho Const. art. I, 5 7; id. art V ,  5 1. The first 
reference to the venerated sight in the constitution provides that: "[tlhe right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate." Idaho Const. art. I, 7. The second reference to the right states that any "fact 
at issue shall be tried by order of court before a jury." Idaho Const. art. V, 5 1. 
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Numerous Idaho cases recount that the right to trial by jury established by these state 
constitutional provisions secured "that right as it existed at the time of the adoption of the 
constitution." Johnson v. Nichels, 48 Idaho 654, -, 284 P. 840, 842 (Idaho 1930); Clzristensen 
v. NolIing;rwarth, 6 Idaho 87, -, 53 P. 2 1 1 ,2  12 (Idaho 1898). See, e.g., State v. Puatt, 125 
Idaho 594, 599, 873 P.2d 848, 853 (Idaho 1994), State v. Benniort, 1 I2 Idaho 32, 37, 730 P.2d 
952, 957 (Idaho 1986); State v. Szvak, 105 Idaho 900,903,674 P.2d 396,399 (Idaho 1983); 
Cornish v. Smzith, 97 Idaho 89,92,540 P.2d 274,277 (Idaho 1975); State 1). Nadlman, 63 Idaho 
153, -, 118 P.2d 58,61 (Idaho 1941); Stale v. Miles, 43 Idaho 46, -, 248 P. 442,442-43 (Ida110 
1926); Bra& v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, -, 242 P. 3 14 (Idaho 1925); People ex ref. Brown v. 
Burnhum, 35 Idaho 522, -, 207 P. 589,590 (Idaho 1922); Shields v. Johnson, 1 10 Idaho 476, -, 
79 P. 391, 393 (Idaho 1904). 
Justices Huntley and Bistline summarized the historical fact that Idaho juries by their 
verdicts chose whether or not death would be imposed from territorial times until passage of 
Idaho Code Ij 19-2515 in 1977. State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362,375-77 670 P.2d 463,476-78 
(Wuntley, J., dissenting); id. at 386-404,487-505 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Justices Huntley and 
Bistline dissented vigorously in Sivak and Creech because the Legislature's removal of the jury 
participation in sentencing proceedings through the enactment of $19-25 15 in 1977 violated the 
constitutional mandate that the right to jury trial "remain inviolate." The United States Supreme 
Court's opinion in Ring makes clear that I.C. 5 19-2515 is unconstitutional in requiring that the 
trial judge make the factual findings regarding the existence of aggravating circumstances. See 
State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d at 875. As set forth supra, in Ring and Harris the Supreme Court 
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conclusively established that statutory aggravating circumstances are elements of the crime, and 
corrected the error of WaEton in holding to the conb-a~.  
Once that legal principle is accepted, the right to jury detemination of the elements that 
mdce a defendmt eligible for the death penalty is a simple matter of long established state and 
federal constitutional law. "The rule in Idaho has always been that a criminal defendant cannot 
be convicted of a crime unless the factfinder finds the defendant guilty of comitt ing every fact 
necessary to constihtte the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Pratt, 873 P.2d at 854 (emphasis 
added) (citing State v. Hoflmatz, 123 Idaho 638, 693, 851 P.2d 934,939 (Idaho 1993); Stale v. 
Seymour, 7 Idaho 257, -, 61 P. 1033, 1034 (Idaho 1900)). The factfinder in a criminal case in 
Idaho must be a jury: "Article I, 5 7 guarantees a jury h5al whenever the possible sanction 
includes imprisoment." Bennion, 112 Idaho at 44, 730 P.2d at 964. 
In Idaho, the "right to a jury trial is a fundamental right, and must be guarded jealously." 
Bennio~z, 730 P.2d at 957 (citing f i rmer  v. LooJbourrow, 75 Idaho 88,94,267 P.2d 113, 116 
(1 954)). The Idaho Supreme Court has characterized the right to trial by jury as the "most 
precious constitutional right." David Steed and Assocs., Inc. v. Young, 115 Idaho 247,250, 766 
P.2d 71 7,720 (Idaho 1988). Writing for the court of appeals, then Chief Judge, now Justice, 
Walters stated that "[blecause trial by jury is one of the fundamental guaranties of the rights and 
liberties of the people, every reasonable presumption should be indulged against its waiver." 
State v. ?$?heeler, 114 Idaho 97, 101, 753 P.2d 833, 837 (Id. Ct. App. 1988). In State v. Paz, the 
Idaho Supreme Court- stated that the "right to a fair and impartial jury is one of the most sacred 
and important guarantees of the Constitution." State v. Paz, 1 18 Idaho, 542, 55 1, 798 P.2d 1, 10 
(Idaho 1990). 
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The right to trial by jury under the Idaho Constitution "is the right which is guaranteed to 
the h ~ e r i c a n  people by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which 
was in force in Idaho Territory when our state came into e~istence."~ Nadman, 11 8 P.2d at 61- 
62. See also Rex v. Poole, Gases Tcmpore Hadwicke 23,27 (17341, quoted in Spnrfv. United 
States, 156 U.S. 5 1,94 (1 895): 
[Ilt is of the greatest consequence to the law of England, and to the subject, that these 
powers of the judge and the jucy are kept distinct; that the judge deternines the law, and 
the jury the fact; and, if ever they come to be confounded, it will prove the confusion and 
destruction of the law of England. 
Id. As an ancient, fundamental component of criminal law in our society, the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial on all the elements of the offense - including the statutory aggravating 
circumstances, which enhance the jury verdict from potential life sentence to potential death 
sentence - existed at the time of adoption of the State Constitution. 
Significantly, in meeler then Chief Judge Walters quoted a U.S. Supreme Court case 
that required a judge who was evaluating a defendant's purported waiver of the right to jury trial 
to exercise "caution increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity." Putton v. 
United States, 28 1 U.S. 276, 3 12-1 3 (1 930), quoted with aupproval in, FUzeeler, 1 14 Idaho at 101, 
753 P.2d at 837. The gravity of the offense in this capital case is of the highest order of 
magnitude, and the deprivation of the fundamental right to a trial by jury on every element of the 
offense must not be countenanced. 
3 The state constitution was drafted August 6, 1889, adopted by the people in 
November of 1889, Sivak, 674 P.2d at 399, and approved by Congress on July 3, 1890. Pratt, 
873 P.2d at 599. 
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There is no question that under Idaho's Constitution, petitioner had an "inviolate," 
fundmental right to jury fa~tfinding on statutory aggravating circmstmces before a sentence of 
death could be imposed. 
If, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF RING. 
A. EQUITY W Q U I m S  APPLICATION OF RING TO PETITIONER'S 
CASE. 
Assuiing ilrguendo the State's characterization of Ring as announcing a new rule, rather 
than the restoration of an ancient rule, Ring is a new development in support of an old claim. 
Under Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (Idaho 2000) (Sivak fi), the Idaho Supreme 
Court has rejected the notion that a previously raised claim is waived when supported by new 
evidence. "We must be vigilant against imposing a rule of law that will work injustice in the 
name of judicial efficiency." lil. at 642, 8 P.3d at 647. Here, the same sort of injustice would 
arise fkom rejection of any assumed "new" rule under Ring, as the Idaho Supreme Court has 
already acknowledged that Idaho's 5 19-25 15 capital sentencing proceedings without a jury are 
unconstitutional under Ring. State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d at 875 (vacating death sentence under 
Ring and remanding for re-sentencing). Equitable principles alone demand that petitioner's 
death sentence be vacated, as lie raised the very point addressed in Ring in his direct appeal case 
years ago. 
The State seeks the inequitable result, indeed, miscarriage of justice, that would deny 
retroactive application of the "new" rule in Ring and allow execution of petitioner - despite the 
fact that petitioner had been denied a jury on the question of whether aggravating factors existed. 
The State relies on Fetterly v. State, 12 1 Idaho 41 7, 825 P.2d 1073 (Idaho 1991), which in turn 
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cited C;rf$lh v. k'entucb, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), for its contention that "new" rules should not be 
applied to cases that are "already final." The State's position is flawed for several reasons. 
B. N N G  ANNOUNCES A SUBSTANTIVE RULE OF LAW NOT 
CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 19-2719(5). 
Ring" recognition that aggravating circumstances are elements of a greater, capital 
offense that must be found by a jury is a substantive rule, and even "new" substantive rules of 
criminal law are retroactive. See BousZey v. United States, 523 U.S. 6 14, 620-2 1 (1 995) 
(inconsistent with the doctrinal underpinnings of habeas review to preclude a petitioner from 
relying on a decision announcing applicable substantive criminal law after petitioner's conviction 
and sentence were final). In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
"the availability of collateral relief from a federal crin~inal conviction based upon an intervening 
change in substantive law." 417 U.S. 333,334 (1974) (emphasis added). Concluding that a 
subsequent, substantive change in the law that established that petitioner's conviction and 
punishent were invalid would "inherently result in a complete miscarriage of justice," the Court 
held that collateral relief would be required. Davis, 417 U.S. at 346-47. See United States v. 
Sood, 969 F.2d 774,775-76 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. MeClelland, 941 F.2d 999, 1000-01 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
The rule gleaned from Ring under the Jones jurisprudence must be read to refine the 
definition of an element of a capital offense, which is unquestionably a substantive decision 
governed by Davis. 417 U.S. at 346-47 (holding that a defendant may assert in a collateral 
proceeding a claim based on an intervening substantive change in the interpretation of a federal 
criminal statute). 
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The essence of criminal law is the definition of elements of the offense. .lorzes clarified 
tbat rnaximun~-punishma-increasing facts are elements. ifpprendi applied to that definition the 
well-established rule that elements must be found by a jury, and Ring confimed and extends 
that rule to the capital arena. The "newtr rule, if indeed there is any, in this sequence was Jones, 
and it is one of criminal law, not procedure. A11 the other procedural benefits tbat inure as a 
result of the definition of the offense of capital murder, i.e., jury decision, unanimity, notice by 
indictment or infornlation follow as a result of the detemination that the stamtow aggavating 
factor is an element of the substmtive offense under long-established law. 
As the right to a jury detemination of the existence of an element of the offense is clearly 
a matter of substantive criminal law, Ring must be applied to vacate petitioner's sentence. 
C. THE REQUIREMENT OF A JURY TRIAL ON FACTS WHICH 
INCREASE THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE IS "IMPLICIT IN THE 
CONCEPT OF ORDERED LIBERTY." 
Even ifthe right to a jury trial on all of the elements of an offense were a procedural, 
rather than substantive, right, (which it is not), petitioner is entitled to its benefit. As set forth in 
pxior sections, the right to a jury trial on all elements of an offense is an ancient rule, not a new 
one. As a rule that preceded petitioner's conviction and sentence by centuries, it is clearly 
applicable to petitioner. 
Moreover, even if one accepts the State's mis-characterization of Ring as a "new" rule of 
criminal procedure, under retroactivity principles announced by the Idaho Supreme Court, Ring 
must clearly be given retrospective effect. The State relies on state retroactivity cases that only 
state the general rule, that new decisions will not apply retroactively to cases that are already 
final on direct appeal. State's Response at 2-3. See FettevZy v. State, 12 1 Idaho 4 17,4 18- 19, 825 
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P.2d 1073, 1074-75 (1991) (citing GriJ'f;ttt v, Kerztucb, 479 U.S. 3 14 (1987)); Stuart v. State, 
128 Idaho 436, 914 P.2d 933 (1996) (citing Fetterly), and Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899,901, 
935 P.2d 162, 164 (1997) (citing fitterly). 
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Supreme C o w  of the United States recognize an 
exceptton to the general rule md allow retroactive application for a new rule that is "implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty," Matter ofGaflord,127 Idaho 472,476,903 P.2d 61, 65 (Idaho 
1995). See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The State entirely ignores this exception. 
Instead, the State incorrectly asserts that the "Teague case clearly holds that new rules 
announced by the Supreme Court do not apply retroactively to defendants whose conviction is 
final in state court and who is only collaterally attacking the conviction in federal court." State's 
Response at 3. The State ignores the two exceptions to Teague's general rule of non- 
retroactivity, the first, for primary conduct which is beyond the power of the State criminal law- 
making authority to pr~scribe,~ and a second for rules that are "implicit in ordered liberty," i.c., 
watershed rules of criminal procedure. Teague, 489 U.S. at 3 11. M i l e  the Idaho Supreme 
Court has not explicitly discussed the Teague exceptions, (both of which petitioner contends 
apply to his case), the state supreme court's recognition of the "implicit in ordered liberty 
exception" in Gaffovd is controlling and mandates retroactive application of Ring in this ease. 
4 Petitioner's Ring claim fits Teague's first exception because recognition of the 
aggravating circumstances as elements places imposition of the punishment of death beyond the 
power of the state, absent a constitutional finding of those elements. This differentiates Ring 
from Appveizdi, whch did not involve a qualitatively different form of punishment, death as 
opposed to imprisonment, that was unavailable in the absence of the aggravation findings. 
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In kfatter ofCaflord, the Idaho Supreme Court mnounced that a "new rule will be 
applied on collateral review if it requires the obsewance of procedures "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty."' Gaford, 127 Idaho 472,476,903 P.2d 61,65 (Idaho 1995) (quoting the second 
exception in Teape  v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1 989) and citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 
(1989)). In Guflord the state supreme court stated that a new rule under Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. 71 (1992), which required the release of an insanity acquitee who had regained his 
sanity or was no longer dangerous, was grounded in due process, was formulated to protect a 
fundamental liberty interest, and must he applied retroactivelq, to cases on collateral review 
because it required the observance of procedures that are "implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty." GaSford, 903 P.2d at 65 (emphasis added).5 
The right to "trial by jury in criminal cases is hdannental to the American scheme of 
justice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Caflord's due process notion of 
fundamental rights being "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" derives from the Supreme 
Court's decision in Palko v. Cosznecticut, 302 U.S. 3 19 (1937). Palko used that description to 
describe a subset of rights set forth in the Bill of Rights which were applicable against the States 
5 The cases relied upon by the State to preclude retroactivity in this case, Fetterly, 
121 Idaho at 41 8-1 9, Stuart 1). Stute, 128 Idaho 436, 914 P.2d 933 (1996), and Butler v. State, 
129 Idaho 899, 901,935 P.2d 162, 164 (1997), are irrelevant, because they do not implicate the 
CafSord exception for rules that are implicit in ordered liberty. At issue in Fetterly, Butler, and 
Stuart, respectively, were the retroactivity of State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho129, 774 P.2d 299 
(1989) (prescribing the method of weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence); State v. 
Townsem!, 124 Idaho 88 1, 865 P.2d 972 (1993) (concluding that parts of the human body are not 
a deadly weapon); and State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 852 P.2d 87 (1993) (requiring submission 
of lesser included offense of second degree torture murder). None of these cases involve a 
fundamental riglit that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," in contrast to the 
fundamental right in this case, trial by jury on all elements of the offense. 
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thougtr the Foweenth hendmen t .  Id. at 324-25 (setting analflical frmework for whether 
Double Jeopardy Clause was binding on the States). In dictum in Palko, the Supreme Court 
stated that the right to trial by jury was "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," 
and that its abolition would not "violate a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fmdmental." Id. at 325 (quoting Sizj~der v. 
Massachuselts, 29 1 U.S. 97, 105 (1 934)). Thirty-one years later the Supreme Court specifically 
rejected the dictum in Pulko that the right to trial by jury was not implicit in ordered liberty. 
Duncur-z v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 155. In explicitly rejecting Palko's dictum and in holding that 
"the right to jury trial in serious criminal cases is a fmdmental right" that "must be recognized 
by the States as part of their obligation to extend due process of law to all persons within their 
jurisdiction," id. at 154, the Supreme Court necessarily found that the right to trial by jury in 
criminal cases is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 
In the most basic sense, Ring remedies a ""tructural defect[ in the constitution of the 
trial mechanism."' Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,281 (1993). In Sullivan, Justice Scalia 
writing for the Court recognized not only that the right to trial by jury is "'fkndanlental to the 
American scheme of justice,"' id. at 277 (quoting Durzcan v. Louisia~za, 391 U.S. at 149), but 
also that its "most important element" is "the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach 
the requisite finding of 'guilty."' Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277 (citing Sparfv. United States, 156 
U.S. 5 1, 105-06 (1 895)). 
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) - which, of course, was the taproot of Gideon 
v. FFainwright, the model case for retroactive application of constitutional change - the Supreme 
Court held that a denial of the right to counsel could be vindicated in postconviction proceedings 
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because the Sixth A m e n h e r ~ t  required a lawyer's participation in a criminal trial to "complete 
the court." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 468. A judgment rendered by an incomplete court was 
subject to collateral attack. Id. What was a mere imaginative metaphor in Johrrson is literally 
true of a capital sentencing proceeding in which the jury has not participated in the life-or-death 
factfinding role that the Sixth h e n h e n t  reserves to a jury under Appvendi and Ring: the 
constitutionally requisite tribunal was simply not there for the critical finding of aggravating 
circumstmces; and such a rahcal defect necessarily "cast[s] serious doubt on the veracity or 
integrity ofthe . . . trial proceeding," Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 929 (Ha. 1980). 
"[Tlhe jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundmental 
decision about the exercise of official power - a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life 
and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power . . . 
found expression . . . in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of 
guilt or innocence." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 156. These same principles require jury 
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence of the factual accusations "necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty." Ring, 122 U.S. at 2443. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494-495. 
The right to a jury determination of factual accusations of this sort has long been the central 
bastion of the Anglo-American legal system's defenses against injustice and oppres~ion.~ As 
6 See Blackstone's Commentaries, 5 5  349-350 (Lewis ed. 1897): 
[Tlhe founders of the English law have with excellent forecast contrived . . . that the truth 
of every accusation . . . should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of 
twelve of his equals and neighbors. . . . So that the liberties of England cannot but subsist, 
so long as this pallalZiunz remains sacred and inviolate; not only from all open attacks, 
(which none will be so hardy as to make) but also from all secret machinations, which 
may sap and undermine it. . . . 
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fosmer Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote: "jury trial has been a principal element in maintaining 
individual freedom m o n g  English speaking peoples for the longest span in the history of man." 
Powell, Jury Ela l  ofCvime.s, 23 Washington & Lee L. Rev. 1, 11 (1966). 
Justice Powell also quotes de Tocqueville as observing: 
that: the jury ""paces the real direction of society in the hands of the governed. . . . 
and not in . . . the government. . . He who punishes the criminal . . . is the real 
master of society. All the sovereigns who have chosen to govern by their own 
authority, and to direct society, instead of obeying its direction, have destroyed or 
enfeebled the institution of the jury." 
Id. at 5 (quoting 1 Alexis de Toequeville, Democracy in h e r i c a  282 (Henry Reeve trans., 
Section 19-2719 and the UPCPA must be interpreted consistently with the Idaho 
Supreme Court's retroactivity decision in Gafford or it is a violation of equal protection, due 
process and an improper suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under the Idaho and United 
States Constitutions, as argued in Section IV infra. In Duncan, the Supreme Court of the United 
States found the right to jury trial to be a fundamental right, one which necessarily is "implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty," given the Supreme Court's express rejection in Duncart of 
Palko's dictum that the jury trial right was not implicit in ordered liberty. The right to jury trial 
Id. See also Rex v. Poole, Cases Teinpore Hardwicke 23,27 (1734), quoted in Sparfv. United 
States, 156 U.S. 51,94 (1895): 
[I]t is of the greatest consequence to the law of England, and to the subject, that these 
powers of the judge and the jury are kept distinct; that the judge determines the law, and 
the jury the fact; and, if ever they come to be confounded, it will prove the confusion and 
destruction of the law of England. 
Id. 
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is implicit in ordered liberty and fundamental under both the Idaho and United States 
Constitutions. The right to jury trial on aggravating circumstances in capital cares mounced  in 
Ring is a hdamental  right, implicit in ordered litrerly, and entitled to retroactive application 
under Gasford. 
111. THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MADE HIM ELIGIBLE: FOR THE DEATH 
PENALTY IS A STRUCTUUL ERROR NOT SUBJECT TO HARMLESS 
E m O R  ANALYSIS, AND EW3N IF RAMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IS 
ATTEMPTED THE ERROR IS NOT a M L E S S .  
The State argues that the denial of a jury trial on statutory aggravating circumstances is 
harmless error. State's Response at 7-8. The deprivation of a jury trial on the existence of 
statutory aggravating circumstances is a structural error not amenable to harmless error analysis. 
As the Ring error in this case is structural, harmless error analysis cannot be undertaken. It is 
impossible to determine rel-rospectively what structure and what record would have existed had 
Ring been in effect at the time of petitioner's trial. In any event, the Ring error is not harmless 
under the facts of petitioner's case. 
A. Idaho Law Provides for a Separate Trial to Determine Statutory 
Aggravating Circumstances. 
Idaho law under which petitioner was tried and sentenced, establishes a bifurcated 
proceeding. I.C. $ 5  18-4004, 19-25 15 The jury finds only whether a defendant has committed a 
first degree murder. The judge finds both whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt at least one statutory aggravating circumstance rendering the defendant death eligible and 
then "whether the mitigating circumstances which may be presented outweigh the gravity of any 
aggravating circumstance found and make the imposition of death unjust." Idaho Code 5 19- 
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2515(c) (1977, m. 1984).~ See Hofman v. Arave, 236 F.3d at 543-544 (explaining how the " ... 
judge must hold a separate sentencing proceeding.") (emphasis in original). The judge makes the 
deternitlation of the existence of statutory aggravating circumstances after a separate trial in 
which he considers both the evidence adduced at trial and a separate body of evidence, including, 
inter alia, evidence ruled inadmissable at trial and a presentence report. I.C. 8 19-25 15(e). 
Hearsay evidence is atlmissible at the trial in which the aggravating circmstances are 
determined. See State v. Osborn, 63 1 P.2d 187, 193-5 (Idaho 1981) (intent of statute is to place 
as much relevant information as possible before sentencing judge). The judge also hears all 
evidence presented in mitigation before he determines whether the statutory aggravating 
circumstances have been proved. I.C. $19-25 15(e). 
Idaho law requires a preliminary hearing and probable cause determination for felony 
offenses. I.C. tj 19-804. In petitioner's case the preliminary hearing did not consider or 
determine the existence of probable cause for any statutory aggravating circumstance. See 
generally Preliminary Hearing Transcript. The Information did not allege or mention any 
statutory aggravating circumstance. CR 17- 1 8 (Information). 
The jury in petitioner's case returned a verdict of guilty on one count of murder in the 
first degree for murder in the perpetration of a robbery andlor a burglary. Contrary to the 
constitutional requirement that all elements of the offense be determined by a jury, no statutory 
7 The statute now reads: Where the court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance 
the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court finds that mitigating 
circumstances which may be presented are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would 
be unjust. I.C. tj 19-25 15(c) (1 977, am. 1984, am. 1995). 
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aggravating circwstmces were submitted for jury detemination. In fact, the jury was explicitly 
insmcted that it could not consider punisbent  in its deliberations. Jury Insmction No. 23. 
Judgment and sentence of death for conviction of felony murder were imposed by then 
District Judge Gerald f. Schroeder, Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, County of Ada, Boise, 
Idaho on March 7,  1991. The findiilgs in aggravation which made Mr. Fields eligible f i r  a death 
sentence necessarily rested on the conclusion the jury did not reach: that Mr. Fields acted with 
express rather than implied malice. CR 168 (' 19-25 1 5 Findings). 
The trial judge in petitioner's case found three statutory aggravating circmstances. 
These were: (1) by the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant 
exhibited utter disregard for human life [$19-25 15(g) (611; (2)the murder was one defined as 
murder of the first degree by I.C. tj 18-4003, subsection (d), cornrnission of a murder in the 
perpetration of a robbery and/or burglary, accompanied with the specific intent to cause the death 
of a human being [§ 19-25 15(g)(7)]; (3) the defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the 
comn~ission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder, which will 
probably constitute a continuing threat to society [tj 19-25 15(g) (811. CR 170-74 (Findings of the 
Court in Considering the Death Penalty, filed March 7, 1991). 
Judge Schroeder made these findings at the conclusion of a hearing in which he 
considered not only the evidence at trial but an entirely different range of evidence, including: 
the presentence report, testimony by a number of additional witnesses in sentencing and post trial 
hearings, and arguments of counsel. See gerzerally Tr Trial vol. VIII; Presentence Report. 
Petitioner never conceded either guilt on the underlying charges or the existence of any statutory 
aggravating circumstance. 
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Mr. Fields timely appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, which affimed his conviction 
and sentence on ESebruw 16, 1995, State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904,908 P.2d 121 1 (Idaho 1995). 
B. The Denial of A Jury Trial Is Structural Error Which Cannot Be Harmless. 
The denial of the right to a jury trial is structural error which cannot be bartnless. 
iMeCurk v. Signberg, 163 F.3d 470 (8' Cir. 1998); People v. Collins, 27 P.3d 726 (Cal. 200 1). 
In Harmon v. i.14arshall, 69 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1995) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that when the jury was not instructed on any elements for two of the crimes in a multi- 
count indictment the error could not be harmless. "We find it difficult to imagine a more 
fundamental or structural defect than allowing the jury to deliberate on and convict Harmon of an 
offense. fur which it had no definition." Id. at 966. The court stated fixther ""[]here is no way 
we can determine the extent to which Harmon's convictions were actually affected by the failure 
to instruct, because we simply cannot tell how the jury reached its decision."' Id. 
The Supreme Court recognizes that the right to a jury trial is fundamental and violation of 
that right cannot be harmless. " m e n  that right [to jury trial in serious criminal cases] is 
altogether denied, the State cannot contend that the deprivation was harmless because the 
evidence established the defendant's guilt; the error in such a case is that the wrong entity judged 
the defendant guilty." Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1 986). See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
8 The State's citation to Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (holding that jury 
instruction omitting element of offense can be harmless error), is not apposite. See State's 
Response at 7-8. Neder analogizes the omission of an element of the offense to cases involving 
improper instructions on a single element and finds that such an omission is subject to harmless 
error. This case, by contrast, involves not just the omission of one element of instructions on an 
aggravating circumstance but the denial of the entire trial at which any of the statutory 
aggravating circumstances were found and the lack of any instructions on any element of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances. 
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U.S. at 38 1. The structural error precludes appellate hmlessness findings precisely because: 
"[a] reviewing court can only engage in pure speculation -- its view of what a reasonable jury 
would have done. And when it does that, "the wrong entity judgels] the deftendant guilty. '" Id. 
(quoting Rose v. Clark). The Idaho stalutory sentencing scheme's "[dlenial of the right to a jury 
verdict of guilt b eyod  a reasonable doubt" is smctwal error, "the jury guarantee being a 'basic 
protectiotn]' whose precise effects are measurable,  but without which a criminal trial cannot 
reliably serve its function." See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281. "'The deprivation of that /jury trial] 
right, with consequences that are necessarily uzquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably 
qualifies as 'strucwal error."' Id. 
The statute under which petitioner received his death sentence provides fbr a separate 
trial to establish the statutory aggravating circumstances, to consider mitigation, to weigh 
mitigation against any statutory aggravating circumstance, and to determine the justness of a 
death penalty in light of mitigating and aggravating (statutory and non-statutory) circumstances. 
I.C. 5 19-25 15(c). Petitioner was entitled at a minimum to a jury trial on the existence of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances and was completely deprived of that right. This deprivation 
is not subject to harmless error analysis. 
C. Harrnless Error Analysis Cannot Be Meanin@ully Conducted In this Case. 
Even if h m l e s s  error analysis could be applied, the error here may not be deemed 
harmless. H m l e s s  error analysis involves reviewing the record and then determining whether 
or not the error affected the jury's determination of guilt. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991) 
(error can be said to be harmless when it is unimportant in relation to everything else the jury 
considered on the issue, as shown by the record). This test cannot be meaningfully performed 
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here because it is impossible to retrospectively determine how petitioner" trial would have been 
conducted and how his lawyers would have tried the case had Ring been in effect. No one can 
do more than guess as to what procedure Idaho would have employed if the jury had to find the 
statutory aggravating circmstances and how petitioner would have defended against the 
aggravating circmstances if the trier of fact were the jury and not the judge. 
Hwrnless error analysis depends on being able to assess the impact of an error on a 
kno~vn record. %%en, the very nature of the proceeding itself is a matter of pure speculation, 
then harmless enor analysis becomes a memingless endeavor. Coleman v. McCurmick, 874 
F.2d. 1280 (9th Cir. 1989), illustrates this point. In Coleman the defendant was resentenced to 
death after his death sentence, imposed pursuant to a mandatory death sentencing scheme, was 
overturned. The resentencing proceeding allowed the court to consider evidence from the 
defendant's guilt phase trial. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, found that this resentencing 
violated the defendant's right to due process and that h m l e s s  error did not apply because of "the 
reviewing court's inability to determine whether such violations were in fact h m l e s s  beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 874 F.2d at 1289. The court reasoned that since Coleman's trial counsel had 
no notice of the consequences of the trial record on the death decision, it would be purely 
speculative to determine what tactical decisions he would have made had he had such notice. Id. 
Similarly, because petitioner and his counsel had no notice that the jury would play any 
role in the finding of the statutory aggravating circumstances which must be found before he 
could be eligible to die, their tactical decisions could not have been influenced by such 
knowledge. Thus, decisions on such vital topics such as whether petitoner should testify were 
made absent this knowledge. Coleman observes that "[Tlhis decision, whether or not to testify in 
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one's o w  defense, can only be made rationally if the consequences of such a cort-rse of action are 
known. Elere they were not." Coleman, 847 F.2d at 1287. This statement applies in full to 
petitioner. Changing the identity of the fact finder on the initial question of death e1igibili.t): has a 
pervasive but u h o w a b l e  impact on virtually every aspect of strategy on both the guilt issues 
and the aggravating circumstances questions. 
Cliaited Slates v. Jordan, 29 1 F.3d 109 1, 1096 (9" Cir. 2002) makes much the same point 
in the context of an Apprendi error. The Jordan court found that not charging or including in the 
elements the question of drug quantity was not harmless error when the defendant received a life 
sentence for a drug offense involving more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. 
M e n  quantity is neither alleged in the indictment nor proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt, there are too many unlaowns to say with any confidence, let alone 
beyond reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless. What evidence might have been 
proffered by Jordan, in a defensive effort to minimize quantity, if the indictment had 
properly charged the quantity involved in the offense, is entirely speculative. We hold 
that the governrnent cannot meet its burden under the harmless error standard when drug 
quantity is neither charged in the indictment nor proved to a jury beyond reasonable 
doubt, if the sentence received is greater than the combined maximum sentences for the 
indeterminate quantity offenses charged. 
Id. at 1096-97. 
Here, the petitioner was charged under an Information w-hich did not mention the 
statutory aggravating circumstances. CR 17-1 8. The jury was never instructed on any of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances, and counsel had no notice that any of those aggravating 
circumstances were for the jury's consideration. The error in petitioner's case is more pervasive 
than in Jordan and its impact even more speculative. The result involves the difference not just 
between number of years in prison but between life and death. And the issues which were never 
alleged in the Information or placed before the jury are far more complex than merely 
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000'79 
determining how m a y  grams of a controlled substance a defendant possessed. Just as hamless 
error could not be found in Jordan, it cannot be found here. 
D. Even If Harmless Error Analysis Is Performed, the Error Is Not Harmless. 
Even if harmless error malysis is perfomed, the error is not harmless under the facts of 
this case where Fields contested guilt and did not concede the existence of any aggravating 
factor. 
Harmless error cannot be found by cobbling together the jury's verdicts on guilt issues. 
The Idaho Supreme Court does not accept the notion that a jury finding on a guilt issue equates 
with a finding of an aggravating circumstance. 
In State v. Sivak, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), the jury acquitted the defendant of premeditated 
murder but convicted him of first degree felony murder. The judge, however, sentenced Sivak to 
death aft-er finding, inter aha, that the murder was planned and calculated. On appeal, Sivak 
complained about this inconsistency but the Idaho Supreme court rejected his argument, noting 
that no inconsistency existed because the judge's finding was based on evidence which the jury 
didn't hear. "Thus, the findings of the jury and the findings of the trial judge are not 
inconsistent; rather they are based on different ranges of information." Sivak, 674 P.2d at 403. 
Sivak's recognition that the statutory aggravating circumstances involve a different 
inquiry and different evidence than the guilt phase findings flows inexorably fiom the statute 
itself. If Idaho had intended that a jury's determination that a defendant killed a person with 
specific intent in the course of a robbery constituted a finding that the ( f )  (7) statutory 
aggravating circumstance, now codified as I.C. tj 19-25 15 (h)(7), had been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, there would be no reason to require a separate proceeding based on different 
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particula, it c m o t  be said that the jury would have found the I.C. $19-25 15 (g)(7), now (h)(7), 
circuslance. 
This is true because (1) we do not h o w  whether the composition of the jury would have 
been the same and whether their verdicts would hatre been affected by their howledge that the 
death penalty was at issue, (2) what instmctions the jury would have received, (3) what evidence 
Fields would have presented had he k n o w  the statutory aggravating circustmces were at stake, 
(4) whether Fields would have testified, and ( 5 )  what arguments his lawyers would have made. 
1. The Jury Did Not Know the Death Penalty Was At Stake. 
The decision about whether to find a person eligible for death is qualitatively different 
than the decision to find him guilty of murder. It has long been recognized that the jury's 
knowledge of the consequences of the decision in a death penalty case may impact on its verdict. 
Caliltvell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (stressing importance of jurors appreciating the 
consequence of their decision in a death penalty case); see also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 ,  50 
(1980) (Constitution will not allow exclusion ofjurors who "frankly concede that the prospects 
of the death penalty may affect what their honest judgement of the facts will be or what they may 
deem to be a reasonable doubt"). Here the guilt verdict was rendered by a jury assured and 
instructed that sentencing was solely the responsibility of the judge. The jury was specifically 
instructed: 
It is not within your province to concern yourselves with the question ofpenaljy 
orpunishment. That feature of the case is solely for the Court. Therefore, I 
instruct you not to concern yourselves with it at all. Your duty as jurors is solely 
are not even arguably implied by the jury's guilt phase verdicts. Notably, the State only argues, 
albeit incorrectly, that the jury's findings "satisfied Idaho Code $ 19-2515 (g)(7)." State's 
Response at 4. 
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to determine h e  guilt or innocence of the accused md upon that question, and that 
question alone you, as jurors, are to vote and return your verdict. 
State V .  No. 16259, Jury Instructions filed May 16, 1990, Instruction 23 (4Ih Jud. Dist. Ct., 
County of Ada) (emphasis added). It thus cannot be presmed that the composition of the jury 
would have been the same. Even more critically, the jurors' diminished, indeed absent, sense of 
responsibility for making a death eligibility detemination precludes deducing the verdicts on the 
statutory aggravating circustances from the guilt verdicts. 
2. Both the Instructions the Jurors Did Receive and Those They Did Not 
Prevent a Finding of Harmless Error. 
Both the instructions the jurors did receive on the guilt issues and the unknown 
instructions for the aggravating  circumstance^'^ prevent a finding of harmless error. The jurors 
were instructed that they would not make any decision concerning the sentencing or penalty. Id. 
The instruction was affirmatively and drastically misleading if the jury's task included finding 
the statutory aggravating circumstances. 
We also do not 1-ow how the jurors would have been instructed on the (g) (7) 
circmstance to be established. The (g) (7) aggravating circumstance, which requires a finding 
that the murder be a first degree felony murder and be "accompanied with the specific intent to 
cause the death of a human being" has also never been precisely defined. Indeed, the Idaho 
courts have warned against instructing jurors on "specific intent." State v. Enno, 807 P.2d 610, 
621 (Idaho 1991) ("We note that the distinction between general intent and specific intent is a 
difficult distinction and has been abandoned in the Model Penal Code. The jury need not be 
10 Presumably the jury would have had to receive instructions on the elements of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances. 
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instructed in the esoteric distinctions between general and specific intent"). Here, for a jury to 
find the (g) (7) aggravating circmstance, an instruction and a decision by the jury on the 
"esoteric" concept of specific intent was required, 
It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that a jusy which had acquitted Mr. Fields of 
premeditated and deliberate murder, ~vould not have found the specific intent required for the 
(g)(7) circumstance, particulasly if the jnsy knew that its verdict would determine whether Mr 
Fields was eligible to be sentenced to death. 
IV. THE STATE'S PROCEDURAL DEFENSES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
A. Idaho Code Section 19-2519(5) Violates Petitioner's Rights to Due Process 
and Equal Protection Guaranteed under the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions. 
The State's argument that Fields' Ring claim cannot be raised in a successive proceeding 
under 1. C. $19-2719, because it is not within the exception of I.C. 5 19-27 19(5) is without 
merit." 
Section 19-2719 treats capitally sentenced inmates who attempt to challenge their 
convictions differently from other criminally convicted petitioners who are subject only to the 
UPCPA. Under the UPCPA, "post-conviction relief is not barred where new evidence is 
discovered, or -~vhere later case law suggests a conviction is unlawful." Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758, 766 n.12, 760 P.2d, 1174, 11 82 n. 12 (Idaho 1988) (citing I.C.5 19-4901) (emphasis 
added). Under the UPCPA, I.C. $ 19-4908, a claim can only be waived ifthe waiver is bzowing, 
1 1  Although the State makes no arguments opposing petitioner's motion to conect 
illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 35, the differing treatment of Rule 35 movants based on 
whether they are capital or non-capital cases is unconstitutional for all of the reasons set forth in 
section IV of this brief. 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 34 
voluntary and intelligent. h4cKznrzey v. State, 133 Iddlo 695, 700-01,922 P.2d 144, 149-50 
(Idaho 1999). Under iWcKinney, section 19-27 19 "supersedes the WCPA to the extent that their 
provisions conflict." Id. at 700, 922 P.2d at 149. In allowing non-capital, convicted imates  a 
collateral challenge to their conviction based upon new law or claims that were not waived 
knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently, the UPCPA offers non-capital imates  f a  broader 
protection and ability to correct an illegal, unconstitutional sentence than Idaho offers to inmates 
under a sentence of death. 
To the extent Idaho Code section19-2719(5) is construed to preclude review of 
petitioner's claims, the statute is unconstitutional. It violates equal protection and due process 
under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, §§ 2 and 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution, in that there is no rational basis, Romer v. Evans, 5 17 U.S. 620, 63 1-36 
(1995); City of Cleburtre v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446-51 (1985); Zubel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); U.S.D.A. v. Morerzo, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973); SterlingH 
Nelson h Sons, Izzc. v. Bender, 95 Idaho 8 13, 8 15-1 6, 520 P.2d 860, 861-62 (Idaho 1974), for the 
disparate treatment of non-capital prisoners who do not need to demonstrate the "heightened 
burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must meet, e.g., Paz v. State, 123 
Idaho 758,760, 852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993), or meet the limitations imposed by I.C. 5 19- 
2719(5). See, e.g., Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 648-49, 8 P.3d 636, 643-44 (Idaho 2000); 
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793,796-97, 10 P.3d 742, 745-46 (Idaho 1995). 
Moreover, the differing treatment of capita1 and non-capital petitioners in the context of 
the right which petitioner seeks to vindicate in this case, the fundamental right to a trial by jury, 
entitles petitioner to strict scrutiny of the discriminatory classification. See Newlan v. State, 96 
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Idaho 7 1 1, 714, 535 P.2d 1348, 135 1 (Idaho 1975) (st-rict scrutiny when statute" classification 
infringes upon a firndmental right); State v. Breed> 11 1 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202, 205 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (strict scmtiny of statutory schemes that infringe upon a "'fundamental 
right' such as voting, procrerslion, or constitutional safeguards for persons accused of crimes"). 
See gerzerafly Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constimtional Law, 5 14.41 at 785 (3rd ed. 1986) 
("'When the govement  takes actions that burden the rights of a classification of persons in tsmis 
of their treatment in a criminal justice system it is proper to review these laws under the strict 
scrutiny standard for equal protection"). As the right to trial by jury is a fundamental right,l2 this 
court must review regulations that purport to regulate the right with strict scrutiny. Van 
Valkenburgh v. Cztzzens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 12 1, 126, 15 P.3d 1 129, 1 134 (Idaho 2000) 
(if a fundamental right is at issue, appropriate standard of review of law infringing on that right is 
strict scmtiny). 
As Idaho's differing treatment of postconviction petitioners fails under a rational basis 
analysis, it clearly fails under strict scrutiny. "A law which infringes on a hdamental  riglit will 
12 "[G]onstitutional safeguards for persons accused of crimes are fundamental rights 
under the state constitution." Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 
573, 58 1, 850 P.2d 724, 732 (Idaho 1993) (dictum). A right is fundamental under the Idaho 
Constitution if it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or expressed as a positive right in 
the constitution. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 126, 15 P.3d 
1129, 1134 (Idaho 2000). Citing the Idaho Constitution's protection of the right of suffiage in 
two places, the state supreme court concluded that the right of suffrage is a fundamental right. 
Id. The right to trial by jury is likewise explicitly protected in two places in the Idaho 
Constitution. Idaho Const. Art. I, $7, id. Art. V, $1. Consistent with the supreme court's dictum 
regarding the fundamental nature of constitutional protections for persons accused of crime, 
together with the explicit recognition of the right to trial by jury in two places in the Idaho 
Constitution, it is unassailable that the right to trial by jury is a fundamental right under Idaho 
law. 
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be upheld only where the State can demons&ate the law is necessary to promote a compelling 
state interest." Id. The state's interest in expeditious handling of capital cases, the puspose of the 
offending provision, X.C. 5 19-2719, is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the 
violation of petitioner's fundmental right to trial by jury. 
B. Section 19-2'719 Unconstitutionally Suspends the Right to Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. 
Section 19-27 19 also unlawfully suspends the writ of habeas corpus under Article 1, 5 5 
of the Idaho Constitution and Article I, 5 9, clause 2 of the federal constitution, by precluding 
petitioner Erom raising valid claims under Ring that invalidate his sentence. Although the 
legislature has regulated the use of habeas corpus by statute, "the writ is not a statutory remedy, 
but rather a remedy recognized and protected by the Idaho Constitution." Mahuflej~ v. Sfate, 87 
Idaho 228, 231,392 P.2d 279,280 (Idaho 1964). The legislature "is without power to abridge 
this remedy secured by the Constitution," id., though by statute the legislature "may add to the 
efficacy of the \vrit," and the statute "should be construed so as to promote the effectiveness of 
the proceeding." Id. Idaho Code sectioii 19-27 19(5)(c)'s purported refusal to allow retroactive 
consideration of Ring violates petitioner's right to challenge his conviction through habeas 
corpus under the state ~onstitution.'~ Id. Const. art. 1, 5 5. 
l 3  Idaho Code section 19-27 19(5)(c)'s purported refusal to allow retroactive 
consideration of Ring additionally violates not only equal protection and due process under the 
state and federal constitutions, Cleburne, supra, Nowak et al., supra, but also petitioner's 
fundamental right to a trial by jury, Idaho Const. Art. I, fj 7, id. Art. \I, fj 1, U.S. Const. amend. 
VI and notice of every element of the offense in the charging papers, Idaho Const. Art. I, 5 8, 
U.S. Const. amend. V. See State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560,564-67, 861 P.2d 1225, 1229-32 (Id. 
Ct. App. 1993) (Walters, J.). 
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The legislature's regulation of the writ of habeas corpus in I.C. $5  19-4901 et seq. and 
19-271 9 may not operate to suspend the writ. As the ldaho Supreme Court stated so aptly in 
Mahafl~y, the legislature's regulation of habeas corpus must pvesewe it: 
the limitations upon the remedy afforded by habeas corpus should beflexible and readily 
available to prevertt mangest irzjustice, for, as Mr. Justice Black has expressed it, the 
principles judicially established for the delimitation of habeas corpus action "must be 
construed and applied so as to presewe - not destroy - cotzstztutional sa_fpuvds of 
human ZiJe and l iher~ . '  [Citation omitted] 
Mahcffley, 87 ldaho at 23 1,392 P.2d at 280 (emphasis added). 
Idaho Code section 19-27 19 (5)(c) does not allow habeas corpus actions that seek 
vindication of fundmental rights through the retroactive application of judicial decisions and 
accordingly precludes relief for a Ring violation of petitioner's right to a jury trial, notice and due 
process. If the legislature's elimination of that aspect of state habeas corpus were constitutional, 
it would leave petitioner with rights to a jury trial, notice of charges and due process under Ring, 
but no remedy. Mahaffey makes clear, however, that the withdrawal of a habeas corpus remedy 
for the denial of fundamental rights violates Article I, section 5 of the Idaho Constitution. 
In the instant case, however, we must face the unique fact that i fwe deny petitioner's 
application he will be in the unfortunate and medieval position of possessing a right for 
which there exists no remedy. Urzless we wish to destroy petitioner's constitutionally 
guaranteed right to be secure from cruel and unusual punishment, we must hold that the 
writ ofhabeas corpus may issue in this type of situation. 
Mahafley, 87 Idaho at 231-32, 392 P.2d at 281 (emphasis added). 
Refusal by the Idaho state courts to enforce the state constitutional and statutory rights 
asserted by Petitioner violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
petitioner's rights to due process of law and violates his liberty interest in the enforcement of 
rights created and recognized by state law. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980). 
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h sum, constming Idaho Code section 19-2719 and the WCPA to preclude consideration 
of the merits of petitioner's claims would violate both the Idatlo Constitution, Article I, $5 2, 5 ,  
7 ,  8, 13 asld 18, and Article V, 5 1, and the United States Constitution, Article I 9 9 el. 2, the 
Fifth and Sixth hendmenls ,  and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourleenth Amendment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The ruling in Ring has reduced Idaho's death penalty scheme to constitutional rubble. 
Anempring to retrospectively determine under what framework Fields's case would have been 
tried, and what decisions his lawyers would have made had Ring been the law, is an exercise in 
guesswork. What Ring does make unmistakably clear is that petitioner was tried under a 
fundamentally flawed statute, that the impact of the error cannot be deemed harmless, and that 
his sentence of death must be vacated. 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE n\*T OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 39 
3X/ DATED this 2day of November, 2002. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I I-IEREBY CERTIFY that on the ay of November, 2002, I served the foregoing 
document on all interested parties by the Aethod indicated below, postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front St., Room 3191 
Boise ID 83720 
Facsimile 
Federal Express 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR S U m A R Y  DISMISSAL - 40 
"w 
* .  /it&++ 6s; 5% a, i""- s P; CJ w$kf s&$&; 4J - - -  -- - -- -- - *@a A M *  FiL;if - 12 : [I.@ - 
$t2. NOV 2 5 2002 
k%i2d ,JQ(btNMt 8ISf-2ER 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 es -- 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
201 N. Main 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-0180 
BRUCE D. LIVINGSTON 
Missouri Bar No. 34444 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
201 N. Main 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-0180 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) 
Petitioner, ) 
) Case No. SP OT 020071 ID 
v 1 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 1 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, i 
Plaintiff ) 
v. 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 
) 
1 Case No. 16259 
) 
Defendant. ) MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION 
The undersigned local counsel, Joan Fisher, petitions the Court for admission of the 
undersigned applying counsel, Bruce D. Livingston, pursuant to Idaho Bar Commission Rule 
222, to allow him to appearpro hue vice for petitioner in these proceedings without payment of 
any fee. 
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Applying counsel, Bruce Livingston, cerlifies that he is an active member, in good 
sanding, of the bar of the Srate of Missouri, that he mainwins the regular practice of law at the 
above-noted address as a Federal Defender exclusively representing indigent clients, and that he 
is a resident of the State of Idaho but is not licensed to practice law in the state courts of Idaho. 
Mr. Livingston certifies that he has never previously been admitted under ICBR or appeared as 
counsel in the Idaho state courts. 
Both undersigned counsel certify that a copy of this motion has been served on all other 
parties to this matter and that a copy of the motion has been provided to the Idaho State Bar. 
Local counsel, Joan Fisher, certifies that the above information is true to the best of her 
knowledge, after reasonable investigation. Local counsel acknowledges that her attendance shall 
be required at all court proceedings in which applying counsel appears, unless specifically 
excused by the trial judge. 
Applying counsel also petitions the court for a waiver of the $200 fee for a limited 
appeaxance. Petitioner is an indigent death row inmate who has previously been granted injbrmu 
pauperis status by the Idaho state courts and the United States District Court for the District of 
Idaho. Applying counsel, Bruce D. Livingston, generates no fees as a result of his representation 
of petitioner and is an attorney employed by the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Defenders of 
Eastern Washington & Idaho, which was appointed to represent petitioner in federal court. The 
Federal Defenders will not seek payment for their representation of petitioner in state court. 
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The motion for limited appearance of Bruce D. Livingston in these proceedings is 
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his employer, the Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho. 
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COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the State's response to the Petitioner's 
Memorandum in Opposition to the State's earlier response and motion for summary 
dismissal of Fields' petition requesting that he be resentenced based upon the holding 
in Ring V. Arizona. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL (FIELDS/HCR16259/SPOT0200nlD), Page 1 00095 
The State has earlier responded to Fields' petition by filing a response dated 
August 30, 2002, In that response, the State has urged the Court to find that United 
States Supreme Court decision in does not apply retroactively to 
petitioner Fields. The State brought to the Court's attention several Idaho decisions 
together with Idaho Code $19-2719(5)(c), which preclude the filing of a successive post 
conviction pleading that attempts to seek the retroactive application of a new rule of 
law. The State also moved this Court for summary dismissal of Fields' petition. 
Since that time, Fields has filed a response, which argues that the Ring decision 
should be applied retroactively to him for several reasons set out in the response. 
Today's State's response is in direct contradiction of Fields' arguments and sets out 
recent case law showing conclusively that the Ring decision cannot be applied 
retroactively by this Court. 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN RING V. ARIZONA DID NOT U K E  THE 
HOLDING RETROACTIVE AND THE HOLDING CANNOT BE RETROACTIVELY' 
APPLIED OTHERWISE BY THIS COURT 
In 1991, when defendant Fields was sentenced to death by Judge Schroeder, the 
law of the land was clear. A judge, without participation by the jury, could 
constitutionally find statutory aggravating circumstances after a guilty verdict or plea 
to first-degree murder and sentence the defendant to death. There was no question 
about it. Fields' judgment and denial of post-conviction relief became final in Fields v. 
State, 127 Idaho 904 (1995). 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL (FIELDS/HCR16259/SPOT0200711D), Page 2 00096 
In the years before Fields was sentenced, and in the years since, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of judge sentencing in first 
depee murder cases. 
A prominent case among the several eases is State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129 
(1989). The United State Supreme Court also upheld judge sentencing in Walton v. 
Arizona, 48'7 U.S. 639 (1990). 
It wasn't until years later when the United State Supreme Court decided 
Apprendi v. New Jersev, 530 US 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) that there 
began to be doubt concerning the continued vitality of judge sentencing. The court in 
Apprendi held that, "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." The Apprendi court vacated the sentence 
of a person convicted in New Jersey whose sentence was enhanced because the 
sentencing judge found that the crime was committed in violation of New Jersey's hate 
crime statutes. The hate crime statutes increased the maximum potential available 
sentence for the offender. Apprendi's jury had not been asked to find that Apprendi's 
crime was committed for hate bias reasons. 
At the time of the Apprendi decision, it was apparent that Apprendi and Walton 
were in conflict. Walton could not stand for the proposition that a judge could make 
factual findings that increase the maximum potential sentence in death penalty cases 
in the face of the Apprendi decision. The issue had to be decided and Ring v. Arizona is 
the application of the Apprendi rule to death penalty litigation. 
Fields now argues that the Ring decision should be retroactive to his death 
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sentence, which was final years earlier. There is no legal basis for a retroacf ve 
application. To begin with, only the Suprerne Court can make the holding retroactive 
and they did not. 
The only reference to retroactivity is in Justice OTonnor's dissent, which the 
Chief Justice joins. They point out that each prisoner on death row in the states affected 
by the Rinff holding, will likely challenge his or her death sentence. Justice O'Connor 
said the following: 
"I believe many of these challenges will ultimately be unsuccessful, either 
because the vrisoners will be unable to satisfv the standards of harmless error 
1 J 
or plain error review or because, having completed their direct appeals, they 
will be barred from taking advantage of today's holding on federal collateral 
review." See 28 U.S.C. section 2244 (b)(2)(A), 2254(d)(1); Teame v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288,109 S.Ct. 1060,103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1383); Rina 122 Sup. Ct. at page 2149 
and 2450. 
The Supreme Court did not say that the decision was retroactive and Justice 
O'Conner recognized that most defendants who attempted to have it applied to their 
cases would be barred from doing so on collateral review. This is in keeping with other 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court has decided the retroactivity issue 
in other cases and has given us clear direction on its application. 
One such recent case is Tyler v. Cain, 533 US 656, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 
632 (2001). A synopsis of the issue before the court in Tyler was set out by Justice 
Thomas in the first paragraph of the decision as follows: 
"Under Cane v. Louisiana, 498 US 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 
(1990)(~er curiam), a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow 
conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, we must 
decide whether this rule was "made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(2)&) (1994 ed., 
Supp V). We hold that it was not." 533 U.S. at page 658. 
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I n  1975, the petitioner Tyler shot and killed his 20-day-old daughter during a 
fight with his girlhiend. Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder and his 
conviction was af i rmed on appeal. Over the next ten years, Tyler filed five (5) post 
conviction petitions, all of which were denied. I n  1990 the United States Supreme 
Court issued the decision, aRerwhich Tyler filed a federal habeas petition 
claiming tha t  the jury instruction defining reasonable doubt in  his trial was 
substantially identical to the instruction condemned in the Cage decision. Tyler also 
filed a sixth state post-conviction petition raising the Cage claim. The Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit allowed Tyler to raise the claim, but the Federal District Court 
denied his petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the petition, which sets 
the stage for the Tyler v. Cain decision. 
The Supreme Court held that  the Cage decision was not retroactively applicable 
to Tvler. This was done in the context of interpreting the federal rule, which prohibits a 
successive petition based upon the application of a new rule of law, much the same as 
Idaho Code $19-2719(5)(c) does in Idaho. The Court stated the following: 
Quite significantly, under this provision, the Supreme Court is the only 
entity tha t  can "make" a new rule retroactive. The new rule becomes 
retroactive, not by the decisions of a lower court or by the combined action 
of the Supreme Court and the lower courts, but simply by the actions of 
the Supreme Court. The only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, "lay 
out and construct, a rule's retroactive effect, or "cause" tha t  effect "to exist, 
or occur, or appear," is through a holding. The Supreme Court does not 
"make" a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principals of 
retroactivity and leaves the application of those principals to lower courts. 
I n  such a n  event, any legal conclusion that  is derived from the principles is 
developed by the lower court (or perhaps by a combination of courts), not 
by the Supreme Court. We thus  conclude tha t  a new rule is not "made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review" unless the Supreme Court holds it 
to be retroactive. 533 U.S. a t  page 662. 
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THE RING HOLDING IS NOT RETROACTIW BASED ON A "TEAGUE'XANALYSIS 
also argued that the Cape rule should be retroactive under a Tearrue v. 
Lane, supra, analysis. The Tyler court rejected the argument that the Teaaue case 
made Cage retroactive as well. An understanding of the case is helpful in 
understanding why the Tyler court held that Cage was not retroactive to Tyler. As 
quoted above, the Tvler, case analyses at len@h the T e a ~ u e  v. Lane, decision. In the 
Teacrue case, the question before the court was whether nor not the court's decision in 
Batson v. Kentuckv, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986) should be 
applied retroactively to petitioner Teaaue. 
Teague was a black man who had been convicted by an  all white jury in Illinois. 
The prosecutor had used all ten of his preemptory challenges to exclude blacks from the 
petitioner's jury. The petitioner was convicted and his conviction became final prior to 
the decision by the Supreme Court in Batson. 
As is well known, the Supreme Court in Batson held that a prosecutor could not 
use peremptory challenges to remove jury members based upon the juror's race. 
Even though Teame's conviction was final in state court, his conviction was 
being collaterally reviewed in federal court on a writ of habeas corpus when the Batson 
case was decided. Much of the T e a ~ u e  decision deals with procedural default and other 
issues related specifically to Tea~ue 's  petition. However, T e a ~ u e  urged that the Sixth 
Amendment's fair cross section requirement should apply to petit juries. In that 
context, the Court addressed the question of retroactivity. 
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The Court pointed out that the retroac~ve application of a new rule upon state courts 
causes a great deal of cost and frustration. The Court stated the following: 
The "costs imposed upon the states by retroactive application of new rules 
of constitutional law on habeas corpus ... generally far outweigh the 
benefits of this application.'3n many ways, the application of new rules to 
cases on collateral review may be more intrusive than enjoining of 
criminal prosecutions for it continually forces the states to marshal 
resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals 
conform to then-existing constitutional standards. Furthermore as  we 
recognized in Engle v. Isaac, "'state courts are understandably frustrated 
when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a 
federal court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional 
commands. citntions omitted 103 L.Ed.2d a t  p .355 
The Court said that it found those criticisms to be "persuasive" and so held the 
following: 
Unless they fall within an  exception to the general rule, new constitutional 
rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases, which 
have become final before the new rules are announced. 103 L.Ed.2d a t  
page 355 and 356. 
It is for that reason, that the Tyler court held that a new rule is not retroactive 
unless the Supreme Court specifically held that it was to be retroactive a t  the time the 
decision was made or unless some subsequent case or a series of cases specifically 
makes it retroactive. 
The Teague court goes on to hold though that a new rule can be applicable to a 
case on collateral review if, and only if, it falls within an  exception to the non - 
retroactivity rule. The Court found two exceptions. The first being that a new rule 
should be applied retroactively if it places "certain kinds of primary private individual 
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to proscribe." 
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The second exception was to be the observance of "'those procedures that are 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" which the court defined to mean '"watershed 
rules of criminal procedure." The Court further defined watershed to mean "bedrock 
procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular 
conviction." An example the Court gave would be the right to counsel a t  trial. 
The Court expanded on "bedrock procedural elements" with the "requirement 
that the procedure a t  issue must implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial." 103 
The Court gave an example of an 'kccuracy enhancing procedural rule" to be a 
rule "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." 
The Court said the following: 
We are also of the view that such rules are best illustrated by revealing 
the classic grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus - -  that the 
proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly 
made use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based on a 
confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods." 103 L.Ed.2d a t  
p. 358 
The Teame court went on to determine that the rule requiring that petit juries 
be composed of a fair cross section of the community was not a "bedrock procedural 
element" that should be retroactively applied. The defendant's petition was denied. 
Once Teague is understood, the holding in Tyler is not surprising. 
The Tyler court said the following of Teame: 
Under Teague, a new rule can be retroactive to cases on collateral review 
if, and only if, it falls within one of two narrow exceptions to the general 
rule of non-retroactivity. Id. a t  3 11-3 13 109 S.Ct. 1060 (plurality opinion). 
See also 07Dell v. Netherland, 521 US 151, 156-157, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 138 
L.Ed.2d 351 (1997). 
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The exception relevant here is for "watershed rules of criminal procedure 
implicating the k d a m e n t a l  fairness and accuracy of the criminal 
proceeding." Graham v. Collins, 506 US 461, 4'78, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 
L.Ed.2d 260 (1993). To fall within this exception, a new rule must meet 
two requirements: Infringement of the rule must "seriously diminish the 
likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction," and the rule must "alter 
our understanding of the bedock pr~cedurai  ejemends essential to the 
fairness of a proceeding." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 US 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 
2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 1993 (1990)(quoting Teague, s u p  a t  311, 109 S.Ct. 
1060 (plurality opinion), in turn quoting Mackev v. United States, 401 US 
667, 693, 91 S.Ct, 1160, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971)(Harlan, J., concurring in 
judgments in part and dissenting in part.) 
According to Tyler, the reasoning of Sullivan demonstrates that the Cage 
rule satisfies both prongs of this Teague exception. First, Tyler notes, 
Sullivan repeatedly emphasized that a Cage error fundamentally 
undermines the reliability of a trials outcome. And second, Tyler contends, 
the central point of Sullivan is that a Cage error deprives a defendant of a 
bedrock element of procedural fairness: the right to have the jury make the 
determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Tyler's arguments fail to 
persuade, however. The most he can claim is that, based on the principals 
outlined in Teague, this court shouldmake Cage retroactive to cases on 
collateral review. What is clear, however, is that we have not "made" Cage 
retroactive to cases on collateral review. 533 U.S. a t  page 665. 
Tyler also claimed that the Cage error was "'structural error" and that as  such 
should apply retroactively to him. The Court rejected that argument as follows: 
The only holding in Sullivan is that a Cage error is structural error. There 
is not a second case that held that all structural error rules apply 
retroactively or that all structural error rules fit within the second Teague 
exception. The standard for determining whether an error is structural, 
see generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 11 1 S.Ct. 1246, 113 
L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)~ is not coextensive with the second Teague exception, 
and a holding that a particular error is structural does not logically dictate 
the conclusion that the second Teague exception has been met. 
Footnote 7 - as explained above, the second Teaaue exception is available only if the 
new rule "alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural essentials "essential to 
the fairness of a proceeding." Classifying an error as structural does not necessarily 
alter our understanding of these bedrockprocedural elements. Nor can it be said that 
all new rules relating to due process (or even the "fundamental requirements of due 
process,") alter such understanding. Citations omitted. P.665 
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The court went on to reject argument tha t  Cage was retroactive and 
denied his request to make it retroactive. The Tyler ease clearly stands for the  
proposition that  a Supreme Court holding is not retroactive until either the court says 
tha t  it is retroactive or the holdings in multiple cases necessarily dictate retroactivity of 
the new rule. It also teaches us  tha t  calling a procedural error structural does not 
necessarily require retroactivity under Teague. As applied to Tyler, even though. his 
jury instruction was unconstitutional because it did not require a proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt finding by the jury, the Cape rule was not retroactive. 
As pointed out above, nothing in the Ring decision makes the holding retroactive. 
The State has  been unable to find any reported case holding tha t  the Ring decision has  
been applied retroactively. The Tenth Circuit has  specifically held that  the Ring 
decision is not retroactive. I n  Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d. 989 (10th Cir. July 19, 2002) 
the court addressed the Ring retroactivity question directly. 
Cannon was convicted of first-degree murder under a n  Oklahoma law tha t  
required the jury, if they made a unanimous recommendation of death, to find a 
statutory aggravating circumstance unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
aggravating circumstance must outweigh the finding of any mitigating circumstances. 
The question of the existence of the statutory aggravators was submitted to the 
jury and expressly made subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but the jury was 
not instructed that  it needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that  the aggravating 
circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Both of those factual 
determinations were necessary to make the defendant death eligible under Oklahoma 
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law. The defendant was sentenced to death and filed a habeas corpus petition, which 
was denied. In  the i~ l s t an t  case, the defendant sought to file a second or successive 
habeas petition. 
The Court held tha t  Cannon was entitled to file a second habeas petition only if 
the Rinff decision 'ket forth a new rule of constitutional law tha t  was previously 
unavailable and the Supreme Court has  made the new rule retroactive to cases on 
collateral review." The Court said the following: 
Cannon's argument in  favor of his assertion tha t  the Supreme Court has  
made Ring retroactive to cases on collateral review is two-fold: (1) because 
Rinc?. announced a new rule of substantive criminal law under the Eight 
Amendment applicable to state capital crimes, the limitations of Tearrue v. 
Lane, 489 US 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 ( 1 9 ~ 9 ) ~  therefore do 
not apply, and the requirements of section 2244(b)(2)(A) are  met; and (2) 
the Supreme Court has  made Rina retroactive to cases on collateral review 
through the combination of T e a ~ u e ,  Ring, and cases preceding Ring in  the 
Apprendi line. Neither assertion is convincing. 
Cannon is simply incorrect in  asserting tha t  the combination of Teague, 
Ring, and the cases in the Apprendi line render the rule announced in 
Ring retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. The Supreme 
Court considered the contours of section 2244(b)(2)(A) in Tyler. The Court 
began by noting that,  "under this provision, the Supreme Court is the only 
entity that  can make a new rule retroactive. 
The new rule becomes retroactive, not by the decisions of the lower court or 
by the combined action of the Supreme Court and the lower courts, but 
simply by the actions of the Supreme Court." The Court went on to note 
that  the only way it could make a rule retroactively applicable is through a 
"holding7'to that  effect. "The Supreme Court does not make a rule 
retroactive when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity and 
leaves the application of those principles to lower courts." (quoting Tyler) . 
. .the Court did recognize that  it could "make a rule retroactive over the 
course of two cases,"but only if "the holdings in those cases necessarily 
dictate retroactivity of the new rule." 
Despite this language from Tyler, the thrust of Cannon's multiple case 
argument is that the rule set out in Apprendi and extended in Ring to the 
death penalty context, fits within Teague7s second exception for watershed 
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rules of criminal procedure and has therefore been rnade retroac"c;vely 
applicable by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review. This 
argument seriously misconstrues . Page 992 - 993. 
The Court went on to find that the mere fact that a new rule might be retroactive 
was not sufficient. The Court held that Cannon had failed to identify language in any of 
the cases mandating "by strict logical necessity" that the Supreme Court has rnade the 
rule in retroactive. 
However, Cannon argued in the alternative that announced a new rule of 
subsdaative criminal law and that the Supreme Court's decision in Bouslev v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 Sup. Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998), holding that 
Teague7s retroactivity analysis does not apply to substantive interpretations of criminal 
statutes, and renders Ring retroactive for purposes of collateral review. 
But the Court held that: 
It is clear, however, that Ring is simply an extension of Apprendi to the 
death penalty context. Accordingly, this courts recent decision in United 
States v. Mora, 293 F.2d 1213, (10th Cir. 20021, that Apprendi announces 
a rule of criminal procedure forecloses Cannon's argument that Ring 
announced a substantive rule. Page 994 
Based on the above, the Tenth Circuit denied Cannon's request to be allowed to 
file a successive petition. The Court found that Apprendi announced a rule of criminal 
procedure and that Ring was just an  extension of that and therefore was not 
substantive. 
The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that the Apprendi decision is not 
retroactive. In Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227 (May 2000) the Ninth Circuit refused to 
apply Apprendi retroactively to a case where the defendant was convicted of attempting 
to murder a cab driver. The language in the Information was, "willfully, unlawfully, 
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and with malice aforethought". The Information did not allege that the attempted 
murder was premeditated. The case went to trial with both the prosecution and the 
defense assuming that premeditation had been alleged in the Infbrmation, and 
premeditation was argued to the jury. 
The jury was instructed that they could only find the defendant guilty of 
attempted murder if the attempted murder was "willful, deliberate, and premeditated." 
The jury so found and the defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The sentence of life imprisonment was only available if the defendant's attempted 
murder was done with premeditation. 
The sentencing court found premeditation, but as  noted above, the defendant's 
charging document did not contain premeditation language. The California Supreme 
Court held that the increased penalty for premeditated attempted murder was a 
sentencing enhancement and upheld the defendant's conviction and sentence. Without 
premeditation, the person guilty of the attempt could only be sentenced for up to nine 
years. 
The issue then before the Ninth Circuit was whether the Apprendi holding was 
retroactive to the set of circumstances described above. The Ninth Circuit denied the 
defendant's claim as  follows: 
After Apprendi, California's treatment of premeditation as  a sentencing 
factor, which was the basis for the California Supreme Court's holding in 
Bright, 909 P.2d 1354, is open to question. We need not decide the 
question of whether the petitioner's conviction comports with Apprendi, 
however, because we find that the non-retroactivity principle pronounced 
in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)~ 
prevents petitioner from benefiting from Apprendi7s new rule on collateral 
review. Page 1236 
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The Court then analyzed the case as it applied to the petitioner. Thc 
Court noted the following, ""the retroactivity rule adopted in Teague reflects not only a 
healthy measure of respect for state court decisions that complied with 
contemporaneous constitutional norms, but it also serves a policy of treating all 
similarly situated defendants equally on federal habeas . 'T~arr i~er  v. Lewis, 948 F.2d. 
588 (9th Cir. 1991). 
Tbe Court said of Teague, "A case announces a new rule when it breaks new 
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government [or] if the 
result was not dictated by precedent existing a t  the time the defendant's conviction 
became final." Teague, supra, page 1236. 
The Court then observed that Apprendi established a new rule and so determined 
that an analysis of Teague factors was appropriate. The Court viewed Teague as  
requiring a three-step inquiry as follows: 
First, the court must ascertain the date on which the defendant's 
conviction and sentence became final for Teague purposes. Second, 
the court must survey the legal landscape as  it  then existed and 
determine whether a state court considering the defendant's claim 
at  the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by 
existing precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was required 
by the constitution. 
Finally, even if the court determines that the defendant seeks the 
benefit of a new rule, the court must decide whether that rule falls 
within one of the two narrow exceptions to the non-retroactivity 
principle. 
A state conviction and sentence becomes final for purposes of 
retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the 
state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for 
a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been 
finally denied. Page 1237 
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With that  criteria in  mind, the Court held tha t  a state court considering the 
petitioners claim in  1992, which was when his case was final, would not have concluded 
tha t  the petitioners conviction violated the constitution. 
The Court then turned to the third prong of , which is whether the new 
rule fits within the two narrow exceptions to the non-retroactivity principle. 
The new rule must be of a kind tha t  either places "certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to 
proscribe [or1 requires the observance of those procedures which are  implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty." Teague, supra. Obviously, the first exception identified in 
Teague was not applicable since the law against attempted murder had not been 
changed. 
The second exception identified in Teague requires retroactive application of 
certain "watershed rules of criminal procedure." Teague, supra. The Court stated the 
following: 
Retroactive application will occur where both (1) a failure to adopt the new 
rule "creates a n  impermissibly large risk that  the innocent will be 
convicted," and (2) "the procedure at issue ... implicates the fundamental 
fairness of the trial." I n  order to qualify under this exception, the new rule 
must do more than  systematically enhance the reliability a criminal 
proceeding; the rule must be a n  absolute prerequisite to the trial's 
fundamental fairness. See C a r r i ~ e r ,  948 F.2d. a t  598. Page 1237 
I n  the case a t  bar, the Apprendi rule, a t  least a s  applied to the omission of 
certain necessary elements from the state court information, is neither 
implicit in  the concept of ordered liberty nor a n  absolute prerequisite to a 
fair trial. Page 1238 
The court found tha t  the defendant was on notice of the nature and details of the 
accusation against him, a s  well a s  the possible sentences he might receive and therefore 
declined to apply the Apprendi rule retroactively. Under the state of the law a t  the time 
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the defendant was convicted, premeditation was constitutionally viewed as a sentencing 
factor only. 
The undersigned cannot help but observe the similarities between the Jones case 
and Fields. At the time of Fields' sentencing, the aggravators were mere sentencing 
factors under well-settled law. There was no question about it. Ring cannot be 
retroactively applied to Fields on the theory that  to do otherwise would "create an 
impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted." The legality of his 
conviction has been upheld by the Supreme Court and is not a t  issue here. We are 
arguing about sentencing procedure only. 
The Ninth Circuit visited the Apprendi retroactivity question again in United 
States v. Juan Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. November 2001). In that case, 
Sanchez-Cervantes was convicted by a jury of several drug offenses, but the jury made 
no finding as to the drug amounts. However, after a presentence report, the court found 
that the defendant was responsible for having distributed methamphetamine, cocaine, 
and marijuana in certain amounts. Based on the amounts found by the judge, Sanchez- 
Cervantes was sentenced to a term of months much higher than he would have been 
eligible for without the finding of drug quantities. The defendant appealed his 
conviction and sentence which the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 1996. 
Later, the defendant filed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and while 
that claim was pending in federal district court, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi. 
Sanchez-Cervantes sought to amend his petition arguing that his sentence violated the 
ruling in Apprendi because his jury had not made the drug quantity determination 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Ninth Circuit noted that at the time of Sanchez- 
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Cervantes trial, all of the circuits in the country allowed a judge to determine drug 
quantity for sentencing purposes. The Court denied the defendant's claim, 
and stated the following: 
Our decisions that subjected claims to harmless error analysis or 
plain error review lend additional support to our determination that  
Ap~rend i  is not a bedrock procedural rule. In these cases, we did not 
consider Apprendi errors to be structural. A structural error is one that  
necessarily renders a trial fundamentally unfair and therefore invalidates 
the conviction. 
We only review for plain error or assess whether a n  error is harmless 
when the error is not structural; in those circumstances, the court must 
determine whether any substantial rights were prejudiced by the error. By 
applying harmless error analysis or plain error review to Ap~rend i  claims, 
we have necessarily held that  Apprendi errors do not render a trial 
fundamentally unfair. Therefore, it would seem illogical to hold that  such 
an  error is a watershed rule that  "implicates the fundamental fairness of 
the trial." In addition, the Supreme Court noted in Tyler v. Cain, supra, 
that  not all structural-error rules fit into Teague's second exception. This 
implies that Teague's second exception is even narrower than the category 
of structural error rules. From these holdings, it follows that the new 
A~prend i  rule is not so fundamental a s  to fit within Teague's second 
exception. Page 670 
In other words, the Court found that  the Apprendi decision was not a "watershed 
rule" that  implicated the trial's fundamental fairness. The Court noted that some 
decisions were given retroactive effect because they were to "overcome a n  aspect of the 
criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth finding function" and so raises serious 
doubts about the accuracy of guilty verdicts. The Court points out that  "the application 
of Apprendi only effects the enhancement of a defendant's sentence once he or she has 
already been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it does not rise to the 
importance of other cases that have been made retroactive. 
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The Sanchez.Cervatnes court cited the examples of In re Winship, 39'7 U.S. 358, 
90 S.Ct. 1068, 35 L.Ed.Bd 368 (1970) and Mullanev v. ?Vilber, 421 U.S. 684 95 S.Ct. 
1881, 44 L.Eda2d 509 (1975) as  decisions later made retroactive by the Supreme Court. 
Winship requlred that  the standard of proof in juvenile prosecutions be proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Mullanev required that  the state prove the absence of heat of passson 
upon sudden provocation in. a homicide case. The burden of proof could not be shifted to 
the defendant. 
The Court said Winship and Mullanev were given retroactive effect because to do 
otherwise would "substantially impair" the trial's "truth -finding function" and would 
raise "serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts." 
Apprendi does not "rise to the level of importance of Winship or It%ullanevn 
because it does not affect verdict accuracy. Allowing the judge to determine the quantity 
of drugs for sentencing purposes does not impair the jury's ability to find the truth 
regarding whether the defendant possessed, distributed, or conspired to distribute some 
amount of drugs. 
There is no question that  the Apprendi decision is only procedural and not 
substantive. The Supreme Court said a s  much in the Apxtrendi decision a t  530 U.S. a t  
475, 120 Sup. Ct. a t  2348: "the substantive basis for New Jersey's enhancement is thus 
not a t  issue; the adequacy of New Jersey's procedure is." A number of federal circuit 
courts have also held that Apxtrendi is procedural rather than substantive. United 
States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d. 139 (4th Cis. 2001); United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d. 304 
(5th Cir. 2002); Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d. 841 (7th Cir. 2002); U.S. ex rel. Perez 
v. Warden, FMC Rochester, 252 F.3d. 993 (8th Cir. 2002); McCoy v. United States, 266 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL (FIELDS/HCR16259/SPOT02007llD), Page 18 00212 
As noted in Harris v. United Stat-, U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 2406,2427 
(2002)(Thomas J., dissenting), "No Court of Appeals, let alone this Court, has  held that  
Apprendi has retroactive effect." See also Curtis v, United States, 294 F.3d 841, 842 (7th 
Cir. 20021, listing cases. 
The State is eongdent that, following these rulings, the Ninth Circuit would also 
find that  the Ring decision flows from and as  such is a procedural change that  
does not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial and so is not retroactive. 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS IN FIELDS' CASE 
There is no question that Fields' case was final before the Ring decision was 
announced. I t  was final before the decision in Apprendi. The United States Supreme 
Court has made it clear that  a decision is only retroactive if the Supreme Court makes 
it retroactive or a series of Supreme Court decisions dictate that the decision be 
retroactive. The Supreme Court did not make the Ring holding retroactive. 
There has been no series of Supreme Court cases since that time dictating that  
the Ring decision be retroactive. 
That means then, that  the Ring decision can only be applied retroactively if it 
meets the narrow exception set out in the Teague case. The Teague court held that  a 
new rule can only be applied retroactively if it: (1) "places certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to 
proscribe." That obviously is not the case here. Or, (2) "a new rule should be applied 
retroactively if it requires the observance of those "procedures that  are implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty." 
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The phrase, "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is further defined by the 
court to be watershed rules that "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction." 
The court gives examples of it's "accuracy-enhancing procedural rules" that might 
be applied retroactively as  being proceedings dominated by mob violence, the use of 
perjured testimony, or the use of a confession extorted from a defendant by brutal 
methods. In the court's view, those are bedrock procedural elements that are in place to 
ensure an accurate conviction. 
By comparison to the issue at hand, there is no argument, and indeed there can be no 
sensible argument made, that any of the classic examples given by the court as requiring 
retroactive application are at issue here. The only issue is whether a jury should have been 
asked to find statutory aggravators instead of the judge. That has nothing to do with the 
accuracy of the underlying conviction. 
The Ninth Circuit has denied retroactive application of the Apprendi case in 
Jones where premeditation language was left out of the Information charging Jones 
with attempted murder and that the judge thereafter found. The court finding of 
premeditation greatly enhanced the defendant's sentence. The Ninth Circuit again 
denied retroactive application of Ap~rendi n U.S. v. Sanchez-Cervantes where the jury 
was not asked to make a finding as to the quantity of drugs possessed by the defendant. 
Rather, the court made that finding and enhanced the defendant's sentence. There is no 
reason to think that the Ninth Circuit, following their own line of cases, would make a 
different finding in applying Ring retroactively. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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As pointed out above, the Tenth Circuit in Cannon v. Mullin, supra, determined 
that was not retroactive. The Tenth Circuit Court found that was simply an 
extension of Apprendi in the death penalty context and since they had found that 
was a procedural rule and not retroactive, they held that Ring was not 
retroactive. That is basically the same analysis used and applied by the Ninth Circuit 
in Sanchez-Cervantes and Jones. 
There is no reason to think that the Ninth Circuit would apply Riqg retroactively 
to Fields. At the time Fields was sentenced in 1991, his sentencing procedure was on all 
fours with existing Idaho and United States Supreme Court case law. 
CONCLUSION 
The basic principle of retroactivity as discussed above is not new. It was clearly 
understood by the Idaho Supreme Court in Fetterlv v. State, 121 Idaho 417 (1991); in 
Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436 (1996); and in Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899 (1997). 
Each of the defendants named above sought the retroactive application of a later 
holding to their own conviction after their own conviction had become final. 
The holding in Stuart is representative of the holdings in all three of the above 
cited cases: 
Even if Tribe had overruled Stuart 1: the fact that Stuart  Iwas  final when 
Tribe was issued would preclude retroactive application. See FetterIy v. 
State, 121 Idaho 417, 418-19, 825 P.2d 1073, 1074-75 (1991), cert. den. 506 
U.S. 1002, 113 S.Ct. 607, 121 L.Ed.2d 542 (1992) (holding new decision on 
death penalty sentencing did not apply retroactively to already final 
cases.) Page 438 
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Idaho Code 19-2719(5)(c) similarly precludes the retroactive apphcation of a new 
rule in a successive petition. The petition belfore the court is, without question, a 
successive petition filed long after the conviction became 6nal. 
I.C. $19-2"19(5)(c) 
A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed 
facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of 
law. 
The Rinc; decision is a new procedural rule flowing from the Apprendi holding. 
For the reasons set out above, Ring cannot be applied retroactively and A~prend i  has 
not been applied retroactively by the Ninth Circuit. Fields' sentence wa s constitutional 
a t  the time it was entered. The retroactive application of the decision to Fields' 
sentence certainly "far outweighs the benefits of this application" and "continually 
forces the states to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials 
and appeals conform to then existing constitutional standards." Teague, supra, 103 
L.Ed.2d page 355. 
Additionally, the petitioner argues that  I.C. 9 19-2716(5)(c) should be found 
unconstitutional because it violates due process. This issue has been considered and 
rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in McKinnev v. State, 133 Idaho 695 (1999). 
Finally, many of the same claims made by this petitioner were made by another death 
row inmate, Maxwell Hoffman. Judge Culet in the Third Judicial District rejected those 
arguments in a written opinion which is attached for reference. The State understands 
that Judge Culet's opinion is not binding, but may be of some use to the Court. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY , 
DISMISSAL (FIELDS/HCR162S9/SPOT02OW11D), Page 22 001.16 - 
For those reasons, the State moves this court to dismiss this successive petition 
and to deny the motion to correct illegal sentence or vacate the sentence of death. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 day of January, 2003. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Atturney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Sentence, Sentences, to Vacate Sentences of Death and for New Sentence and Trial to 
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The above-entitled cause came before the court on the State's motion for 
S m  Dismissal, of Maxwell Hoffinan's Petition of Post-Conviction Relief andfor 
Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal Seitence, to Vacate Sentence of 
Death and for New Sentencing Trial filed by defendant on August 2,2002. Rxe court 
heard oral argument on the matter on November 19,2002, with L. LaMont Anderson and 
G. Edward Yarbrough appearing for the state, and Ellison M. Mathews and Joan M. 
Fisher appearing with the defendant Maxwell HofFman, who was also present. Mr. 
Anderson and Ms. Fisher presented mgument, at the conclusion of which the court took 
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the nzaaer mder advisement m d  now issues its decision grmhg the Motion for 
Eaetual and Procedural Background 
On September 23,1988, m Momation was filed chmging Ho&m with .the 
September 19, 1987 &st-degee murder of Denise Willims. (Owyhee County Case No. 
4843) ,A jury trial comenced Mwch 7,1989, after which Ho%m was found @lty of 
first-degrce murder. 
Mer the verdict, Hofian hied a motion with the court to Imve a jury impaneled 
I 
for purpose of sen~encing~ or in the alternative, to serve as an advisory jury, which was 
denied by the district court. On June 9,1989, after a sentenckg hearing before &e 
district court, without a jury, the presiding judge read his written hdings, which were 
subsequrntly filed June 13,1989. The court found the sate had proven two stakutory 
agpvatiag factors beyoxld a reasonable doubt; (I) that the murder was especially 
heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity, and (2) that the murder 
was committed against a witness or potential witness in a legal proceeding because of 
suc11 proceedings. The c o w  rejected two other staatory aggavahg factors requested 
by the state. The court also found additional non-statutory a g g a v a m  factors m d  
several m l t i g a ~ g  circmtaaces. After v v e i w g  the collective Illltigating circustanccs 
against each of the statutory aggravating factors individually, the court imposed the death 
pedty .  
On July 25, 1989, Hoffman filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief. (Owyhee 
County Case No. 4888) In an amended post conviction petition, Hoffma~ specially 
alleged, ' m e  Idabo death penalty statute is unconstiuhonaf, as it does not permit the 
pdcipation of the jury, in violation of the Idriho Constitution a d  the United States 
Constititutioa." After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition. In 
addressing the claim regarding jury participation, the district court denied the claim based 
upon State v. Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129,774 P2d 299 (I 989). 
On J a n w  29, 1993, in a consolidated appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
HoEfntanYs conviction, sentence and the denial of post conviction relief. State v. 
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Hoffiman, 123 Idaho 63 8,85 1 P.2d 934 (1 993). Addressing the quesdon of whether jury 
involvement in a capital sentencing is mcmhted, tbe court concluded, ''itis well settled 
that p u i s b e n t  in a capital Gstse is to be dete 
123 Idaho at 643. 
aced federd habeas proceedings in May of 1994, and 
filed his initial P e ~ ~ o n  f r Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 1,1994, (Mof ian  v- 
Avave, Case No. GTV94-200-S-EJL), cl 
Pe~tioner was sentenced to death under an Idaho SBmte 
wbicl~ allows the sentencing judge to determine elernma of the 
crime in violation of Pe.1J.tioner's right under the Sixth, E i & ~ ,  and 
Forneenth Amenhents to the United States Comtiw~on to have 
the elements ofthe crime. 
An identical claim was raised in H o m m ' s  Find Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus in that same case. On June 13,1997, the federal district COW dismissed the claim 
because it ~ f a s  not presented as a federal conshmtiond claim before the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 230Jyi.m v. Arave, 973 F.Supp. 1 152,1162 (D. Idaho 1997). Alternatively, the 
court concluded that based upon tVuZton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647 (1990), '%ere is 
no con&m~onal requirement 'that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the 
findulfIs prereqksite to hposition of such a sentence."Yd., at 1 163. 
On appeal, Hoffinan challenged the Federal District Court's opinion.. In the 
interim, t11e U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, (2000). Ninth Circuit still concluded, "Wulton forecloses HofEnan's Apprendi- 
based challenge to Idaho's capital sentencing scheme." Hoflman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 
542 (gh Cir. 2001). However, the court reversed on other claims and ordered the district 
court to conduct sa evidentiary hearing regarding ineffiective assistance of counsel 
claims. Id., at 542-43. 
After the evidentiary hearing, the Federal District Court granted the wit with 
respect to ineffective assistance of counseJ claims at sentencing, but denied the writ with 
respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claim at trial. H o h a n ' s  appeal and the 
state's cross-appeal are pending before the Ninth Circuit Come1 have informed the 
court: that the Ninth Circuit C o w  of Appeals has stayed the pending cross-appeals from 
Ho&m's federal habeas proceedings pending both the m t e  court" final disposition of 
mMOlRANDW DECISION 3 
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~ o & a ~ s  state post-conviction per4tion based upon Ring v Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 
(20021, a d  the Ninth Circuit's decision on the retroactive effect of Ring. 
While liciga~ng his federal habeas petition, Ho&m filed a successive post 
conviction petition in State CoW on July 7, 1995. (Owhee County Case No. SP95-492) 
On May 20, 1996, the trial court dismissed H o f i m ' s  successive petition. Ho Bed 
a Notice of Appeal June 7,1996. On December 6,1996, the Idaho Supreme Court 
panted the state's motion to dismiss and djsmissed Ko*an's appeal. 
Ho&m filed a second successive post conviction - g ineffective assistance 
of counsel wkch is still pendhg befare the district court. Homnn v. State, #SP0 1-1 55 1 . 
That matter had been stayed pending outcome of the State's s d  HofEnan's 
do rema~oned  federal appeals in the Ninth Circuit. 
On A u p r  2,2002, Hornan filed the present ssuccessive post conviction petition, 
claiming the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, supra, " is truly 
[an] exwaordinary legal development which compels this Court's reconsideration of the 
c o n ~ ~ u ~ o n d i ~  of Petitioner's death sentence under both the United States' and Idaho's 
comtitutional protections. The petition is being filed so that this Court can give this case 
that reconsidera~on.'" 
The State of Idaho has filed a Motion for S m a r y  Dismissal, which was argued 
on November 12,2002. 
Analysis 
Hoffman argues the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 
122 $. Ct. 2428 (2002), '4s truly [an] extraordinary legal development which compels this 
Court's reconsideration of the constitutionality of Petitioner's death sentence under both 
the United States' and Idaho's constitutional protections." The state responds that the 
petition must be dismissed under Idaho Code 5 19-271 9. 
1. Hoffman's ciaims raised in his successive petition for post-conviction relief must 
be dismissed under Idaho Code 15 19-2719. 
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Idaho Code tj 19-2719' requires that the defendendant in a capital case must "file any 
legal or facrud challenge to the sentence or conviction that is b o w  or reasonably 
should be known" ' ~ n  42 days of the date of fiw o f f  e judpent  bposing deatll. 
I.C. 8 1 9-27 1 963). The stamte is qujte specific in its requirement that d l  such actions, 
including post conviction relief and habeas coipus actions, must be commenced within 
the 42-day time period and in accordance to the of the statute. LC. 8 19- 
271 9(4). Any defendanr who fails "ro frle such proceedings within the h e  requirements 
of and in codommce with I.C. 8 19-271 9 is deemed to be have waived any such claiuu 
I f *  I h , l ~ U  .' 8 ,  (In p e h e n t  part) &P& special appellate and posbeonvicdon procedures for capital cases - 
Automatic sray. 
The followhg special procedures shall be interpreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating unnecessary 
dcfay in q i n g  out a d i d  death sentence . . . 
(3) Within forty-two (42) days of the filing of the judgment imposing the punishent of  dearh, and before 
the death w a m t  is Ned, the defendant must any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or 
conviction that is known or reasonably should be known. 
(4) Any remedy available by post-conviction procedure, habeas corpus or  any other provision of state 
law must be putsued according to the procedures set forth in this section and within the time 
limitations of subsection (3) of this section. ... 
(5) If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits 
specified, he sllall be deemed to hava waived suclt claims for relief as were known, o r  reasonably should 
have been known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have 
been so waived or giant any such relief. 
(a) An allegation rhat a successive posr-conviction petition may be heard because of the 
applicability of the exception herein for issues that were not known or could nor reasonably have 
been known shall not be considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a 
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) inaterial facts stated under oatb 
or affimation by credible persons with k t  hand knowledge that would support the issue or insues 
asserted. A pleading that fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or 
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed. 
(b) A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed facially 
insufficient to the extent it alleges matters that are: curnularive or impeaching or would not, even if 
the allegations were true, cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction or sentence. 
(c) A successive posr-conviction piending asserting the exception shall be deemed Eacially 
insufficient to the extent It  seeks retroactive application of new rules of law. 
(6) in the event the defendant desires to appeal froin any post-conviction order entered pursuant to 
this section, his appeal must be part of any appeal taken 60m tbe conviction or sentence. All 
issues relating to conviction, sentence and post-conviction challenge shall be considered in the 
same appellare proceeding . . . (Emphi s  added) 
... 
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for relief ""as were lrtlown or reasonably should have been hown  to the de_Jendant." LC. 
4 19-2719(5). F d e r ,  ""The cows of Idaho shall lave no power to consider any such 
for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief" Id 
The c o r z s ~ m ~ o n a l i ~  of Idaho Code 8 19-271 9, with regard to the defendat" 
rights under an equal protection analysis, was upheld in State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 
766 P.2d 678 (1988), cerr. denied, 489 U.S. 1073,109 S, Ct, 1360, 103 L. Ed. 2d 827 
(1989). The Court noted that the while the starute provides for special expe&ted 
procedures for post convic~on review in capital cases, it does not involve a suspect class 
g of t l~e  United States C o n h a ~ o n  or the ldaho Constitution, and 
accordingly, strict scrutiny is not requizled. In addition, the C o w  found no "obviously 
in~diously discdinatory classification" in the statute that would warrant a mems-focus 
clclssihcation review to determine any e q d  protection violation. Id. The statute has also 
been held to be constitutional under a due process analysis. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 
795,820 P.2d 665 (1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987,112 S.Ct. 2970,119 L.Ed.2d 590 
(1992). The coa(jtitution&w of Idaho's statutory scheme for capitol post-conviction 
proceedings has most recently been upheld in Creech v. State, 5 1 P.3 d 3 87,2002 WL 
1225040 (2002). 
Finally, while the Unifom Post Conviction Procedure Act (Idaho Code 9 Ij 19- 
490 1, et seq.) applies to capital cases, that act is modified by Idaho Code fj 19-271 9, 
which supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict NcKinney v. 
Srate, 133 Idaho 695,992 P2d 144 (1999). 
A. Hoffman's claims raised in his successive petition for post-con&ction relief 
were known when he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief. I3;e has 
failcd to make a prima facie showing that his successive post conviction 
claims where not known or reasonably should not have been known when he 
filed his initial petition for post-conviction relief, Therefore, his claims do 
not fall under the exception in Idaho Code 4 19-2719(5) and must be 
dismissed pursuant to that statute. 
As reflected in the history of this case, H o f i a n  timely filed a motion for jury 
sentencing or alternatively, for an advisory jury, following the jury's guilty verdict of 
first degree murder. Me timely raised the issue again in his initial post-conviction petition 
W M O m U M  DECISION 6 00123 
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d a t  was filed within the 42-day req&ement of Idaho Code 5 19-271 9. Both requess 
were properly denied under the exi ~ ~ - t y  at lira@2. 
l&&o Code fj 19-272 9 has bean held to prwide a defend- one oppob"r ) r  to 
raise d l  challenges to a convicdon and sentence in a capital case in a posi-convicdon 
petition, d e s s  the paitioner can show that the claims raised in a successive petition 
were not known and could not reasonably have been lullown wiw 42 days of the enixy 
of the judgmmt of conviction. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1 991), 
cat.  denied, 504 U.S. 987,112 S.Ct. 2970,119 L.Ed.2d 590 (1992); Pizzufo v. S'rate, 127 
Idaho 469,903 P.2d 58 (1995). IH[o%an must meet a hei&tened burden and must make 
aprimafacie showing that the issues raised in his pe~tion fdl within thc: naxrow 
exception provided by the statute, Pkndo, supra. Finally, the t i n e  Ifitations contained 
in Idaho Code Ij 19-2719 "are jurisdictiona1 in nature, the statute specifically depriving 
the c o r n  of Idaho the power to consider any claims for relief that have been waived 
under the statute. I.C. $ 19-2729(5)." Id. at 471 and 60. 
In the present case, Hofhan's argues that he could not have prevailed on the 
same claim earlier because of the "erroneous analysis applied to by the Idaho Supreme 
Court until the United States Supreme Court recognized that only a jury may rnake the 
factual findlngs which rnake a defendant eligible for the death penalty." That argument is 
essentially a request that Ring be given "retroactive effect," which is addressed elsewhere 
in this decision- The issue under 8 19-271 9(5) is whether the petitioner bevy or 
reasonably codd have k n o w  of tlxa claims at the time he filed his initial post-conviction 
petition, not wl~ether he could have prevailed. 
B. Hoffman's successive petition is expressly barred by Idaho Code 6 19-2719(5)(c). 
Hoffman argues that he could not have prevailed earlier, and did not, on the issue 
of jury fact finding of aggravating factors because of erroneous constitutional analysis by 
the Idaho Supreme Court, until the United States S u p m e  Court recognized in Ring v. 
The thm existing benchmark case was Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 11 1 L. Ed. 2d 5 1 1,110 S. Ct. 
3047 (1990). 
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Arizona, mpru, that only a jury may make the factual finding which would make a 
defendant eligible for the death penalty. 
Despite the exceptions provided in Idaho Code 19-27 19(5) for issues raised that 
were: not known or reasonably could not have bem known within the time frame allowed 
by the statute, Idaho Code $ 19-2719(5)(c) provides fwther r d c t i o n  regardmg post- 
conviction applications that seek retroactive application of new law: 
A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed 
facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules 
of law. LC. 5 1 9-271 9(5)(c) (Emphasis added). 
At the time of Hoffman's trial and sentencing hearings, and initial post-conviction 
proceedmgs, as well as his initial appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the existing law 
was that the U.S. Constitution did not mandate that juries impose the death sentence or 
h d  the aggravating fictors prior to sentencing. (See, ProfJift v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 
49 L. Ed. 2d 913,96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976), Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,111 L. Ed. 2d 
511,110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).) 
Idaho Code 5 19-2729(5)(c) expressly prohibits successive post-conviction 
petitions which seek the retroactive application of new rules of law. There does not 
appear to be any Idaho appellate case specifically addressing the constitutionality of 9 19- 
2719(5)(c), which was added by the legislature in 1995. However, prior to the adoption 
of 5 19-27 1 9(5)(c), the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished between retroactive 
application of new rules of law on capital cases that were already final as opposed to 
capital cases that were still open for sentencing, holding that the distinction is a proper 
basis for denying retroactive effect of new rules of law. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 
825 P.2d 1073 (1991). 
In Fertlerly, a defendant under a death sentence had fled a successive post 
conviction relief petition on the basis of State v. Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129,774 P.2d 
299 (1989), requesting retroactive application of the Charboneau rulmg that "the triaI 
court may sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial, c o w  finds that alJ the 
mitigating circmnsraa.ces do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating 
circumstances found and make imposition of death unjust." In rejecting Fetterly's 
F m r l y .  supra, at 419 and 1074. 
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agument, the Court followed the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Griflth v. Kenmcky. 
479 U.S. 314,107 S.Ct. 708,93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987): 
Obviously, the Chorboneau decision wss issued after petitioner-appeuaot's initial 
petition for post-conviction reiid Tnus, the claim the Charboneau 
interpretahon of 1.C. $ 19-251 5 was not b o r n  or should not have been h o r n  
misses the real issue, The real issue is whether Charboneau applies 
retroac~ely to eases that were final at the time of its issuance. 
We have not applied the Charboneau decision to my case that was find 
prior to the issumce of Charbangau on April 4,1989. Conversely, it has been 
applied to cases that were s t i l l  open for sentencbg on rhis date. The distinction 
between defendants whose cases were fmal before the issuance of 
Charboneau and tbose whose eases were not is zl valid dishction. III Grgfith 
v. Kentuckyt 479 US, 314,107 S-Ct. 708,93 L,Ed2d 649 (1987), the United 
States Supreme Court recognized this distinc~on as a proper basis for 
denying retroactive effect of new rules to cases that are already final. 
Tberefore, the Charboneau interpretation of LC. fj 19- 25 15 does not apply to the 
present case because the p r e s a  case was final prior to the issuance of 
Charboneau. 
Fetterb v. Sfate, 121 Id&o 417,418-419, 825 P.2d 1073,1074 - 1075 (1991) (Emphasis 
added). 
The reasoning behind such a policy is addressed in Teague v Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 
109 S-Ct. 1060 (1989), in which the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
retroactive effect of new cornti-od rules on collateral review of cases that are already 
final: 
Application o f  constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction 
became fmal seriously undermines the principle offinalify which is essential 
to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without kality, the crimind 
law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect. Tl~e fact that life and liberty are at 
stake in cximinal prosecutions ''shows only ihat 'conventiod notions of f d ty '  
should not have as much place in c h i d  as in civil litigation, not that they 
should have none. " (Citation omitted). . . " fqf a crirninal judgment is ever to be 
find, the notion of legality must at some poht include the assignment of h d l  
competence to determine legdity ." (Citations omitted). . . 
The "costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules o f  
constitutional law on habeas corpus ... generally fhr outweigh the benefits of rhis 
application." (Citation omitted) In many ways the application of new NZes to 
cases on collaterd review may be more intmsive than the enjoining of criminal 
prosecutions (citation omitted), for it continually forces the States to marsh& 
resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals 
confomed to then-existing constitutional standards. Furthermore, as we 
recognized in Engle v. Isaac, "[sltate courts are understandably frusfrated when 
they f a i W l y  apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal court 
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discover, duiing a [habeas] proceeding, new co~lstitutiond commands." 45 6 U.S ., 
at 128,n. 33, 102 S,Ct., at 1572, n. 33. 
Trague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,309-310,109 S.Ct 1060,1074 - 1075 (1989) (Emphasis 
added). 
h tbe present case, both Idaho Code. 5 19-2719 and case law dictate that H o f h m  
is barred %om b r i n a g  this successive post coavicfion peticion seeking retroacirve 
applicahon of new rule of law. 
C. Ring v. Arizona is does not appear to have retroactive application to Hofhan's 
case. 
On the other hand, Hoffman argues that 3!ing4 enwciates a "watershed" exception 
that is so h h e n t a l  that it warrants retroactive applicatio~~ to all defendants who have 
gone through the death penalty sentenchg aspect in. the Idaho court system since the 
current system has been in place. He argues that Idaho Code $ 1 9-27 19 merely 
&da tes  what has been stated in Mamr ofGnfjord, 127 Idaho 472, 903 P2d 61 (1 99515, 
and Teague v Lane, 489 US 288,109 S-Ct. 1060 (1989), which he argues stand fox 
retroactive application of "watershed" rights, or rights that are so hdamental as to be 
paanteed and "implicit to the concept of ordered liberty." 
Essentially, the "Gape  doctrine" bars retroactive application, in the collateral 
attack on a sentence, of any new constitutional rule of criminal procedure which had not 
been announced at time that the petitioner's conviction became final. The Teague court 
did note tvvo exceptions under which the new rule should be applied retroactively, (1) if it 
pla~es certain kinds of primary, private individud conduct beyond the power of criminal 
law-&g authority to proscribe, or (2) if it requires observance of those procedures 
that are 'kplicit in concept of ordered liberty," which the court fixther limited to 
'"uvatershed rules of criminal procedure." 489 US 288, at 307 and 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060. 
The second exception has been further defined as requiring observance of "watashed 
Qing has been held KO invalidate Idaho's death penally statute. Srate v. Fenerly, - I d a h o ,  52 P.3d 
874 (2002). ' Guard involves a petitioner who had been committed to a stare mental hospital after being acquitted of 
criminal cllargcs by reason of insanity. Thereafter, his mental condition improved and he contcndcd thar he 
was no longer mentally ill. The lidaha Supreme Court held that the case turned on the prospective 
application of a new rule of law as opposed to a retroactive application. 127 Idaho 472, at 476. The case 
did not involve successive post-conviction relief petinons. 
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d e s  of cd ina l  procedure implicahg the h h e n a  of the 
criminal proceeding." Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,665, 121 S.Ct. 2478,2483 - 2484 
Obviously, the first exception is kapp1icZ"ble in the present case. For the second 
exception to apply to Hoffman's case, the new rule must meet two require men^: 
gement of the rule must "seriously diminish the iikdihood of obtaining an 
accurate conviction," and the rule must " ' "a.l%ar our underamhg of the 
bedrockprocedural elements " ' essential to the f ~ e s s  of a proceedbg." Sa~ryer 
v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227,242,110 S.Ct. 2822, 1 11 L.Ed.2d 193 (1 990) (quoting 
%ague, supra, at 3 1 1,109 S. Ct. 1060 @lmaliry o p ~ o n ) ,  in f x m  quoting Mucky 
v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,693,91 S.Ct 1 160,28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971) 
(IrEarllan, J., concu~ing in judgments in part and dissenting in part)). 
I)iler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,665, 121 S.Ct. 2478,2483 - 2484 (2001) @old emphasis 
added). 
In Qler, the Court held that a "sWctM'kerror, which the court defined as one 
whicb '"is not amenable to hdess-error  analysis and 'will always invalidate the 
conviction,"' (Id at 665), does not logically dictate the conclusion that the second Teague 
exception has been met. Id at 666-667. The primary issue in that case was whether the 
Supreme Court's earlier ruling in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39,111 S.Ct. 328,112 
L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), (in which the court determined that a jury instruction is 
unconstitutiond if there is o. reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction 
to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasondble doubt), was made retroactive to 
cases on collaxeral review by the Supreme Cow. The court was quite unequivocal with 
regard to how and when they determine the retroactive effect of even new substantive 
rules on collateral review: 
According to Tyler, the reasoning of Sullivan demonstrates that the Cage rule 
satisfies both prongs o f  this Teague exception. First, Tyler notes, Suflivan 
repeatedly emphasized that a Cage error fundamentally undermines the reliability 
of a trial's outcome. And second, Tyler contends, the central point of SzlZivan is 
tlzat a Cage error deprives a defendant of a bedrock element of procedural 
fairness: fhe right to have the jury make the determination of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Tyler's argumenl fail to persuade, however. The most he can 
claim is that, based on the principles outlined in Teugue, this Court should 
make Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review. What is clear, however, 
is that we have not "maderr Cage retroactive to eases on collateral review. 
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Tyler v. Cnin, 533 U.S. 656,665-666, 121 Sect. 2478,2484 (2001) Gmphasis added16 
The C o w  Wxer noted at foolnote 7 of the decision: 
As explained above, the second Teogue exception is available only if the new rule 
" ' "aZter[s] o w  undersrandi~g of the bedrock procedural elements" ' essential to 
ess of a proceedhg." (Cit8tions o ~ ~ e d )  Clasfiing an error as 
structural does not necessarily alter our u r n d a s ~ d h g  of these bedrock procedural 
elements. Nor cm it be said that all new rules relabg to due process (or even the 
" m d m e n a  requirements of due process," see post, at 2489 (dissenhg 
op*on)) alter such, u n d e r s a h g .  . . . 
On &e conwq,  the second Teague exception is reserved only for truly 
"watersfied" rules. . . . As we have recognized, it is unlikeIy that any of these 
watershed rules "hha[s] yet to emerge." 
Tyler, 533 U.S. 656,665-666,121 S.Ct. 2478,2484 (2001) (Bold emphasis added) 
The U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Jones v. United Srates, ' 526 U.S. 227, 119 
S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 3 1 1 (1999), Apprendi v New ~erse~? 530 US 466, 120 S.Ct. 
2348 (2000), and Ring mark a shift in the manner in which the courts will view and apply 
enhanced sentencing factors. Prior ro Ring, the Idaho statutory scheme was deemed 
valid, (See, fifton v Arizona, 497 U S  639 (1 990)). A trial judge sitting as the trier of 
fact could make "rhe determination of statutory aggravating factors, and thereby determine 
whether those factors (what are now deemed additional elements) had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and still be mlX within the confines of both the Idaho 
Constitution sund the Constitution of the United States. Those d e t e k a t i o n s  have 
"he case slso refers lo Suffivan v. LouLrinntt, 508 US. 275,113 S.Ct. 2078,124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1 993). 
"Under d ~ e  Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury vial guarantees ofthe 
Sixth Amendment, my fact (otber Than prior conviction) that increases the maxiaurn pen* for a crime 
must be charged in an indiment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubLFY 
Jones V. Us, 526 U.S. 227, fn.6,243, 119 S . a .  1215, 1224 (1999) 
"*h sum, ow reexamination of our cases in &is area, and of the history upon which they rely, con&-ms the 
opinion that we expressed in Jones. Other than rhe fact of a prior conviction, any fact thar increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed smmtory maxirnum must be submined to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Witb that exception, we endorse the srarement of the rule set forth in the 
concurring opinions in that w e :  '[Ijt is unconstitutjonal for a legislature to remove from the jury the 
assessment of fads that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is 
exposed. It: is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' 
Apprendr' v. Nav Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490, 120 S.Ct 2348,2362 - 2363 (2000) (Emphasis added) 
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repeatedly been subject to stringent appeUate scrutiny by the Idaho Supreme Court and 
by the federal court system.9 
After a review of the case law history arising ffom the Idaho capital punishment 
scheme, which is largely the same as the Arizona statutory scheme invalidated in Ring, 
this court does not conclude that Ring enunciates an exception so fundamental as to 
"seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction"(See Tyler u. 
Cain, supra.) 
In the alternative, Ho&m argues that Idaho Code 8 19-27 19(5), and particularly 
$ 19-271 9(5)(c), violate his rights to due process and equal protection guaranteed under 
the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. Nis argument partially stems from his position that 
Ring announces a substantive rule of law that is not contemplated by $ 19-27 19(5), that 
the statote's blanket prohibition against retroactive application of new rules of law to 
cases on collateral review denies him his fundamental right to a jury trial. This argument 
has been partially addressed elsewhere in this de~isiori,'~ in addition to the following 
discussion. 
While Apprendi and Ring represent a change in the manner in which the courts 
will view and apply enhancing sentencing factors, those cases have been determined to 
' E.g. Sate v. Creech, 105 Jdaho 362,670 P 2 d  463 (1983), c c n  denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1327, 
79 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1984); State v. Sivak, 105 ldaho 900,674 P2d 396 (1983), cen. denied, 468 U.S. 1220, 
104 S. Ct 3591,82 L. Ed. 2d 887 (1984); State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358,690 P.2d 293 (1984); State v. 
Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766,710 P.2d 1202 (1985), cen. denied, 479 U.S. 870, 107 S. Ct. 239,93 L. Ed 2d 164 
(1986); Sate  v. Wood, 132 ldaho 88,967 P.2d 702 (1998), cert denied, 526 U.S. 11 18,119 S. Ct. 1768, 
143 L. E d  26 798 (1 999); State v. Charboneay 1 16 Idaho 129,774 P2d 299, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922, 
110 S. Cc. 287, 107 L. Ed. 2d 267,, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S .  C t  290,107 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1989), overruled on 
other grounds, Sfate v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,825 P.2d 1081 (1991), cert denied, 506 U.S. 915,113 S. Ct 
321, 121 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1992); State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904,908 P.2d 121 1 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
922, 1 16 S. CI, 3 19,133 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1995); State v. Pizzuto, I 19 Idaho 74581 0 P 2 d  680 (1991), cert. 
denied, 503 U.S. 908,112 S. Ct. 1268, 1 17 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Sme v. Card, 
121 Idaho 425,825 P2d 1081 (1 99 I), cerr. denied, 506 U.S. 9 15, 1 13 S. Ct. 321,121 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1992); 
S w  v. Rhoades, 121 ldaho 63,822 P.2d 960 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1047, 113 S. C t  962,122 L. 
Eh 2d 119 (1993); State v. Fain, 119 Idaho 670, 809 P 2 d  1149 (1991), cen. denied, 493 U.S. 917, 110 S. 
h 277, 107 L. Ed 2d 258 (1989), 504 U.S. 987, 112 S. Ct. 2970, 119 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1992); State v. Beam, 
109 Idaho 616,710 P2.d 526 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153,106 S. Ct 2260,90 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1986); 
State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860,781 P.2d 197 (1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 1 10 S. Ct. 3295, 11 1 
L. Ed. 2d 803 (1 990); State v. Leavitr, 121 Idaho 4, 822 P2d 523 (1991), cert denied, Leavitt v. Idaho, 506 
U.S. 972,113 S. Ct. 460,121 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1992); State v. Hoffiman, 123 ldaho 638, 851 P 2 d  934 (1993), 
cert denied, 511 U.S. 1012, 114 S. Ct 1387,128 I,. Ed. 2d61 (1994). 
' O  This issue has partially been addressed in the previous discussion (section l., above) of the ldaho 
Supreme Court's consritutional analysis of Idaho Code 8 19-2719 prior to the 1995 enactment of 5 19- 
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d c d a t e  a new rule of p rocedd ,  sarher than sub e, law. Prior to the  issuance of 
Ring, the U.S. Eleventh Circuit addressed the retroactive effect of Apprendi in McCoy v. 
US,, 266 F.3d 2245,1257 -1257 (C.A.11 (Fla.) 20011, in which a d e f e n b q  who h d  
been conected of possession with intent to dislrj3ute crack coc&e, moved to vacate, set 
aside, or to correct the sentence. The court cvduted the case in lieu of Teague and held 
that rhe new c o d m ~ o n a l  rule of c a d  procedure mounced in Apprendi does not 
apply r e ~ o a ~ ~ v e l y  to cases on c o l l a t d  review. The court further noted: 
FN16. We reject- the: c o n c ~ n g  opinion's position that the Apprcrvrdi decision 
creates a new substmtive rule of law. ]In Apprendi, the S u p m e  Court 
specScally noted that "[tlhe substantive basis for New Jersey's enhmcemeni 
. .. is not at issue; the adequacy of New Jersey's procedure is."53 0 U.S. at 475, 
120 S.Ct 2348 (2000). The application ofApprendi merely changes the 
method or procedure for detemining drug quantity and his sentence; it 
does not make McCoy's conduct not criminal, thereby raising the spectre 
of actud innocence as the concurring opinion implies. Thus, as other 
circuits have, we conclude Appre~di announced a new rule of criminal 
procedure. 
McCoy V. US, 266F.3d 1245, 1257 -1257 (C.A.ll (Fla.) 2001) (Emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Cannon v Mullin, 297 F 3d 989,994 (lo& Cir. 20021, the U.S. 
Tenth Circuit held that Ring enunciates a procedural, rather than a substantiye change 
in the law. 
It is  clear, however, that Ring is simply an extension ofApprendi to ihe death 
penalp context. See Ring . . . 122 S.Ct. at 2432. Accordingly, fhis court's 
recent conclusions in Untied States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 121 3,2002 WL 
13 17 126, at *4 (1 0thci.r. 2002), that Apprendi announced a rule of aimind 
procedure forecloses Cannon's argument that Ring announced a substantive 
rule. 
Cannon v Mullin, 297 F 3d 989,994 ( 1 0 ~  Cir 2002). The court also concluded that 
"Cannon is simply incorrect in asserting that the combination of Teague, Ring and the 
cases in the Apprendi line render the rule announced in Ring retroactively appIicable 
to cwes on collateral review." ld. at 992-993. 
The Seventh Circuit Corn of Appeals was also unable to conclude that Ring had 
- - 
2719(5)(c) (See State v. Beam, suprq and State v. Rhoades, suprc) and after its adoption (Creech v. State, 
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ffier the argment of this appeal, the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, - 
U-S. ----, 122 S.Ct. 2428,153 LBd.2d 556 (2002), holding t b t  capital defendab 
are en.t_ided to a jury det ation of m y  fa& such as the e-xlismce of a 
mitigating or aggavating factor, that consritutes a legislatively o rdhed  condition 
of cwiPal punishme~t. The parties agree that we cannot consider Ring in decidmg 
this appeal because the Supreme C o w  has not yet held it to be retroac~ve. See 
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656,662-64, 121 S-Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001). 
Truebloodv. Davis 301 F.3d 784,788 (C.A.7 (Ind.) 2002). 
Both the Cannon and Tmeblood cases involved p e ~ ~ o n e r s  who were convicted in 
state c o w  af &st-de~ee murder and sentenced to death, and tilereafter soubt  to 
cbaflenge their death sentences in federal habeas actions. Tyler involved a peti'trioner who 
was convicted in state court of second-degree murder and who likewise, sought to 
challenge the state court conviction and sentace in a federal habeas adon.  Both Tyler 
and Canmn involved federal siatutes that require dismissal of successive habeas 
appljcations unless ''the applicant shows that the c f ~  relies on a new rule of 
c o n s u ~ ~ o d  law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
CoLlrt."' ' 
Wile Ida110 Code 19-2719(5)(c) does not contain similar language as the 
federal counterpart applicable in those decisions, the Tyler, McCoy and Cannon cases 
shed persuasive andysis on the issue of whether &is court is in a position to declare that 
Ring has retroactive application to Hofhau's case. 
F d e r ,  because this court has not d e t d e d  that Ring i s  re&oactive to 
Hoffinan's casee, the specific constitutional conflicts of Idaho Code $ 19-271 9(S)(c) that 
have been raised by H o f i a n  need not be determined, as the issue is not dispositive of 
the case before the court. 
D. Hoffhau's alternative Rule 35 petition is barred by 19-2719. 
Ho&m also raises his claims under Idaho C M  Rule 35, vylzich states in 
part: 
The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence 
that has been imposed in an illegal manner within the h e  provided herein for the 
reduction of senten~e- .. . 
supra), and discussed in the Teague analysis of retroactive effecc above, 
" 28 U.S.C. 5 2244@). 
MEMOMWUM DECISION 15 
'(666'1) ZS'E ' ~ ' 1  PZ'd 266 "OL '569 OFPI €€I ' 3 1 ~ 8  ' A & ~ ~ ! x ~ M I  
-PT aas *sndxo~ 
mSqWJ0 lW 3r[r L U ~ Q  IOU saoP 6 1LZ-6 i !$ '3.1 'Vd3dA a'B 1%; 'PI ,,'Q@P 
puognlpuo:, s,~m3gdd-e a q  q3a)o~d ;lal p m  u o ~ ~ o ~  saizquqa fsuop.a3?1ddv 
anrssa:,~ns p m  snoppada~ sprone,, jalpl  uoga~~uo~-%sod 303 uogyad -e $0 asn 
~ d o ~ d ' a ~  '(696 )6101 ' ~ 1 0 1  P2.d 6SP 'LEz 'SET OFPI £6 '9JnlS aauao!CTaaS 
-uorppuo~  e j o  I l t ~ p p ~  a q  8 ~ u a p q ~  jo asodmd aqS roj snd~o:, ssqaqjo  tw 
ayl pamlda~ QAW sl3g ampa9o~d Uo3~rhno~-$sod 'fib96 I) 082 ' ~ L z  P Z'd Z6t: ' I £2 
'$22 oqqq ,53 'arv~s -A X ~ ~ D ~ D N  -sndro~ seaqsqjo t g s  a q l p  asn a q  8np@al  
S33NW smd Aern amtg.ls.F$alaqJ, '(j7)6 I LZ-6 '1 ! '3'1 '6 'I LZ-6 T $ '3'1 $0 mo?m"n!T 
a q  ay) pm sampa3oid avo4 8urpro~ar~) pansznd aq m m  ampa3o~d uoppuo:, 
-4sod Lq so sndlroa m a q q j o  1.y Xq arqqzne sam3 prdm p sapaura l ~ v  
' (~661  '6676 '13) TL-OLO1 '8907: PZ'd 6P6 %t9-98 '198 OVPI OET "JWJS ' A P W G I  
anssf s q j o  srsiipun! , s p a d d . ~ ~ ~ o  m o 3  cxp ~ ~ y ~ o  ' 3 u 3 4 m  s g  pa[az a& 
6 1 LZ-6 1 5 3Po3 OFPX IvW P ~ & R  PV¶ laa011.FJad aq) P?4M '(666 1) WE PZ'd 266 '569 
" ~ 6 6  1) 168 PZ'd 8 28 '298 OW1 121 'mD%T n ~JWS) .qgap $0 z n a q s p d  9 ~ s 0 6 y  
* y4a - 4  . 
?&'$!, - - - - - -  
1YNI1183 33IdJO ' 3 . V  PEG 8 0 1  l??d 60:QT C005160/TO 
01/09/2o03 l0:03 FAX 208 39-23B A.G.  OFFICE CRIMINAL tGg93a~ ----
*@ +<WY&F t C /  "adz %& + 
2. This court is without jurisdiction to hear Hoffmsn's case as a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
R o m a n  has filed his claim in the d t e m ~ v e  as a p e a o n  for writ of habeas 
corpus. However, idaha Code $ 19-4202 grants origin& jurisdiction to consider a writ of 
habeas corpus in the Idabo Supreme Court or the District Court of the county in which 
rhe person is In Row v. Stute, 135 Idaha 573,21 P.3d 895 (2001), rhe 
defendmlt's petition for habeas corpus relief was dismissed without prejudice because the 
pefidoner failed to fi le it in the county in which she was being detained. Ho&m is 
currently being detained at the Idaho Maim= Security Institution in Ada Gomty, 
Idabo. This court is without jurisdiction to hear his petition for w i t  of habeas corpus in 
an Owyhee County proceebg. 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, the state's motion for sxmmary dismissal of the above-entiaed cause 
is granted. 
Rated this ' . day of December, 2002. 
l2 19-4202. Jurisdiction to comider petitions for writ of habeas corpus. 
The following c o r n  of this state shall have original jurisdiction to consider a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, grant the writ d o r  order relief under this chapter: 
(1) The supreme court; or 
(2) The district corn of the county in which the person is detained. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE: COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE FIELDS, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
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George Junior Porter filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief andlor 
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Lewis County Case No, SP4244I) and a Motion to 
Correct Illegal Sentence, To Vacate Sentence of Death and for New Sentencing 
Trial (Lewis County Case No. M)53)."e State responded by filing a Motion for 
S-ary Dismissal, The issues have been joined and both Porter's petition and 
the State's motion are now before me for decision, 
It is important at the outset to undersmd what Porter's petition does not 
involve. It does not involve whether or not he was guilty of first-degree murder. 
A jury of his peas decided beyond a reasonable doubt that he was. Verdict, filed 
1 Porter's petition and n~otion are referred to as the petition unless individually identified. 
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Jmuw 26,1990. Nor does it hvdw whetiher the trid for fimt-degree murder 
was far. The Idaho Suprme Court b decided it was. Porfe v. State ofIdafro, 
130 Idaho 772,948 P.2d 127 (1997) rrh 'g. denied Dec. 12,1997, cert. denied 523 U.S. 
3126,118 S.Ct, 18113 (May 18,1998)(P"orfer I). Nor does it involve w h e ~ e r  there is 
a right for a pemon accused of capital murder to have a jury rlriher than a judge 
decide the facts that justify a death sentence. The United States Supreme Court 
has decided there is. Ring v. Anmm, 536 U.S. 584 122 S+Ct. 2428 (2002). 
The question presenkd for decision i s  whether the right to have a jury 
decide the factors that justify a death sentence applies retroactiveiy to Porter. if  it 
does, I am. obliged to vacate his death sentence and resentence him. If it does 
not, then Porter's death sentiEince will stand. 
III. PROCEDtTRAL E-IISTORY 
The State of Idaho charged that Porter murdered Theresa Jones at KamiaPl 
on December 21,1988. The dormation charging Porter with firs t-degree murder 
chd not list as elements of the crime the aggravating factors specified in Idaho 
Code 5 19-2515 hat  warrant the death penalty. Criminal Information, filed July 
13,1989; Amended Criminal. Momation, filed September 22,1.989. 
Nor did the instructions to the jury at trial defining first-degree murder 
include the aggravating fact- as ehents  of the crime. Porter was neither 
charged nor tried for the crime of capital murder, Instead the jury was instructed 
that it was not to concern itself with the pedty.  
The jury has notlung whatever to do with the penalty which 
ma be idicted in this case if conviction is had, The province X of e jury is simply to determine the facts. The penalty is for 
the Court to determine. 
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Jury h h c t i o n s  Given by the Cart ,  filed Jmuary 26,2990. 
Based on the evidenm and those imtrucbons, the jury convicted Porter of 
murder. Verdict, filed January 26,1990. The State hen notrfied the 
defendmt it would seek the death penalty. Notice of Intent to Seek the Death 
ty, filed February 1,1990. The State presented evjdmm of aggravaGng 
fa- to tile district judge at a sentenhg henring. Court Mnuks, June 15, 
3.990, June 29,1990, That evidence, if stabfished beyond a =asonable doubt and 
found by the judge to outweigh the mitigating factom, permitted him to impose 
dte death penalty. Idaho W e  § 79-2515. Porter did not ask the judge to include 
h e  aggravating factors as elements of the crime in his instructions to the jury or 
to involve the jury in the penalty phase of the proceedings. 
'rhe district judge found the State established beyond a reasonabIe doubt 
that the murder manifested exceptional depravity, that Port= probably would be 
a continuing threat to society, and hat the murder was of an actual or potential 
witness m a criminal proceeding. Findings of the Court in Considering the 
Deatk Penalty hrsuwlt to the Provisions of Idaho Code Section 19-2515(e), filed 
September 7,1990. The procedure followed by the trial. judge comported with 
supreme court precedent and I.C. 9 19-25 15(e). After weighng the aggravating 
factors against the nlihgatring factors and basd on his findings, the district judge 
imposed the death penalty. Judgment and Sentence, filed September 7,1990. 
Porter then appealed his conviction and death sentence to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Notice of Appeal, filed September 30,1990. 
Porter next filed a wries of post-conviction relief petitions. On November 
28,1994, more than four years after the judgment of conviction and the death 
sentence had been filed, Porter k t  broached the issue of the constitutionality of 
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the sentmdng procedure. He contended the fdure of the State to implement the 
ldaho Constitution and laws requ%g "a jury to determine all questions of fact 
and the d t imak  p ~ s h m e n t  of life or death deprived the Pedtioner of h s  
guarantees to equal prokction as agendtred by the United States Constilu~on." 
Second -ended Pczgcilion for Post-ConvicCion Relief, filed Novmber 28,1994, at 
15. The dis.bict judge denied the petilims. 
O n  appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld Porter's conviction and 
death ~ntence. It cmluded t;he record did not suppol the &strict court's 
finding that an actual or poten~af. witness had been murdered. It also held the 
Federal and Idaho Constitutions did not require the jury to decide the 
agpavahg factors: 
The United States Supreme Court has concluded definitively 
that the f e d d  constitution does not require a jury 
detehnatlon of aggravating cirmstances. Spmiano u. Florida, 
a 8  U.S. 447, 460, 104 S.Ct. 3154,3162,82 L.Ed.2d 360 (1984). 
Additionally, this COLU~ consistently has rejected arguments 
similar to Porter's and has upheld judicial determination of 
aggravahg &cumstmces, as consistent with the Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the US, Constitution and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution. (Citations 
omitted.) 
Porter v. State, 130 Idaho at 795-%. 
At the time of the tna l  and sentmang, the Idaho Supreme Court had 
repeatedly held that the death penalty phase of a capital murder .trial was 
appropriately decided by a judge and that excluding the jury from that process 
d;ld not offend the Sixth Amenbent right to a jury trial. See, e.g., State u. Creed, 
105 Idaho 362,670 P.2d 463, (1983); State u. Siunk, 112 Idaho 197,731 P.2d 192 
(1987); State u. Fain, 116 Idaho 82,774 P.2d 252 (1989); State v. Charboneatd, 116 
Idaho 129,774 P.2d 299 (2989) 
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Following the Idaho Sapreme Court decision on thtt appeal, the distsja 
judge issued a death w m m t  commding the warden to put Porter to death. 
Death Wmant,  filed January 12,1898. The execu~m was scheduled for 
February 4,1998. Supreme Court Justice Sm&a Day CYComm stayed Porter's 
execu~on on Jmuary 23,1998, p n h g  Porter's pet-itian for cedar.& to the 
Unitpd State Supreme Court. Order, filed January 29,1998. Upon denid of the 
eertiarrari pelilion, the district judge issued, a new death wanrant. Death Warrant, 
fded May 29,1998. 
Porter filed a successive p tanvic t ion  peri~on; the State moved for 
s m a r y  drsmissal; the district judge grmkd thts motion; and the aupEme court 
dismissed the appeal, Porfer v. Sfate, I36 Idaho 257,32 P.36 151 (2001) (Porter If). 
Portds current petition web  etroactive. relief h r m  lus death sentence 
pursuant to the United States Supreme C o d s  decision in Ring. The Ring court 
held &at aggavating factors which an Arizona trial judge had found justified 
the death penaIty in comectians with a first-degree murder conviction, were 
elements of the crime of capid murder. Since ttte Sixth Ammdmmt right to a 
jury trial contemplatw a jury, not a judge, decide dl the factual elements of a 
crime, the Court concluded the death sentence violated Ring's right to a jury 
trial. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 
On August 27,2002, the State moved for s m a r y  dismissal of the 
petition. I am now d e d  on to decide Porter's petition for relief and the Stiate's 
motion for summary dismissal. 
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Because the conclusion I reach dqends largely on the nature and role af 
the jury in heric'm ct.imin;tl jwispderrse, a brief htstory of the jury's 
evduGon i s  hefpfd. 
By h e  ~ d d e  of the! thirteenth cenhuy the jury had become the body that 
determined the facts m English criminaf caws. See, Welsh S. a t e ,  fief -Finding 
a d  the Dmth Pennlg: The Scope oja wilfat D13fdnf ' s  Right. to a Junj Trial, 65 
NCIW DAME L. REV. 1,6 (1989). In their early rofe jurors were per- who had 
personal knowledge of: the fa&. The judge's role was to tell the jury what crime 
the law ascribed to the facts and the jury had found k, exist. Id. 
The jury, with its unfettemd role as the factfinder, became the buffer 
bemeen an overreaching and harsh sovereign and the subjeds whom the 
ssvereign accused of wrongdoing. Jurors used their facdinding power to nullify 
or reduce the charges by what they found the facts to be. By that means the jury 
could refuse to impose the penalty that the sovereign was trylng tu exact. Id. at  7. 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centwies jurors became Iimited to 
conside~ng only evidence presented to them during a trial. Despite threats and 
prtlssure by Crown-appointed judges to accommodate the Crom'c wishes, the 
jury resisted intrusions on its independence and role in criminal cases. Id. at 7 - 
1 1. The turning point in jury independence occurred in Bushell's h e ,  which 
held a judge could not impose fines or imprisonment on jurors whose verdict he 
disliked. Id. a t  9 (citing Case ofthe Imprisonment of Edward Bzishell, 6 Howell's 
State Trials 999,1010,124 Eng.Rep. 1006,1012 (1670)). The rationale was that 
since the decision of what the facts were was the sole provine of the jurors, the. 
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judg";', as a rnaeer oi defisrit-ion, could not crzndude the verdict w s  cmtra~y to 
the law. Rather, the legal penalty had to empod with the facts the )ury found. 
Id. 
The American colonists were keenly aware of the vital role a jury played 
in ~ o t d n g  the king's ~ubjects from his arbihary wfrirrts. In 1735, John Peter 
ZI-?nger pI"ubsh:ht.cl the Nuw York Weekly Journal in New Yvrk City. The Crown 
charged anger with the e of sedi~on by "prin- and publishng a false, 
wandalw~ and d t i o u s  libel in wheh His Excaency, the Governor who is the 
h g ' s  imediate  repscscntative here, is p a d y  and luljustly scandahzljd as a 
person that has no regard to law or justrice." V. BuraneUi, The Trial O f P p f p y  
Zenger, 94 (1957); 17 Howell's State Trials 675 (1'735). 
h & e w  H b l t o n ,  k & e r l s  lawyer, admitted Zenger had published the 
issues of ~e J O U T T U ~ ~  the governor found offensive. The Crown argued the 
sedition sbtute required the jury to return a guilty verdict, The judge agreed 
and prohibited Harmlton h m  prrsenting evidence that what Zenger had said 
was h e .  But Hamilton argued to the jurors that they wax "witnesses to the 
truth of the facts we have offered, and are d d e d  the liberty to prove." Bwanelli 
at 112. The jury acquitted Zenger "in a sxnd time." Burmelli at 132. 
The tension between the praagatives of the sovereign and the rights of 
the governed could not have been more pronounced. The jury, and the jury 
alone, decided Zenger would be free, the truth would be known, and the 
governor's prerogatives would be banished from the courtroom. 
By the time of the American Revolution, in the colonies, as in Englad, the 
jury's mlc in criminal cases was secure. The jury had become an especially 
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hpa&mt buffer behYeen khe savezeip and the governed because mmy gimes 
were pdshable by death. Wk, at 9 - 11, 
Whm a person was charged with a mme he or she knew exactly what the 
penalv would be if they were con~cted as ged. n e  judge's role was not 
he administratively imposed the penalty the st-abte pmdbed f o r  
the off- the jury found had been commieed. If the jury found a lesser offense 
eed, the judge, again, was Ifited to imposilzg the sentence 
presoibed far that offew, rather than the offense that had been charged. 
A~reTzdi v. Nrw Jersey, 530 US. 466,47&80 (2000), (citing 4 Blackstone, 
Cmment;uies m the Laws of England, 368-70 (Cooley ed. 1899)). 
Our DeCtara ticm of Independence complained of the king "depriving us in 
rnany cases, of the brnefits of Trial by Jury. . ." Alexander Hamilton authored 
the pamphlet supporting the right to a jury during the Federalist Papers 
campaign to persuade the cdonies to approve the new constitution. 
The bends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if 
they a ee in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set 
UPOR if e trial by jury; or if there is any vast difference befween 
&ern it consists in h s :  the f o m a  regard it as a valuable 
safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palIadium 
Irf free govemmt .  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamifton), 
It is little wonder, therefore, that when the hot-headed revolutionaries 
who put their lives, fortunes and sacred honor at risk during our war of 
independence became the sedate and somber founding fathers we now revere, 
that they included the nght to a jury trial in both the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights. 
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The Constitution provides, "[tjhe Trial of all Crimes, except in cases of 
i m p a c h m l ;  shall be by Jwy . . ." U.S. CONST. art nI, 5 2, cl. 3. The Sixth 
hmhent stipdates that "in aU criminsl p 
the right to a speedy and public ~ d ,  by an impartial jury . . . .'r U.S. C o ~ n .  
m e n d  m. 
As the Nation mamed, legislafim gave judges more disuetion in 
mteneng by establisking a range af punish& for s p r j f i e d  crimes. When it. 
came to tfie death pendty, however, juror &=tion led to its arbikary 
appticatim. For the same crime mine died, others lived. 'fie poor and 
minoritJes fared worse for the same offense. This disparity beeme so 
pronounced that in 1972 the United Slates S u p m e  Court declared that I.he 
death penalty, as appIie& violated the auel and unusual punjshment prohibition 
of the Eighth Ammdment. Furmarl v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972). 
Justice Potter Stewart c o n h  in the decision, saying, "I simply conclude that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments c m t  tolerate the intlictxon of a 
sentence of death under legal systems that permit ttus unique penalty to be so 
wantonly and so freakishly imposed." 408 U.S. at 31 0,92 S.Ct. at 2763. 
FoIlowing Furman, the states that wanted to retain the death penalty 
redrafted their statutes to ensure a mow objective and uniform application of the 
penalty. Those states established aggravating iadors, which, if pmven to 
outweigh mitigakg factors, would justify the death sentence. Most of the states 
Ieft the deternunation of those factors to the jury. Idaho, together with Arizona, 
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Colorado. Montana, and Nebraska, assigned that role to the judge.' See, John W. 
Foulos, Liability Rzdles, Sentencing Factors, and Sirth Amendnlmf Right to a Jury 
Triul: A Prelirnirzgry Irrqtdiry, 44 W. M w t  t. REV. 643.65760 (1 990). 
During the last eightem years the United States Supreme Court struggled 
with the issue of whether the aggravating factors were part of the penalty 
dwe to be dedded by a judge or whe&er they were elements of the crime 
itself to be decided by the jury. Spazinno u. Floridn, 468 U.S. at 459 ("The Sixth 
Anlendnlmt never has hem thought to guarmte a right to a jury determination 
of that issue [death penalty sentence]."); Watton v. Ariznna, 497 U.S. 639,110 S.Ct. 
3047 (1990) (aggravahng factors properly assist the sentendng judge); 
Almndarm-firres v. United Stales, 523 U.S. 224,118 S.Ct. 1219 (1998) (some~mes 
the aggravating factors are e1ement.s of the &me); Jones v. Unit& States, 526 U.S. 
227,120 S.Ct. 2348 (1999) (interpreted statute so tkat the aggravating factors were 
elements of the crime); Amrelzdi v. Nao Jersey, 530 U.S. at 490 ( "Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fad that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed maximum must be submilted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. "1. 
V. R2NC v. ARIZONA 
The Supreme Court resolved this urgent question for capital cases in Kirrg 
v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. at 2443. It conduded that any fact that increased a penalty is 
an element of the crime and must be pmvm to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It held that allowing a judge to determine if the death penalty should be imposed 
infringed on an accused's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
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Because Mzona's enmerated ag~ava"cing crlmtmstances 
uymate as "the. b d o n a l  e q ~ v d e n t  ofan e1aent of a p a t e  
o&ew," Apl"rmdi, 530 U.S., at 4494, n, 19,120 S.Ct. 2x8, the 
Sixth hendmiezlt retfuires h t  they be found by a jury. 
* * *  
"The guarant:ees of jury trial in the Federal and State 
Gomtihrticins reflect- a profound judpmt about the way in 
which law should be enforced and justice adwniste~d. . . . .If 
the defendant prefmed the eo judment of a jury 
to the more tutored but perhaps less syolpa&etic reaction of the 
single judge, he was to have it." Dtrncnn v, buisiarur, 391 U.S. 
145,155-156,88 SCt. 1444,20 L-Ed.2d 491 (1%8). 
Id. The flawed Arizona m t e n h g  procedwe in Ring is virtually identical to 
Idaho's. The Idaho Supreme Court foUoM Ring's mmdate in Stgfe v. Fet.te*, 
137 Idaho 729,52 P.3d 874 (2002). 
VI. Lf; m R E R ' S  CLAM FUR RELIEF WAIVED? 
The State first asserts that Porter did not comply with the Act's provision 
that post-convidiun daims for relief that were "known, or reasonably should 
have been known" are deemed wdved unless filed within forty-two days of the 
"mng of the judgment imposing the judgment of death and before the death 
warrant is filed. . . ." 1.C. 5 19-2719(3), 
Porter did not directly raise the issue of whether all the elements of a 
capital case should be tried only to a jury in his 1984 posi-conviction relief 
petition. He did argue that try-ing all elements of all crimes to a jury except a 
capital crime offended the Equal Protection Clause. Second Amended Petition 
for Pwt-Conviction Relief, filed November 28,1994. 
The State nonetheless argues that Porter reasonably s h d d  have known 
about the claim within forty-two days of the judgment imposing the death 
sentence whidr was filed on September 7, 1990, Brief in Support of Motion for 
Summary Dismissal, at 6-7,ll-13. Since Porter did not file any "legal challenge 
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to the senmet: or convictiq" (X.C. tj 19-2719 (3)), vviCflin furty-hva days, the 
State agues he is "deemed to have wdJvIQd" it by virtue of 1.C. fj 19-2719 (5). 
Brief m Suppod of Motion for S xy Disdss& at 21-13. 
Porter respctnds that he c d d  not have raised the R% decision vvihn the 
fow-ho day limit. btcause it was not dedded until twelve years later. He 
contends he &gently complied with the Act. by bringing his petitictn dt-hin 
forty-hvo days of the Ring dedsion. Petitionel's Response to Motion for 
S m ~ i t r y  Dismissal of Rule 35 M o ~ o n  at 2, 
When Porter was convicted the Unikd States S u p m e  Court had held 
that judges could decide the aggravating factors necessary to justify the 
~ m p i t i m  of the death p a t t y .  Walfan v. Arizona, 497 US. at 649; see, Spaziano v. 
Florzda, 468 U.S. at 459. The Idaho S u p m e  Cowt had specificdly held that the 
U.S. and Idaho Gonsetutions pemtted a judge to decide whether the death 
penalty should be imposed. Strrfe v. Creecit, 105 Idaho at 367,670 P.2d at 468 
("We hold that here is no federal constitutional requirement of jury participation 
in the sentenang process and that the deasion to have jury partiripation in the 
sentencing process, as contrasted with the judicial discretion sentencing, is 
within the policy d & e b a ~ o n  of the individual states,"); Sfab  u. Siuak, 1% 
Idaho at 902-903. There was no reason at t h f  time to thuzk that either of those 
courts would rev- itself. 
The ady decision during that time that upheld an accused's right to have 
a jury decide all the elements of capital murdw was Adamson v. Rickets, 865 F.2d 
101 1 (9th Cir. 1988). The Idaho Supreme Court specifically rejected 
Adamson in State u. Cfitlrborzeau, 116 Idaho at 146, 774 P.2d at  317. It said: 
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To accept [ AppdlanYs] ent &at lfne jury must be 
involved in de aggravaMg cirmstances 
exist, we w a d  that the aggravating 
eircumstmes Eat& in LC. 19-Z15(g) we elements of first 
degree mmdm. We are unable to reach that mnclusion. The 
stances listed in the stahte are clearly circumistmces to 
be conside-d ~YI ~nten<ring and not elementf, of first degree 
rnurder. It is not uconstitrutional for a judge, instead of a jury, 
tu detedne whether any of the aggravating fircumstances 
listed in the statute exlst 
Our opinion in this aspeck of the case is not changed by the 
decision of the Ninth Circuit in Adamson u. Rickets, 865 F. ;ld 
101 1 (9th Cir ,1988). In Adamson the Ninth Circuit held 
M o n a ' s  death pnaIty sentencing statutes to be in violation of 
the Sixth Amadmat.  M n g  reargummt of h s  case to 
determine what impad Adamson might have on our opixlion 
h a ,  the solicitor general for the state of Idaho achwledgtd  
that trheru! is no significant difference between the Arizona death 
penalty mkncing statutes md those of Idaho. Nevertheless, 
we are not convinced that Admsctn correctly states the 
reguhments of the Sixth Amendment on this issue. 
The undeniable fact is, as a matter of adjudicated law in Idaho, and in the 
United States, there did net exist a credible claim for relief based on the assertion 
that the judge rather than the jury decided whether a person convicted of first- 
degree murder lived or died. That issue had been definitively decided. Wtton, 
497 U.S. at 649; Creech, 1.05 Idaho at 367; Charburrenu, 116 Idaho at 146. The Idaho 
Supreme Court demonstrated the transparent futility of such a claim when it 
peremptorily dismissed Perter's constitutional appeal on that issue in a single 
paragraph without dissel~t. Stafe v. Porter, 130 Idaho at 795-796,948 P.2d 150- 
15l(quoted supra at 4). 
The A d  does not say that any issue which might conceivably have been 
raised, even if contrary to all appeIIate precedent, must be raised within the 
forty-two day time frame or be forever barred. Rather, it deems waived "such 
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claims fDr rcliqf as known, or reasonably should have been known" (emphasis 
added). I.C. 9 19-2719 (3). 
A daim fur relief by de~ l t ion  is a darn bawd on a prinaple of law ar a 
cms~htional nght that errtitles a plitimer to a change in his or her legal status. 
Po&er/s sSatus qw is hat  of a pemon cantrid& of h t d e  
whom a wmmt of death has been iswed, The relief he seeks is to have the 
death warrmt vacated. The predicate for his petjGon is &at the agpvating 
factors which reulted in the wmmt  were decided by a judge instead of a jury. 
The right to have a jury dedde those factors did not exist in a capital case until 
JuIy 24,2002, the d a k  Ring was decided. 
The State contends dnar even though both the Nation's highest court and 
Idaho's hghest court. had decided that the judges' hposition of the death 
penalty passed cometu~onal muster, Porter was none~eless obliged to raise 
that issue within the forty-two day Ring limit prescribed by I.C. 9 19-271 9. It 
argues that Ring hmseIf raisd that issue as: a basis for a favorable ruling on his 
behalf and no less should be expected of Porter. 
I am unpersuaded At the time Porter was sentenced, W f o n  and Spaziano 
were the only United States Supreme Court decisions on the jury-death sentence 
horizon. When Ring was sentenced by the trial judge in 1997 (Ring, 122 S.Ct at 
24351, the Iegal landscape was ~ i ~ f i c a n t i y  altered. The Court had expressly 
held that all the elements of a crime must be tried to a jury in Bowley v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 614, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (1998) and United Sfafes v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 
510, 115 S.Ct-. 2310,2320 (1995), which put the comtitutiunal moorings of Walfon 
on very shaky footings. 
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The issue Porter raised in his 1994 pctilion for post-conviction relief and 
on his awed to the IdJlv Sup 
rclsult. Porter I, 1% Idaho at 795796,948 P.2d at 1!3&151. I condude for one to 
have reamn to h o w  there is a cf for reBef hew must be at: least some nedible 
authorifit to su it, Xn Idaho at the time Porter was mtenced to death there 
was none. The judge's role in deddtng whether a pason who had committed 
murder lived or died had tke ixn of h e  only two supreme 
c u u h  from whch Porter could seek relief, 
VII. DOES ACT'S BAR TO RETROAC3TVE EEFECTAPPLY? 
The State next argues the application of Ring to Porter is precluded by the 
Act because it provides that a pleading assuting an exception to the forty-two 
day time limit for filing a daim for relief "shall be deemed fadally insuffident to 
the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of law." LC. 3 19- 
27l9(5)(c). 
The right to have all the elements of a capital case tried to a jury is not of 
recent vintage. As discussed above, until the various states tried to cope with the 
F t c r m m  decision finding the death penalty unconstitutional, that right had never 
been questioned. It was only after Idaho and four other states relegated that 
duty to a judge that any question about the jury's role arose. Spaxiam validated 
the aberrant approach in 1984, Walton confirmed it in 1990, and Ring ended it in 
2002. 
Having a jury try all the elements of a crime was not a n m  d e  of law 
See, e.g., In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970) ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except u p  proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."). 
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It: was not the d e  of law however, d Ifl.te b e  Pofier was p m e c u a  
sentaced m death. The Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged as much in State v. 
Cree&, 105 Idaho at 372-373.670 P.2d 47-74 when it said, "At other places or at 
other times, juries have been given an integral mle in impsing the death 
sentence. However, we hold that jury partidpation in the sentencing process is 
not consabtionalf y required." 
Even if Ring had announced a new rule of law, thfz Act's ban an its 
retroactive effect wodd not apply to Porter. The Act was mended in 1995 to 
include subsection (5)(c). The first inquiry, thereforeI is whetfter its constraints 
against mmactivity apply to Porter, whose convicrtion and death penalty 
preceded the date of h e  mmdmentis enactment. The statute ~tself maker; no 
provision for its retroactive effect. Idaho Code 6j 73401 instructs that "[njo part 
of Lhese compiled laws is retroactive, unless rn declared.'' The Idaho 
Supreme Court has decided the statute means what it says. Nebeker D. Piper 
Airoaf) Corporation, 113 Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23(1987). I conclude, 
therefore, that Idaho Code 5 19-2719(5)(c) has no retroactive effect in this case. 
Vllf. DOES HNG APPLY REmOAMmLY TO PORTER? 
The next inquiry artd the gravamen of Porter's petition is whether Ring 
applies retroactively to his death sentence. 
The State argues that a new criminal procedural rule is not retroactive, 
citing Te~gue v. hne,  489 US. 288,109 S.Ct 1060 (1989), and that finality of death 
sentences preceding Ring is essential, because "[tlo require the application of 
Ring to those cases and potentially force the resentencing of every capital 
defendant wodd seriously undermine any deterrent effect associated with the 
death penalty.*' Reply Brief In Support of Motion For Summary Dismissal at 4-7. 
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Po&m mpes R i ~ g  defines a suhstanL.ive rule, c i ~ n g  Bousfq, 523 U,S, at 
620. We mntends the Teape ban on releu>ac%iviy only appIies to pmcedurdl rules 
of law m d  that Ring involves a subsMtive right &at is w i h  the "concept of 
ordaed liberty," citJng Davk u. Uniied Slats, 417 U.S. 333 (1974). Peti~mer's 
Rapon= to Motion far ruy Disfisc;al at 16-22. 
The right to a fair trial is a furtdmmM li secured by &e Fou&wn& 
hendatent. &ope zl. Missouri, 420 U.S. I62,95 S.Ct. 8% (1975); see a h ,  
Maftfrrws zt. Eldrdge, 424 U.S. 329,96 S.Ct. 893 (1976). Porter's petition does not 
question the fairness of hs  trial for first degree murder. It does question the 
f ~ m e s  of a trial for ht-degree murder that resuIb in a sentenctt for the &me af 
capital murder. Stated another way, he contends it is fundamentally unfair to 
sentence h for a crime for which he has not been convicted by a jury. 
The history and role of the jury in Anglo-American jurisprudence is 
pivotat to my decision. In my judgment the jury is the single-most vita1 
guaantur of our demmatic form of govement. Legislators can legidate, 
executives can execute and judges can adjudicate, but, as Peter k g e r  
cfiscovered 265 years ago, it is ultimately a jury that protects our individual 
liberties as citizens from their overreahng. There is a very simple reason for 
that. 
Twelve persons who are governed by the sovereign sit in judgment of the 
charges agaimt the accused brought by the sovereign that g o v m  them. Their 
Iife experiences, common sense, m d  co1Iective wisdom buffer the unsavory traits 
that power and ambition often foster in those who govern. The fact that all 
helve jurors must agree hat  the state has made its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt tempers any arbitrary or suhective approach that any one individual . 
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nught indulge, whch is the peril of having just one per makf: a dedsion as 
fateful as life and death. 
The United States Supreme Coivt ahowledged the j w s  role when it 
held that "the right to a jury trial in &ous cJimfnal cases is a h d m e n t d  right 
and hence must be recoezed by the States as part of their ubligalim to extend 
due prmess of law t-o all personsj within their j ~ s ~ d e n c e . "  D-tincnn v. 
Louisiann, 391 US. 145,154, I38 S.Ct. 1444,1450 (1968). 
Both the United States S u p ~ m e  Co& in Teape, 489 U.S. at- 305-31 I, 109 
S.Ct. at 1072-1075, and the Idaho Supreme Cwrt  in Iil the Maf.ter of Gaford, f 27 
Idaho 472,476,903 P.2d 61,65 (I%) cave  out an excepfion to the general rule 
that new comtitugo~xd rules are not rebadive if the rule is "implidt in the 
concept of ordered liberty." Lf a right to a jury trial is a "fundmental right" and 
an essential element of due process, as the m n a n  Court has held it is, then, by 
definition it is implieit in h e  concept of ordered Iikrty. 
The State's reliance on Fetlerly a. Sttzte, 121 Id& 417 (1992) and CriJ3"Ftjx v. 
Ke~nttlcky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) is misplaced. There the courts assumed the new 
constitutional ntles under review w e  procdural. Both decisions preceded 
Tmgtde and Gafird. The T e a p  distinc~on between a procedural rule and 
fundamental right is n o ~ r  dispositive regarding retroactivity. 
In that vein, the State argues that Ring just establishes a new procedural 
rule for trying capital cases and therefore is not retroactive under Teague. I: 
disagree. Iri Boustey the Supmrne Court held that the actual use of a weapon 
rather than its mere possession was a necessary element of the crime of 
"howing1y and intentionally [using] . . . firearms during and in relation to a 
drug trafficking mime." 523 U.S. at 616. Because the existence or absence of . 
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acbaLly using a weaport cl 
establishg Chat dis~ncfion was eomidmed substmtive, and thmfom 
rekoadve. Bowlq, 523 U.S, at 620. 
The Court in Bumley reached &at condusim because of the "significant 
risk that a defendmt s h d s  m n ~ d e d  of 'an act that tfte law does not make 
&mind,'" (quo6ng Dmis v. United States, 417 U.5, at 3461, 523 U.S. at 620. Were 
Porter stands stmtenmd to death for capital murder, which the Idaho legislature 
had not made a crime and which was not submitted to the jury for its decision. 
In sum, Porter has been sentenced to die for a crime for which a jury has 
not convicted h m .  His dmmmstance is indistinguishable in principle from 
B Q U S ~ ~ .  In HowIqy the factual question was whether the weapon was being used 
while drugs were being trafficked. 523 U.S. at 620. LnRing, it was whether an 
aggravahg factor existed when the murder was committed. 122 S.Ct. at 2434-37. 
The flaw in the Arizona and Idaho statutes was that the judge was entitled 
to decide the aggravagng factors preasefy because that determination was 
enonmusly considered to be procedural. The teaching of Ring is that the factors 
that decide life and death am substantive elements of the h e e  itself, not simply 
a procedural protocoi ta be wrapped up by a judge at the end of the trial. 
At its c m ,  the right to a jury trial is the right of all citizens to have the 
State's criminal charges against them decided by their fellow citizens, rather than 
by a judge who is employed by the same State that has brought the charges. 
Thehere can be no more hrndmental and substantive right in a free society than to 
have one's liberty decided by one's peers. Permitting a judge to dedde the facts 
that detemitxe whetha a murder is capital mudm subverts the very essence of 
the right to a jury trial. Even worse, it embraces the peril of an arbitrary judge . 
00157 
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that the jury has to steadfastly vanquished in &mind hia ls  during the past eight 
hundred years of Anglo-hdcan  j ~ s p d m c e .  
Poxtes was sentmced. to death for a crime hat  the jury had not found he 
capiM fisstdepe murder. That had additional factual 
elements h e  jury was not E d  to decide. I condude, therefore, that 
sentencing Porter to death far a crime for which the jury did not convict him 
denied h m  his Sixth hendnlmt  right to a jury trial and the p r e s s  he was due 
by virtue of the JFoMmnh Annenhent. 
The m e d y  fur that wrong is presdhd by prwedmt. Whm a person 
has b m  convicted for a crime based on an imhction that omitted an essential 
element of that crime, the pwson c m  be w n t e n d  ody fur the crime whtch the 
inshctions defined. State v. J&ppe$en, 138 Idaho T1,76,57 P.3d 782,787 (2QO2); 
State v. Nururz, 133 Idaho 13,19-20,981 P.2d 738,74445 (1999). That principle is 
no less applicable here. Since Porter was convicted by the jlxry on only those 
elements which define first-delifree murder, I condude that it the only m i l e  for 
whch he can be sentenced. id.  
IX. ORDER 
1. The State's Motion for S u m q  Dsmi~a l  is denied; 
2. Porter's Petifion fm Post-Conviction fielief and/or Writ of Habeas 
Corpus (Lewis County Case No. 02-041) is granted; 
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3. Po&&s MoGm to Corn& alegal *ten=, to Vacate Z;enkmre of Death 
and far New Sententing Trial (Lewis C o w 9  Case No. 6053) is denied 
Mtk~ttt prejudice as moot? 
4. The Verdict, filed January 26.1990, hding Porter guilty of finirst-degree 
murder s h d  sbd;  
5. The district court's order and judpetlt &at Porter is "guilty of the 
C OF FIRST DEGWE as charged in said 
i d o m a ~ o n  as found by the jury in their u n h o u s  verdict"' contained in 
the Judmmt and Sentence, filed September 7,1990 shall stand; 
6, The dislricf: murt's order, judgment and decree that Porter is 
''smtenced to suffer the punishment of death in accordance with the 
provisions of Idaho Code Section 18-404  and in the m m e r  prescribed by 
Chapter 27 of Title 19, Idaho Code, at the Idaho State Penitentiary in Boise, 
Ada County, Idaho" contained in the Judgment and Sentme, f2ed 
%tetember 7,1990 is hereby vacated; 
7. A new date will be set to sentence Porter for first-degree murder, the 
only crime of which he now stands convicted by a jury of his peers. 
rr IS SO ORDERED t h i s x  day of April, 2003. 
Although I have serious reservations about h s  courfs jurisdidion to impose 
the death penalty in this case, Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736,739,747 P.2d 758 
(Ct.App. 1987) ("A jurisdictional defect exists when the alleged fads are not 
made criminal by statute, or where there is a failure to state facts essential to 
establish the offense charged"), because I conclude I.C. 9 19-2719 does not bar 
Porter's petition for relief, I do not reach those issues raisedsby his Rule 35 
motion. 
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IN THE DISTMCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
1 Case No. SPOT 020071 1D 
1 
1 
1 W P L Y  TO STATE'S MSPONSE TO 
) PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN 
) OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION 
1 FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
1 
Zane Jack Fields ("Petitioner"), through counsel, files this Reply to State's Response to 
Petitioner's Brief in Opposition to State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, dated January 15, 
2003 [hereinafter "Response"]. For the reasons set fonh below Respondent's motion to 
summarily dismiss Mr. Fields' Petition for Post-Conviction Petition should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
A. AEDPA's Successive Petition Requirements Do Not Apply to These Proceedings. 
The State's first argument is that because the United States Supreme Court has not yet 
made Ring v Arizonu retroactive, this Court cannot do so. Response at 2. The argument relies 
in whole upon the State's fundamental misunderstanding of the Supreme Court's decision in 
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Tyler v. G i n ,  533 U.S. 656 (2001 j. The principles of relsoactivity under Teugue 1). Lane, 489 
U.S. 288 (1 989) must not be confused with the Anti-Tenorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
["%EDPA"]% requirement for successor petitions, in which claims must rely on a previously 
unavailable "new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme C~LM." 228 U.S.C. 5 2234(b)(2)(A). 
The State thus misapprehends Tyler when it asserts "the Tyler court held that a new rule 
is not retroactive unless the Supreme Court specifically held that it was to be retroactive at the 
time the decision was made or unless some subsequent case or a series of cases specifically 
makes it retroactive." Response at 7. In fact, Tyler v. Cuin, has no impact on the question of 
retroactivity before this Court. In Tyler, the United States Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. $ 
2244(b)(2)(A) did not incorporate the Teague standard but that in order for a new rule of 
constitutional law to be made retroactive to cases on collateral review, the Supreme Court must 
expressly hold it to apply retroactively. 533 U.S. at 664-667. 28 U.S. C. §2244(b)(2)(A) is a 
subsection of the federal statute regulating and limiting the federal courts power to grant relief in 
successive habeas proceedings. It has no applicability or enforceability in the context of these 
state proceedings. Thus, the thrust of the State's reliance thereon is seriously misplaced. 
This misunderstanding of federal proceedings and the Supreme Court's rulings thereon is 
muddled further by the State's argument that the Supreme Court rejected an argument in Tyler 
"that the Cage rule should be retroactive under a Teague v. Lane " and thus, '-held that Cage was 
not retroactive to Tyler." Response at 6. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court expressly 
stated that "[tlhe most [Tyler] can claim is that, based on the principles outlined in Teague, this 
Court shouM make Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review. What is clear, however, is 
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that we have not h a d e '  Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review." Tyler v. Chin, 533 U.S. 
at 666. The question of whether or not C ~ g e  will be retroactively applied was not answered in 
Tyler- the only question the Court mswered was at the time Tyler sought to file a 
successive petition for habeas corpus the Cuge rule bad been "made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court" for p q o s e s  of $2244(b)(2)(A). They held it had not. 
533 U.S. at 664. 
Similarly, the State relies on a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' case, Cannon v. Mullen 
297 F. 3d 989 (loth Cir. 2002). The State enoneously asserts that Cannon "specifically held that 
the Ring decision is not retroactive." Response at 10. Cannon did not so hold. Cannon, like 
Tyler and in reliance thereon, was held to be procedurally barred from proceeding in federal court 
on a successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(A). 297 F. 3d at 994. The Court 
held only that "Cannon has failed to make aprimu facie showing that the Supreme Court has 
made Ring retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review" and denied his application for 
permission to file a second habeas petition. 297 F. 3d at 995. The analysis of whether Ring 
ought to be applied retroactively under Teague v. Lane is dicta and presented in a case in 
procedural posture of Cannon has no relevance to the issues at hand. As such, cases like Tyler v. 
Cuin, 533 U.S. 656 (2001), and Cannon are easily distinguishable from the requirements 
imposed on Mr. Fields under Teague in these state proceedings. 
B. The "Rule of Ring" is Retroactive Under Boustey v. United States. 
The State next argues that Ring is not retroactive under Teague v. Lane. Response at 6. 
The argument fails for several reasons. Initially, this argument relies again on Tyler v. Cain in its 
effort to explain the substantive holding of Teague. Response at 6-10. To the extent the State's 
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targurnent relies on Tyler, an AEDPA case, to support its asgument on Teague, Lhe reliance is 
misplaced. As noted by the United States Supreme Court itself, "'if ow  post-AEDPA cases 
suggest mything about AEDPAfs relationship to Teugue, it is that the AEDPA and Teagut. 
inquiries are distinct.'Wom v. Bunk, 536 U.S. 266 (2002). 
Similarly, the State's su ary rejection of the argument by Petitioner that Teague does 
not apply because Ring es~blishes a new rule, if it is new, of srrbst~ntive ri~ninal aw rather than 
procedure is based on a faulty understanding of Teugue and Ring. Response at 12. What is 
perhaps most misunderstood is what the rule of Ring is. Ring simply applies old procedural law 
of the 5" and 6' Amendment Due Process right to Notice by information and jury findings 
beyond a reasonable doubt to the new understanding of the substantive nature of the role that 
statutory aggravating factors play in a capital case. The role has not changed, i.e., making a 
person convicted of first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, but rather the Supreme 
Court's understanding oftheir role was clarified in Ring, nor have tlie procedural protections 
which arise by the clarification changed. Simply because the rights which attach as a result of 
Ring's subtantive rule not previously acknowledged does not make the rule itself "procedural." 
Since Petitioner's Brief in Opposition was filed in this case, the United States Supreme 
Court has made much more clear the substantive nature of the rule of Ring. In Sutlazahn v. 
Pennsylvania, -U.S.-,123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (Jan 14,2003), the United States Supreme 
Court held that "neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty against 
petitioner on retrial." Id., 123 S. Ct at 742. In reaching its conclusion, Justice Scalia, joined by 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thon~as, laid to rest any question regarding precise in~pact of 
Ring v. -4rizonu when he wrote: 
Just last Term we recognized the import of /lppren~li n the context of capital- 
sentencing proceedings. In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. -, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (20021, 
we held that aggravating circumstances that make a defendmt eligible for the 
death penalty "operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
ofinse."' Id., at (slip op., at 23) (emphasis added). That is to say, far puwosss 
of the Sixth Amendment's jv - t r i a l  guarantee, the underlying offense of "murder" 
is a distinct, lesser included offense of "murder plus one or more aggravating 
circustmces": Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a maximm penalty 
of life imprisoment, the latter increases the maximum permissible sentence to 
death. Accordingly, we held that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, and 
not ajudge, find the existence of any aggravating circumstances, and that they be 
found, not by a mere preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable 
doubt. I d ,  at - -  (slip op., at 22-23). 
Sattcrzcrhn v. Pennsylvania, supra, 133 S. Ct at 739. Justice Scalia, with a majority of the court 
concurring in Ring, unambiguously establishes that "murder plus one or more aggravating 
circumstances" is a separate offense from "murder simpliciler." Id. 
Three points illustrated by Sattazahn are essential to the question before this Court. First, 
that Petitioner here has been found guilty only of "murder simpliciter" [murder in the first 
degree] and not "murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances" [capital murder] and thus, 
death is not a statutorily permissible penalty. See Idaho Code 18-4004. In this case, instructions 
specifying the elements of a murder simpliciter were given to the jury. The jury was not 
instructed to find the element of any statutory aggravating circumstance, which raises the offense 
to a capital murder. Because the instructions did not define the crime as a lesser included 
offense of a capital murder, the jury was not asked to consider first whether the evidence was 
sufficient to find the defendant guilty of the capital murder before it determined that Fields was 
guilty of the lesser, murder offense. See I.C. 5 19-2 1321~). Accordingly, Fields should have 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POST-. 
CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 5 
been sentenced only for murder simpliciter and not "hurder plus aggravator." See Sfate v. 
f ines ,  133 ldaho 13,20,98 1 P. 2d 738,745 (1 9991, rehearing denied ' 
Secondly, it is clear from Justice Sca1ia"s opinion that Ring, in its application of Appre~zdi 
to the capital context, does not effect a "new rule of law" and thus, its application is not barred 
by Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c). In Sirttuzahn, Justice Scalia expressly found that 
Apprendi "'clur~>ed what constitutes an "element" of an offense for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment's jury-trial guarantee." 123 S.Ct. at 739. To clarify simply does not create a new 
rule but makes the rule clear or intelligible or frees it from ambiguity. See Webster's 
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary Random House, 1996 (2d Ed.) at 380. The statutory 
aggravating circumstances were elements of the offense at the time of crime, conviction and 
sentence and they remain elements. Petitioner was at all times entitled to notice and a jury trial 
thereon. The conviction which now stands is nothing more than a conviction for first degree 
murder," an offense for which death is not an available penalty 
Thirdly, there can be little argument that the definition of a crime by its elements is 
undoubtedly substantive and not procedural. Thus, Teague v. Lane does not apply and the 
holding of Ring must be applied to Petitioner under Bousely v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,620- 
21 (1995). Inherent in the State's arguments is a fundamental misapprehension of greater and 
lesser included offenses and the application of that criminal law structure to Petitioner's 
conviction. The State continues to argue that Petitioner was convicted of murder, a conviction 
which is not subject to question in this proceeding, and the aggravating circumstances were mere 
' f i n e z  also makes clear that a proceeding under ldaho Criminal Rule 35 is the 
appropriate vehicle to correct the sentence. See id., 133 Idaho at 16,981 P.2d at 741. 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POST- 
CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 6 
sentencing factors. Response at 16. We agree Petitioner was convicted of murder but the 
conviction under scrutiny here is the conviction, or more imporlantly lack of conviction, for 
capital murder, without tvhich Petitioner cannot legally be sentenced to death. 
C. Even If Teague Applies, Ring Should Be Applied Retroactively. 
1. Ring Satisfies the "Private Conduct Beyoud the Power to Proscribe" 
Exception to the fingue Doctrine. 
It is in understanding the substantive nature of the statutory aggravating circumstances 
that the State's sgument dismissing the first exception of Teagzde under authority of Jones v. 
Smirh, 231 F.3d 1227 (91h Cir 2000) must be rejected as well. See Response at 15-16. Even if 
Ring were a new rule of criminal procedure, it would be applied retroactively because "it places 
'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law- 
making authority to proscribe."' Teague, 489 U.S. at 3 1 1 (quoting Mackey v. United Slates, 401 
U.S. 667,693 (1971)(Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)). This exception arises 
from Teague 's adoption of Justice Harlan's views on non-retroactivity in which he noted that 
"[tlhere is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it 
ought properly never to repose." Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692-93 (Harlan, J., conc~uring in part and 
dissenting in part.) Thus, Justice Harlan concluded and the United States Supreme Court 
ultimately accepted that "[nlew 'substantive due process' rules that . . . free[] individuals from 
punishment for conduct that is constitutionally protected" ought to be retroactive. Mackey, 401 
U.S. at 692-93; accord Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. at 620. 
In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 303,330 (1989) the Court recognized that the exception 
extended to capital cases in a unique way, noting that a "new rule placing a certain class of 
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individuals beyond the state's power to punish by death is analogous to a new rule placing certain 
conduct beyond the State's power to punish at all." A constitutionai rule barring execution of the 
revsded would fall outside Teague v. Lane 's ban on retroactive application of new constitutional 
rules because it placed the ability to execute the retarded "beyond the State's power." Id. 
(discussing Teugtie, 489 1J.S. at 30 1-02). 
Unlike any other class of proscribed criminal conduct, before a goverment may sentence 
a person to death, it must adhere to stringent jurispmdential requirements under the Eight11 and 
Fourleenth Amendments. Ring 11. Arizona, 122 S. Ct at 2442 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring)) ("[Iln the area of capital punishment, unlike any other area, we 
have imposed special constraints on a legislature's ability to determine what facts shall lead to 
what punishment--we have restricted the legislature's ability to define crimes."). The first Teugue 
exception permits a rule to be raised collaterally if it prevents lawmaking authority from 
criminalizing or punishing in a certain manner certain kinds of conduct. Teague, 489 U.S. at 
31 1 ;  Penry, 492 U.S.  at 330. Ring like Nunez prohibits the state from imposing the death 
penalty upon those who have been convicted by jury only of the lesser included offense of 
murder and are not eligible for death absent additional jury fact finding which never took place. 
Ring clearly comes within the ambit of the first Tiague exception compelling application of its 
constitutional principles to Zme Fields 
2. Ring Satisfies The "Watershed" Exception to the Teague Doctrine. 
Assuming arguendo that Ring announced a new rule of criminal procedure, the final step 
in the Teague analysis, is to ascertain whether the constitutional principle announced in Jones, 
applied in ilpprendi, affirmed and extended in Ring is a watershed rule of criminal procedure, 
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implicating both the accuracy and fundmental fairness of criminal proceedings. Teugue, 489 
U.S. at 312. Justice O'Connor bas certainly mswered that question in the affirmative when she 
wrote in her dissent in Apprendi: 'Today, in what will surely be remembered as a watershed 
change in constitutional law, the Court imposes as a constitutional rule the principle it first 
identified in Jones." A~pprendi v. New Jersex 530 U.S. at 523 (O'Comor, J., dissenting). But 
see Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2449-50 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (noting that claimants may be "barred 
from taking advantage" of Ring "on federal collateral review"'). Ring v. Arizona, which 
extended Apprendi to capital case sentencing proceedings, requires jury findings on, and pre-trial 
notice of, aggravating circumstances -- concepts which are "implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty" under Teilgue's second exception. See Teilgue, 489 U.S. at 3 1 1. 
A rule that qualifies under this exception "must not only improve accuracy [of the trial 
and conviction],%but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to 
the fairness of a proceeding." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227,242 (1990) (internal quotation 
marks and quoted cases omilted). Ring applies the principles of Jones v. United Stales and 
Apprendi in the capital context and is a sweeping rule of criminal law. Ring applies to every 
capital defendant in Idaho and in every other death penalty jurisdiction whose judge sentencing 
scheme usurped the jury's fact-finding function and stripped the accused of his or her right to 
notice, jury trial and due proce~s.~ 
As argued in our Response in Opposition to Request to Summarily Dismiss, the Teague 
requirement of "accuracy-enhancing" does not appear to be applicable under Idaho law. hilatter 
of Gilflord 127 Idaho 472,476,903 P. 2d 61, 65 (1 995). See Petitioner's Response at p. 17-1 8. 
3 See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. at 2442 n.6 ('"[olther than Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat. $13- 
501 (C)] , only four States commit both capital sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing 
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Ring's requirement that a jury, not a judge, find beyond a reasonable doubt the factual 
elernents necessary for a conviction of capital rnurder meets the second Teasue exception 
qualifications. Applying ,lorzes and L4pprentfi to the capital context, Ring raises the standard for 
cletemining factors that may subjed a criminal defendant to a possible sentence of death from a 
prepondermce of the evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby increasing accuracy. 
Similarly, Ring" requirement, that every element of a crime - defined as every fact that increases 
the statutov maximurn - be charged in the indictment and found by a jury by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt improves the accuracy of the fact-finding process because it reduces the risk 
that an imocent person might be convicted of a more serious crime, or that a guilty person might 
be punished more severely than the law allows. In Ring, the Court explicitly declined to accept 
Arizona's asgunlent that judicial factfinding is superior in capital cases. The Court found that 
argument '"far from evident," noting that "the great majority of States . . . entrust[] those 
deteminations to the jury." Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2442. 
In light of the hedarnental nature of the right to pre-trial notice of every element of the 
offense and findings by a properly instructed jury beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of 
the offense, the holding in Ring must meet the Tecrgue exception for a watershed rule affecting 
bedrock procedural requirements implicit in ordered liberty and necessary to a fair trial. A 
decision entirely to judges. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 5 16-1 1 - 103 (2001) (three-judge panel); Idaho 
Code Q' 19-25 15 (Supp.2001); Mont. Code Ann. 5 46-1 8-301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. 5 29-2520 
(1 995). . . Four States have hybrid systems, in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the 
judge makes the ultimate sentencing determinations. See Ala. Code $5 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 
(1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, 5 4209 (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. 5 921.141 (West 2001); Ind. 
Code Ann. 5 35-50-2-9 (Supp.2001)). 
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cornparison to other rules, held to meet Teugue's watershed rule exception, forces the conclusion 
that Ring necessarily falls within its purview. 
[Clourts have applied the second exception of Teagut;. to a range of constitutional 
rules of crin~inal procedure. See, e.g., Ostrosky v. Afush, 9 1 3 F.2d 590,594-95 
(9" hir. 1990) (mounting a new due process rule concerning mistjke of law 
defenses and finding that the rule falls within the Tecrgzre exception for 
"procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberly" ); Hull v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 
154 1, 1543 n. 1 (1 1 th Cir. 1990) (finding as a1 exception the rule announced in 
Sandsfrom v. hfontunu regarding burden shifting instructions); Graham v. Hoke, 
946 F.2d 982,994 (2d Cir. 1991) (iinding as an exception the rule amounced in 
Cruz, that non testifying codefendant's confession may not be admitted); Williams 
v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448,454-56 (4" Cir. 1992) (finding as an exception the _MiIIs 
rule striking the unanimity requirement in jury findings of mitigating evidence); 
Gaines (v. Kelly], 202 F.3d [598,] 604 [(2d Cir. 2000)l (finding as an exception 
the Cage rule that describing reasonable doubt in terms of grave or substantial 
uncertainty and requiring a "moral certainty" violates due process). 
NofJLnan v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 547-48 (9th Cir. 2001) (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
The State assures the Court that the accuracy of the conviction is not at risk. Response at 
20. "The only issue is whether a jury should have been asked to find statutory aggravators 
instead of the judge. That has nothing to do with the accuracy of the underlying conviction." 
Response at 20. The State's inability to comprehend the concept at the heart of Ring v. Arizona - 
the conviction in question is the conviction for capital murder, not simple murder - wholly 
undermines the State's analysis regarding the affect that the lack of a jury properly instructed had 
on the findings of aggravating circumstances and thus the accuracy of the verdict of "death- 
eligible." 
D. Prior Rulings That Apprendi Is Not Retroactive Do Not Preclude This Court From 
Applying Ring Retroactively. 
The State relies in part on the Ninth Circuit decisions of Jones v. Smith, 23 1 F. 3d 1227 
(9th Cir 2000) and United States v. Sanchez-Cbrvantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002), which have 
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declined to apply Apj~rendi retroactively. In Jones v. ,kith, an element of the crime was omitted 
from the state court information, but the jury instructions were proper and argument to the jury 
was made as to all the elements. 23 1 F. 3d at 1237. In analyzing whether Aj7prevziti uras 
retroactive, the court held without disciplined analysis that -4pprendi was a new rule of criminal 
procedure, thus satisfying the first step of the analysis. The Court went on to hold that the 
Apprendi rule, "at least as applied to the omission ofcertain necessary elemenis@om the state 
couri infirmution," did not fit into either Teugue exception and declined to apply ifpprendi 
retroactively. Id., at 1238. Because Jones limited its analysis and holding regarding the Teague 
exceptions to the facts of that case, it guides but does not control here. See United States v. 
Sanchez-Cervunies, 282 F.  3d at 668. Indeed, in this case the jury was not properly instructed 
nor were they asked to find the existence of any statutory aggravating circumstances. 
In United Stutes v. Sanchez-Cervantes, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
Apyrendi is not a watershed rule in the context of drug quantity determinations and does not 
apply retroactively. 282 F. 3d at 671. The holding of Sanchez-Cervantes does not undermine the 
retroactive application of Ring. 
The Sanchez-Cervantes Court found that "requiring the jury to make drug quantity 
determinations beyond a reasonable doubt will [not] greatly affect the accuracy of convictions." 
282 F. 3d at 669. This observation has no application to the qualitatively different, and infinitely 
more complex and important decision as to whether a defendant should be singled out as 
deserving the possibility of facing the death penalty. "The penalty of death is qualitatively 
different from a sentence of imprisonment." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 
(1976). Because of this qualitative difference, procedures which may be acceptable in the non- 
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death arena cannot pass constitutional muster when death is involved. The bifurcated nature of 
capital proceedings compels the conclusion that the retroactive application ofthe critical 
constitutio~~al principle of Ring is not bared. lfoffmun v. Aravt., 236 F. 3d at 539 (wherein the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached FiRh and Sixth Amendment conclusions in a capital case 
that were different frorn a non-capital case (Buumann), by distinguishing the capital bifurcated 
jury proceeding in Estelle frorn Baumunn's "noncapital," "routine" sentencing). 
Just as the Baumnnn court limited its application to non-capital cases, so did Scmchez- 
Cervanres, 282 F. 3d at 67 1 n.45. The jurispntdential reasonableness of the distinction as noted 
in HofJ";nun is compelling. 
By distinguishing the procedures required in capital presentence stages from those 
permitted in non-capital presentence interviews, Baz-lmann joined a long line of 
cases requiring heightened procedural safeguards in capital cases. See Lankford 
v. Idaho,500U.S. 110, 125-27, 111 S.Ct. 1723, 114L.Ed.2d 173 (1991) 
(weighing the "special importance of fair procedure in the capital sentencing 
context" and holding that the lack of notice to the defendant of Idaho's intent to 
seek the death penalty violated Due Process); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 1 1 1, 1 13-1 5, 102 S.Ct. 869,71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (discussing heightened 
protections in capital cases and reversing death sentence because the jury was not 
permitted to consider all of the capital defendant's mitigating character evidence); 
Beck v. Alaharnir, 447 U.S. 625,637-38, 100 S.Ct. 2382,65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) 
(noting the Court's "often stated" principle that "there is a significant 
constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments," and 
overturning death sentence because the jury was not instructed on a lesser 
included noncapital offense); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 
S.Ct. 2978,49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (finding that "the penalty of death is 
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment," and therefore holding 
North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional). 
Hofian, 236 F. 3d at 539-540. Therefore, under HoJYinan both Apprendi and Ring may be 
applied retroactively in the capital context without running afoul of federal precedent. The State's 
confidence "that, following these rulings, the Ninth Circuit would also find that the Ring decision 
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flows from ,4pprerzdi and as such is a procedural change that does not affect the fundmental 
fairness of the trial m d  so is not retroactive, " [Response at 191, is pure speculation as the issue 
has not been decided by the Ninth Circuit and no reliance thereon can be had.' 
E. Idaho's Case law Does Not Preclude Relief 
Notwithstanding the position of the federal courts, this Court has the responsibility to 
apply state law to the question as well. The State relies in part on the failure of the Idaho 
Supreme CourtZs opinions in Fetterly v. State, 12 1 Idaho 41 7, 825 P.2d 1073 (1 99 1); Stuurt v. 
State, 128 Idaho 436 ( 1  996) and Butler v. Stclte, 129 Idaho 899 (1 997) to apply particular rulings 
reeoactively. None of these cases are dispositive of the question of retroactive application of 
Ring v. Arizortcr to Petitioner's case. 
"The federal constitution has no voice upon the subject [of retroactivity of a new rule of 
state law]. A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself 
between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward." Gt. A'orthern Ry. v. 
Sunburst C'o., (1 932) 287 U.S. 358,364. Accord, People v. Carrera, 777 P.2d 121, 142 (Cal. 
1989). Idaho has used a three pronged test in both direct appeals and collateral attacks 
established by the United States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 38 1 U.S. 6 18 (1 965) to 
determine the retroactive effect of cases. See e.g. State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 49 1, 53 1 P.2d 
579,58 1 (1 975) (a direct appeal where the Court cites Linkletter) and Starkey v. State, 9 1 Idaho 
74, 76,4 15 P.2d 71 7, 71 9 (1 966) (a collateral attack where the Court cites Linklefter). The 
question in Idaho of whether a case applied retroactively was determined by weighing, 1) the 
4 Indeed, the issue is currently pending decision in the Ninth Circuit in a case nominated 
SumnzerIin v. Stewart, No. 98-99002 (argued en bnnc Dec. 8,2002). 
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pulFose of the new rule. 2) the reliance placed on the former rule and 3) the effect the retroactive 
application of the new rule sould have on the administration of justice. 381 U.S. at 636, 85 
S.Gt. at 174 I .  Two important principles of Id&o law on the question of retroactivity must be 
kept in mind: (1) the usual rule is to give retroactive effect to judicial rulings, T@ton v. State, 99 
Idaho 670,672, 587 P.2d 305, 307 (1978) ("The question of whether to follow the usual rule that 
retroactive effect be given to judicial rulings or whether a particular case should be limited to 
prospective effect only, using the criteria we outlined in State v. iCZihitnzan, 96 Idrtho 489,491, 
53 1 P.2d 579, 581 (1975), arises when the rule announced in the more recent case overrules a 
precedent upon which parties may have justifiably relied."); and (2) a state supreme court has 
unfettered discretion to apply a particular ruling either purely prospectively, purely retroactively, 
or partially retroactively, limited only 'by the juristic philosophy of the judges." Id. 
"Consideration is given to applying a ruling prospectively 'whenever injustice or hardship will 
thereby be averted.' " Wurtvick v. State ex rel. Clhunee, 548 P.2d 384,393 (Alaska 19761." Id. 
It cannot be said that the reliance on Wulton v. Arizona was reasonable in light of the 
clear language in Wirlton itself which misunderstood Arizona's statutory scheme and rejected 
Walton's contention that the aggravating fictors in Arizona were elements. Wulton v. Arizona, 
497 US at 648. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Idaho Supreme Court was well 
aware of the role that the statutory aggravating circumstances played in determining death 
eligibility, See State v. Churbuneau, 1 16 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1 989) . Even if the reliance 
on Wallon could be considered reasonable, prospective application only, is not necessary to avert 
5 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at 610, 122 S.Ct. At 2444 (Scalia J. concurring). 
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injustice or undue hardship. The need fbr finality in judgments must subrnit to the irrevocability 
of the death sentence md  the absolute need for accurate and reliable findings regading the 
verdict on the statutory aggravating circumstances. Courts can only be confident in the accuracy 
and the reliability in a finding of death eligibility when the factfindil~g body is able to debate and 
diseowse and is free of any political pressure, i.e., when a jury of twelve not a single judge is 
charged with the responsibility. Applying the third factor, there can be no reasonable tjnding 
that applying the rule to fifteen defendanls who despite requests fbr the same were denied the 
factfinding cannot be considered an adminislsative hardship worthy of depriving persons 
sentenced to die of the retroactive effect of Ring v, Arizona 
F. Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(e) Does Not Preclude Relief. 
As its final argument, the State contends "that Idaho Code 19-2719(5)(c) [J precludes the 
retroactive application of a new rule in a successive petition." Response at 22. 
1. Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 Does Not Apply Because Mr. Fields' Sentence Of 
Death Was Outside The Range Of Permissible Sentences For His Offense Of 
Conviction. 
By its terms Idaho Code 19-2719 applies to death cases. Petitioner has been convicted 
only of murder, not capital murder as it is now understood to include the elements of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances. See generally, Petitioner's Response to State's Motion to 
Summarily Dismiss Rule 3 5, pp. 7-8, State v. Fields, Case No. 16259. 
2. Idaho Code Section 19-27 19's Time Limitation Jurisdictional Bar Violates The 
Idaho Constitution's Separation Of Powers Requirement. 
Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5 )(c) plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts. 
However, legislative efforts to restrict the district court's jurisdiction violate the Idaho 
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Constitution. Idaho Const. Art. 11 # 1 (mandates that the powers of the three governmental 
brancl~es remain separate); Art. V $1 3 (specifically prohibits legislative abrogation of judicial 
jurisdiction); Art. V $ 20 (confers original jurisdiction on the district court to hear all cases). The 
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently and long held that the legislature may not directly or 
othewise restrict the district court's jusisdiction. See generally, Pdtioner" Response to State's 
Mo t iu~~  to Smmarily Dismiss Rule 35 Petition, State v. Fie/&, Ada County Case No. 16259 
(filed herewith.) Consequently, even if Ring does mnounce some new rule of law which Mr. 
Fields seeks to have applied to his case, Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c) cannot stand as a bar. 
3. Idaho Law Prohibits Retroactively Applying Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5). 
It is long settled "that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express 
legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. 
Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230,526 P.2d 835 (1974)[.I7Vebeker v. Piper Aircrafi Corporation, 113 
Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987)(citations omitted). See Idaho Code Section 73-101 
('30 part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.") 
Though the instant petition was filed after Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) was amended 
to include subsection (c)~, applying that statutory provision in this case would constitute a 
retroactive application. Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c) raises an absolute bar to relief on any 
claim based on the retroactive application of a new rule of law. Section 19-27 19(5)(c) does not 
create mere procedural requirements. It precludes an entire class of substantive claims, leaving 
postconviction petitioners with no mechanism by which to assert those claims. Consequently, 
6 Subsection (c) was amended into Section 19-27 19(5) in 1995. 
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applying Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c) to Mr. Fields would constitute a retroactive 
application. Though Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) expressly and absolutely bars 
postconviction petitioners' claims dependent on retroactively applying a new rule of law, it 
contains no express legislative statement that it st~ould itself be retroactively applied. It cannot, 
then, be applied to the case at bar. See generally, Petitioner's Response to State's Motion to 
Smmarily Dislniss Rule 35 Petition, State v, Fields, Ada County Case No. 16259 (i3ed 
herewith). 
4. Idaho Code Section 19-25 19(5) Violates Petitioner's Rights To Due Process And 
Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The United States And Idaho Constitutions. 
If Mr. Fields did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)'s 
time limitation jurisdictional bar would not "I.C. fj 19-2719 does not eliminate the 
applicability of the UPCPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their 
provisions conflict." hfcKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (Idaho 1999). 
Because of this difference, applying that bar in the instant case would violate Mr. Fields' due 
process and equal protection rights. 
TO the extent Idaho Code Section 19-2719's time limitation jurisdictional bar is construed 
to preclude review of petitioner's claims, the statute is unconstitutional. It would violate Mr. 
Fields' rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
'Under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief 
is not burred where new evidence is discovered, or where luter case luw suggests a conviction is 
unlaufil." Arugon v. State, 1 14 Idaho 758, 766 n. 12, 760 P.2d, 1 174, 1 1 82 n. 12 (Idaho 1988) 
(citing 1.C.g 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. Ij 19-4908, a claim can 
only be waived if the waiver is knowing, volunfury and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695,700-01,922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho 
Code Section 19-27 19 conflicts with the UPCPA, the Section 19-27 19 provision governs. 
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States Constitution, md Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, in that there is no 
rational basis, for the disparate treatment of non-capital prisoners who do not need to 
denrollstrate the '"heightened burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must 
meet, e.g., Prrz v. State, 123 Idaho 758,760,852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 19931, or meet the 
limitations imposed by Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5), see, e.g., Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 
648-49,8 P.3d 636, 643-44 (Idzrho 2000); Pizzuh v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 796-97, 10 P.3d 742, 
745-46 (Idaho 1995). See generully, Petitioner's Response to State's Motion to Summarily 
Disrniss Rule 35 Petition, Slate v. Flelair, Ada County Case No. 16259 (filed herewith). 
Idaho's disparate treatment of capital as compared to non-capital postconviction 
petitioners fails under a rational basis analysis. Necessarily, then, it fails under strict scrutiny 
analysis, too. "A law which infringes on a fundamental right will be upheld only where the State 
can demonstrate the law is necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id. The state's 
interest in expeditious handling of capital cases, the purpose of the offending provision, Idaho 
Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c), is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the violation of 
petitioner's fhdarnental right to trial by jury. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons and for all the reasons in Mr. Fields' previously filed pleadings in 
the instant matter and in the Rule 35 Motion filed under Case no. 16259, the Court should deny 
Respondent's motion to summarily dismiss the pending 19-27 19 petition, vacate Petitioner's 
sentence of death and set the matter for sentencing anew. 
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Dated this & day of April, 2003. 
Attorney t'or Petitioner Zane Jack Fields 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-? 
I hereby certify that on the 4 day of April, 2 0 0 3 , I  caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne U.S. Mail 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Wand Delivery 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office Facsimile 
200 W. Front St., Room 3 191 Overnight Mail 
Boise ID 83702 
Facsimile: 208-287-7709 
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JOAN M. FISHER 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Capital Habeas Unit 
APR 1 5 2005 , \ 
'7 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
201 N. Main 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-0180 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. HCR 16259 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 FtESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
v. 1 BSPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 1 PETITIONER'S RULE 35 MOTION 
Defendant. 1 
Zane Jack Fields ("Defendant"), through counsel, files this opposition to Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal of Mr. Fields' motion filed pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. 
Together with this Response, Mr. Fields is filing a supplemental response to respondent's motion 
to summarily dismiss the August 2, 2002, Petition For Post Conviction Relief And/or Petition 
For Writ Of Habeas Corpus. See Petitioner's Response In Opposition State's Reply Brief in 
Support of Motion For Summary Dismissal of Petition For Post-Conviction Relief And/or Writ 
Of Habeas Corpus. For the reasons set forth below Respondent's motion to summarily dismiss 
Mr. Fields' Rule 35 motion should be denied. 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 




Mr. Fields was convicted by a jury of first degree mrrrder. The infomation did not 
chasge, the jury was not instructed on and did not find that the prosecution had proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt the existence of my aggravating factor included in Idaho Code Section 19- 
25 15. After the jury returned its verdict of guilt of Murder in the First Degree, the trial court 
conducted sentencing proceedings and detemined beyond a reasonable doubt three aggravating 
c i r c m s a c e s  existed' and sentenced Mr. Fields to death. 
Shortly before Mr. Fields filed the Rule 35 Motion, the United States Supreme Court 
overruled its holding in Wulton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), that Arizona capital defendants 
were not entitled to a jury decision on whether sentencing aggravating factors existed beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428,2432 (2002). The court clarified that 
"[clapital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination 
of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Id. at 
2432. Before Ring, the Idaho Supreme Court consistently rejected the claim that the federal and 
state constitutions require that Idaho capital sentencing involve a jury. See, e.g., State v. 
'The trial judge found and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the three aggravating 
circumstance found and weighed by the trial court, ( 1 )  "by the murder, or circumstances 
surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life"; (2) the 
"murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery and/or burglary and was accompanied by 
an intent to cause death"; (3) "the defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of 
the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder, which will constitute a 
continuing threat to society [§ 19-25 15(g) (8)]. CR 167- 170 (Findings of the Court in 
Considering the Death Penalty, filed March 7, 1991). 
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C'huvboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129,774 P.2d 299, reh7g denied (1 989). Ring compelled the Idaho 
Supreme Court to reverse course, demonstrating that its earlier position was mistaken because it 
was grounded in a misreading of United States Supreme Court precedent. Stute v. Fetterly, 137 
Idaho 729,730,52 P.3d 874,875 (2002)(vacating death sentence and remanding for resentencing 
on ground that Ring requires juries to ""make factual findings of the aggravating h t o r s  necessary 
to the imposition of a death sentence"). 
In Ring, the United States Supreme Court attributed its erroneous holding in Walton to its 
misunderstanding that under Arizona state law, "the aggravating factors [were not] 'elements of 
the offense' [but, rather, were] 'sentencing considerations' guiding the choice between life and 
death. [Waiton,] 497 U.S. at 648 (internal quotation marks omitted)." Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2437. 
This was mistaken because under Arizona law, absent a finding of an aggravating circumstance, 
death and life imprisonment were not "the alternative verdicts." Walton at 648. Ten years later, 
the Arizona Supreme Court clarified that under its state law capital defendants are not eligible for 
a death sentence absent a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance. Stute v. Ring, 200 
Ariz. 267,279,25 P.3d 1 139, 1 15 1 (Ariz. 2001)("ln Arizona, a defendant cannot be put to death 
solely on the basis of a jury's [guilty] verdict[.] . . . [Tlhe death sentence becomes possible only 
after the trial judge makes a factual finding that at least one aggravating factor is present."); see 
Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2436. 
With t h s  corrected understanding, the United States Supreme Court necessarily reached a 
different result than it had in Whlton. In particular, the court held that "we overrule Walton to the 
extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating 
circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443. Put 
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another way, King made clear that m y  facts necessary to increase the maximum allowable 
sentence are elemears of the offense. Ring, 122 S.Gt. at 2443 (because aggravating factors 
necessary to the imposition o f a  death sentence '"perate as 'the he t iona l  equivalent of an 
element of a greater offense' the Sixth Amenbent  requires that they be found by a 
jw'?j)citation omitted); see Harris v. UnifedSfates, 122 S.Ct. at 2409 (Kennedy, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., m d  O'Connor & Scdia, JJ.)("Yhose facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, 
and of the judicial power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for the p q o s e s  of the 
constitutional analysis") )and at 2323-24 (""[If the legislature, rather than creating grades of 
crimes, has provided for setting the punishment of a crime based on some fact . . . that fact is also 
an elementm)(Thomas, J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsberg, JJ.). As Justices Scalia, 
Rehnquist and Thomas very recently agreed: 
Our decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 
clarified what constitutes an "element" of an offense for purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee. Put simply, if the 
existence of any fact (other than a prior conviction) increases the 
maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defendant, that 
fact . . . constitutes an element, and must be found by a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Id., at 482-484,490. 
[Flor purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, the 
underlying offense of "murder" is a distinct, lesser included 
offense of "murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances": 
Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of 
life imprisonment, the latter increases the maximum permissible 
sentence to death. Accordingly, we held that the Sixth Amendment 
requires that a jury, and not a judge, find the existence of any 
aggravating circumstances, and that they be found, not by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[Ring], at [2443] (slip op. at 22-23 j. 
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Suttuzahn v. Pennsyl~~aniu, 123 S.Gt. 732, 739 (2003)(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & 
Thomas, J.). 
Applied to the instant case, this means that Mr. Fields was convicted of non-capital ikst 
degree muder, a lesser included offense of first degree murder "plus one or more aggravating 
circmstances[,]'3.e.-capital murder. For this reason, Mr. Fields' death sentence was outside the 
range of sentences lawfully available for his offense of conviction. Mr. Fields, then, must be 
resentenced for non-capital first degree murder. See State v. Nzmez, 133 Idaho 13,20,981 P.2d 
738, 745, reh'g denied (Idaho 1999)(where jury instructions omitted essential element of felony 
but included elements of misdemeanor, conviction was for misdemeanor; "accordingly, Nunez 
should have been sentenced only for misdemeanor convictions [and] [%]he case will be remanded 
for this purpose."); State v. Roll, 11 8 Idaho 936,801 P.2d 1287 (Ct.App. 199O)juudgment of 
conviction reversed without any harmlessness analysis where essential element of offense 
omitted from jury instructions). 
Indeed, because the jury did not convict Mr. Fields of capital murder, the trial court was 
without jurisdiction to impose a death sentence on him. It was without this jurisdiction for other 
reasons, too: the charging document, a prosecutor's information, did not include the aggravating 
factor elements relied on at trial; no preliminary hearing determination was made that there was 
substantial evidence supporting the existence of the aggravating factor elements relied on at trial; 
the jury did not determine that any aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances; and the jury did not determine that the mitigating circumstances did not make the 
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imposition of death unjust."aYs v. State, 113 Idaho 736,739,747 P.2d 758,761 (Ct.App. 
1 %7)(""A jurisdictional defect exists when the alleged facts are not made criminal by statute, or 
where there is a failure to state facts essential to establish the offense charged. L7iate V. Grady, 89 
Idaho 204,404 P.2d 347 (1965); State v. CuZe, 31 Idaho 603, 174 P. 13 1 (1981); 1,G.R. 7(b)."), 
afd, 115 Idaho 3 15,316 766 P.2d 785,786 (Idnho 1988)("we concur with the decision of the 
Court of Appeals'". Since Mr. Fields was sentenced to a penalty greater than authorized for non- 
capital first degree murder, his sentence "is void as to the excess if the valid portion is severable 
from that portion which is void." State V.  Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71,76,57 P.3d 782,787 (Idaho 
2002).3 In any event, where a jury charge omits an essential element of a greater crime, but fully 
instructs on a lesser crime, a guilty verdict is a conviction for the lesser offense. State v. Nunez, 
133 Idaho 13,20,98 1 P.2d 738,745, reh'g denied (Idaho 1999). The sentence must, therefore, 
be within the range of penalties for that lesser offense. Id. 
'Mr. Fields raised each of these claims in his August 2,2002 Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence pursuant to Rule 3 5. 
3This claim is timely. "The issue of whether a court has exceeded its subject matter 
jurisdiction is never waived and purported judgments entered by that court, acting without 
subject matter jurisdiction, are void and subject to collateral attack. Sierra Life Insurance Co. v. 
Granata, 99 Idaho 624,626,586 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1978); see Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 
459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1 984)Cvoid judgment is nullity and "can be collaterally attacked at any 
time"]." State v. Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568, 571,929 P.2d 744,747 (Ct. App. 1996). Even where 
the Uniform Post Conviction Act, Idaho Code Section 4901 -491 1, is generally unavailable as an 
avenue to relief, "it is available to cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial which affect 
either the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the judgment, even though these errors could 
have been raised on appeal." Smith v. Stute, 94 Idaho 469,474,491 P.2d 733,738 (Idaho 1971). 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S RULE 35 MOTION- 6 
B. THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS FAIL. 
Noting that Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows a court to correct an illegal sentence at any 
time, Respondent while not specifically arguing agaches to its brief Judge Culet's Decision and 
Memorandum in WoHman v. Arave, in which Judge Culet finds that this provision is trumped by 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719's time limitation. This argment fails because, as already noted, the 
trial court was without jurisdiction to impose a death sentence, and jurisdictional claims rnay be 
raised at any time. Supra, at 6 n.3 and accompanying text. Even if this Gaud disagrees, though, 
the argument fails for several other reasons. First, Section 19-2719 does not apply because Mr. 
Fields' sentence of death was outside the range of permissible sentences. Second, Section 19- 
27 19's time limitation jurisdictional bar violates the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers 
requirement. Third, Idaho law prohibits retroactively applying Section 19-271 9 to Mr. Fields' 
case. Finally, fourth, applying Section 19-271 9's time limitation jurisdictional bar to Mr. Fields' 
case would violate his rights to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution and Idaho Constitution. 
1. Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 Does Not Apply Because Mr. Fields' 
Sentence Of Death Was Outside The Range Of Permissible Sentences For 
His Offense Of Conviction, Non-Capital First Degree Murder. 
The Hofian decision relies on State v. Beam, 12 1 Idaho 862, 828 P.2d 891 (1 992). 
There, the Idaho Supreme Court held "that the forty-two (42) day time limitation of I.C. tj 19- 
271 9(3) applies to claims of illegality of a sentence of death." Id. at 864, 893. The petitioner in 
Beam asserted that his sentence was illegal because the trial judge failed to weigh each 
aggravating circumstance against all mitigating circumstances as required by State v. 
Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129,774 P.2d 299 (Idaho 1989). Thus, the petitioner complained that 
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the trial judge employed an illegal process to detcmine the otherwise permissible sentence not 
that death was an impermissible sentence. By contrmt, Mr. Fields contends here that his 
sentence was outside the range of pemissible senteilces for his offense of conviction. Beam is 
inapposite. 
2. Idaho Code Section 19-27 19's Time 1,irniation Jurisdictional Bar Violates 
The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of Powers Requirement. 
Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5) provides: 
(5) If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this 
section and within the time limits specified . . . [t]he courts of 
Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims[.] 
(a) An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition rnay be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception for issues that 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not 
be considered unless the applicant [meets certain other enumerated 
requirements]. 
(c) A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception 
shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks 
retroactive application of new rules of law. 
I.C. tj 19-27 19(5). This provision plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts. 
However, legislative efforts to restrict the district court's jurisdiction violate the Idaho 
Constitution. 
The Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 20, confers original jurisdiction on the district 
court to hear all cases. Idaho Constitution Article 11, Section 1, mandates that the powers of the 
three governmental branches remain separate and, more particularly, Article V, Section 13, 
specifically prohibits legislative abrogation of judicial jurisdiction: 
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The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial 
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it 
as a coordinate depmment of the goverment; but the legislature 
shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, 
when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their 
powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, sofar as the 
same may be done without conflict with the Constitution[.] 
Id. (italics added). Of course, as the Supreme Court has long held, a postconviction petition "is a 
proceeding entirely new and independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction." 
Paradis v. State, 1 10 Idaho 534,636, 71 6 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986). Thus, Article V, Section 13's 
reservation of power to the legislature has no application to 9 19-27 19 proceedings since they are 
not appeals. 
Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c)'s removing district court jurisdiction to consider 
postconviction claims seeking retroactive application of new rules of law violates the Idaho 
Constitution's separation of power mandate. In State v. Interest oflindsey, 78 Idaho 24 1,246, 
300 P.2d 491,494 (1 956), the Idaho Supreme Court struck a statute purporting to transfom 
previously criminal matters of juveniles into civil matters because "[tlhe legislature, by denoting 
as a civil matter what the law has previously regarded as a felony, attempt[ed] to take away 
jurisdiction vested in the district court by the constitution itself, and . . . attempted to render that 
court powerless to do anything about the prosecution of such persons." Similarly, in Boise City 
v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441,444-45,243 P.2d 303, 304 (1 952), the Supreme Court held 
that "[tlhe original jurisdiction conferred upon the district court by the constitution, Art. 5, 920, 
cannot be diminished by the legislature. Const. Art. 5, 91 3[.]" Again, in Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 
Idaho 25 1,256-57,239 P.2d 266,269 (1 95 I), the Court held that "[tlhe broad jurisdiction 
[created by Article 5, Section 131 is not subject to diminution by legislative act." The Court held 
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the same thing in Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idabo 122, 127,212 P.2d 103 1, 1033-34 (1949). 
Finally, in McIf~ight v. Grant, 13 Idaho 629,637,92 P. 989,990 (1907), the Court held that, 
'"[wle think [Article 5,  Section 131 was . . . intended to preserve to the judicial depastment of the 
state government the right and power to finally detemine controversies between parties 
involving their rights and upon whose claims some decision or judgment must be rendered or 
detemination made." In short, the Idaho Svlpreme Court has consistently and long held that the 
legislature may not directly or otherwise restrict the district court's jurisdiction. Consequently, 
even if Ring does announce some new rule of law which Mr. Fields seeks to have applied to his 
case, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) cannot stand as a bar. 
3. Idaho Law Prohibits Retroactively Applying Idaho Code Section 19- 
27 19(5). 
It is long settled "that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express 
legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. 
Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230,526 P.2d 83 5 (1 974)[,]" Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 1 1 3 
Idaho 609'6 14,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987)(citations omitted). See Idaho Code Section 73-1 01 
("No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.") 
Though the instant petition was filed after Idaho Code Section 1 9-27 19(5) was amended 
to include subsection (c), %applying that statutory provision in this case would constitute a 
retroactive application. Puradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223,9 12 P.2d 1 10 (Idaho 1996), illustrates 
why. There, the lower court applied a statute enacted after the trial and direct appeal were 
concluded. The Supreme Court held that the statute's application was prospective, not 
4Subsection (c) was amended into Section 1 9-27 19(5) in 1 995. 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S RULE 35 MOTION- 10 
:papnpuo~rn3.r13 .  
yWod ay1 SV ' (~661)  8Z-LZf 'OZE 'S 'n IZS 'kildJn~"1~ 'A ypuq -ir'33a33a anp3voqa.1 v aAvy ppoM 
os 8u10p 31 pagddv aq IOU Xaur suo!sr~o.~d v d a g v  3ypads 3vy3 pajou o s ~ e  svy 31 '~uaurpvua 
s'33v ayl layv palg suoy11ad 01 saqddv v d a a v  ‘aim 1v.Iaua8 v sv '1vq play svy ~ 0 3  aura~dng 
sa lv~s  p a p n  a y ~  I!W * ( , , v d a w , , )  966 1 30 33v 41vuad q3vaa a~p3333a p w  ursr.ma113uv 
ayloj  p.Iv8a.I ~ I I M  aspv Xvur uopsanb a w s  syy~ ley1 pajou aAvy s w o 3  1v.rapad 
-uoqv:,r~ddv . . a~g3voqa.1 v ajnlpsuo3 pInoM spIard -.IN 03 (3)(~)6 I LZ-6 I uoysas 
apo3 o v p ~  8uyLlddv 'Lpuanbasuo3 -slay uoy$e:,gddv ou svy Burp~oy s,uno:, s j p ~ ~ t l d  aylloj  
pun018 puo3as ayl 'uosva~ a m s  syy~ 103 may1 Xol~sap 01 suoctrnd ~y 's3y8!.1 anrJuvlsqns jo ssvp 
S'YI ,,13ajjv,, X~a~aur IOU saop ( 5 ) ~  1 LZ-6 1 uoy3as ' X ~ M  laqouv 1nd -sur!el:, asom passe 01 Y 3 q M  
Xq urs!uvy3aur ou ~ I I M  s~auo1111ad . . uop3yuo31sod 8uyval 'sursvp ansur?Jsqns 30 ssp13 a q u a  
ur? sapnpa~d  31 '.ray]vx -s~uaura.xpbar 1vmpa3olrd slaw alva.13 IOU saop (3)(~)6 1 LZ-6 1 uoq:,as 
'~svsuo:, La  JIM X1duro3 pino:, s~auoy!~ad uoy3f~uo31sod 1~ asnr?:,aq sq9n aArJuelsqns 
anssr 1v auo aqloj  ~svquo:, 3 y ~ v m ~ p  ur spuv~s ase3 syy1 u! snss! 1.e uo!sr~o.rd Ajoln~~js  314 jA 
'PI 1 " t z  3e ' p ~  ,,'unl laX lou pey [uopjiad ~op:,?~uo33sod ay) 
4urlr~: J ~ J ]  polmad suoge1!!u11 ho$n1'1?ls ayl,, (z) pue ~t r?~laddv aqjjo s1y8y aA!JuElsqns Am $33JJt? 
We agree with petitioner and those courts that having had cause to 
consider the question in full, have concluded that the Supreme 
court did not hold in Lindtz that courts are necessarily to apply the 
new provisions of chapter 153 to all habeas petitions filed after 
April 24, 1996 [i.e.- AEDPA7s enactment date]. More particulaly, 
we hold that Lindh did not foreclose-and indeed contemplated- 
continuing resort to L~mdgraf [i.e.-retroactivity of statutes] 
analysis in order to ensure that application of chapter 153's new 
provisions is not impemissibly retroactive in such cases. 
bfueller v. Angelone, 1 8 1 F.3d 557,567 (4' Cir. 1999)(citing to t - o ~  re Wansurd, 123 F.3d 922, 
933 n.22 (tjth Cir. 19971, and citing to In re Mnarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3"' Gir. 1999), and Brown v. 
Angelone, 150 F.3d 370 (4" Cir. 1998)). See Scott v. Boos, 21 5 F.3d 940, 949 (9" Cir. 
2000)(federal prohibition against retroactive application of statute absent clear Congressional 
statement of intent looks to "parties' actions, not the date of filing"). 
Though Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) expressly purports to absolutely bar 
postconviction petitioners' claims dependent on retroactively applying a new rule of law, it 
contains no express legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot, 
then, be applied to the case at bar. 
4. Idaho Code Section 19-25 19(5) Violates Petitioner's Rights To Due 
Process and Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The United States And 
Idaho Constitutions. 
If Mr. Fields did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)'s 
time limitation jurisdictional bar would not apply.5 "I.C. $19-27 19 does not eliminate the 
'Under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief 
is not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where later case law suggests a conviction is 
unlawful." Aragon v. State, 1 14 Idaho 758,766 n.12,760 P.2d7 1 174, 1 182 n.12 (Idaho 1988) 
(citing I.C.9 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. $ 19-4908, a claim can 
only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 13 3 Idaho 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER'S RULE 35 MOTION- 12 
applicability of the TJPGPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their 
provisions conflict." hfckrinney v. Slate, 133 ldaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144, I49 (Idaho 1999). 
Because of this difference, applying that bar in the instant case would violate Mr. Fields' due 
process and equal protection rights. 
To the extent Idaho Code Section 19-27 19"s time limitation jurisdictional bar is construed 
to preclude review of petitioner's claims, the statute is unconstitutional. It would violate Mr. 
Fields' rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, in that there is no 
rational basis, for the disparate treatment of non-capital prisoners who do not need to 
demonstrate the "heightened burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must 
meet, e.g., Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758,760,852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993), or meet the 
limitations imposed by Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5), see, e.g., Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 64 1, 
648-49,s P.3d 636,643-44 (Idaho 2000); Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793,796-97, 10 P.3d 742, 
745-46 (Idaho 1995). Romer v. Evans, 5 17 U.S. 620, 63 1-36 (1 995); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,446-51 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,61-63 
(1982); U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,535 (1973); Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. 
Bender, 95 Idaho 813,815-16,520 P.2d 860,861-62 (Idaho 1974). 
Moreover, because Idaho's statutory postconviction scheme makes available different 
mechanisms for enforcing fundamental rights-here, the right to a jury trial-depending on whether 
the petitioner stands sentenced to death, that discriminatory scheme must be assessed with strict 
695,700-01,922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho 
Code Section 19-27 19 conflicts with the UPCPA, the Section 19-27 19 provision governs. 
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scrutiny. See Van Vulkenburgh v. C'ifisensfor Term Limii,~, 135 Idaho 12 1, 126, 15 P.3d 1 129, 
1 134 (Iddo 2000) (if a h d a e n t a l  right is at issue, appropriate standard of review of law 
infringing on that right is strict scrutiny); iVewEan v. Sfate, 96 Idaho 7 1 1, 7 14, 5 35 P.2d 1 348, 
135 1 (Idaho 1975) (strict scrutiny when statute's classification infringes upon a fundamental 
right); Siute v. Breed 11 1 Idaho 497,500,735 P.2d 202,205 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (strict 
scrainy of statutory schemes that infkinge upon a "'fundmental rightbuch as voting, 
procreation, or constitutional safeguards for persons accused of crimes7'). See generally Ronald 
D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise On Constitutional Law 5; 18.41 at 800-01(3"' ed. 1999) 
("When the govement  takes actions that burden the rights of a classification of persons in terms 
of their treatment in a criminal justice. system it is proper to review these laws under the strict 
scrutiny standard for equal protection.") 
Idaho's disparate treatment of capital as compared to non-capital postconviction 
petitioners fails under a rational basis analysis. Necessarily, then, it fails under strict scrutiny 
analysis, too. "A law which infringes on a hndarnental right will be upheld only where the State 
can demonstrate the law is necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id. The state's 
interest in expeditious handling of capital cases, the purpose of the offending provision, Idaho 
Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c), is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the violation of 
petitioner's fundamental right to trial by jury. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons and for all the reasons in Mr. Fields' previously filed pleadings in 
the instant matter, the Court should deny Respondent's motion to summarily dismiss the pending 
Rule 35 petition, vacate Petitioner's sentence of death and set the matter for sentencing anew. 
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Dated this d:ay of April, 2003. 
Attorney for Zane Jack Fields 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/- iL 
I hereby certify that on the / 3 day of April, 2003,I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne U.S. Mail 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Hand Delivery 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office Facsimile 
200 W. Front St., Room 3 19 1 Overnight Mail 
Boise ID 83702 
Facsimile: 208-287-7709 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE FIELDS, ) 
) Case No. SPOT020071lD 
Petitioner, ) 
) STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
vs . ) PETITIONER3 S W P L E m m A L  
) AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) PETITION FOR POST 
) CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent. 1 
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes a State's Response to the Supplemental 
Authority provided by the Petitioner in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
This supplemental authority is the memorandum decision by District Judge Bradbury in 
the George Porter v. State of Idaho case from the Second Judicial District. 
The State does not attempt an exhaustive analysis of Judge Bradbury's opinion in 
this response because of time constraints. However, the State's research indicates that 
every court that has considered the question of whether or not the decision is 
retroactive has decided that it is not retroactive. The following federal courts have found 
STATE'S S P O N S E  TO PETITIONER'S SUPPLEME3TAL AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR POST CONMCTION RELKEF (FIELDS), Page 1 
that the decision is not retroactive: Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 98 (10' Cir. 2002); 
Trueblood v. Davis, 301 F.3d 784, 788 (7" Cir. 2002); ,2003 WL 
261799 (8' Cir. 2003); Sibley v. Culliver, 2003 WL 256907 (M.D. Ala. 2003); U.S. v. 
n o m a ,  2002 VlL 31545772 (D. Del. 2002); Gav v. U.S., 2003 WL 168416 (S.D. New 
York 2003); United State v. Johnson, 2003 WC 1193257 P . D .  111.2003); Ben-Yisravi v. 
Davis 2003 WL 402829 (N.D. Ind. 2003). -9 
The folIowing state courts have found that the Ring decision is not retroactive: 
State v. Towery, 64 P3.d 828 (Ariz. 2003); Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (Nevada 2002). 
In addition to the cases cited above, five Idaho district court opinions have denied 
post conviction relief based upon the Ring decision, including: McKinnev v. State, 
Leavitt v. State, Rhoades v. State, Hoffman v. State, and Wood v. State. This Porter 
decision is the only one that the State is aware of that has found the decision to be 
retroactive. 
Additionally, regardless of whether or not Teawe v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1 989), 
applies to Idaho Code $19-2719, every state and federal opinion that the State has been 
able to find that considers the Ring case and A~prendi v. New Jersey, has held that Ring 
and Arsprendi are not substantive, but are procedural. The most recent cases include 
United States v. Davis, 2003 WL 1837701 (E.D. La. 2003); State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828 
(Ariz. 2003); Sibley v. Culliver, 2003 VVL 256907 (M.C. Ala. 2003); United State v. 
Sampson, 2003 7JVt 352416 (D. Mass. 2003). 
Judge Bradbury held that Fetterlv v. State, 12 1 Idaho 4 17 (1 99 1) may not apply 
because Fetterly was decided before Teape. However, subsequent cases have applied 
the Fetterly analysis after Teague was decided. Stewart v. State, 128 Idaho 436 (1996); 
Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899 (1997); State v. Townsend, 124 Idaho 881 (1993). 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR POST CONVICTION RELEF (FIEXIlS), Page 2 00195% 
Finally, as discussed in '64 P.3d at 834-35, the Supreme Court declined to 
make Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), retroactive. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 
U.S. 63 1,633 (1968). Duncan held that the basic Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. In DeStefano at page 634-635, the 
court explained, "we would not assert, however, that every criminal trial - or any 
pmicular trial - held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as 
fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury." In Towery, supra, the Arizona 
Supreme Court found this argument to be particularly persuasive in holding that Ring was 
a procedural change only. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, it appears that the better weight of authority is that the Rinp; 
decision and the A~prendi decision are procedural changes and that they are not 
retroactive. 
RESPECTFULLY SUB-D t h i s 2  day of April 2003. 
GREG H. B O W R  
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
- 
By: Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTmCAm OF SERWCE 
that on this & day of April, 2003, 1 served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing State's Response to Supplemental Authority in Support of 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief to Joan M. Fisher, Capital habeas Unit, Federal 
Defenders of Eastern Waswgton and Idaho, 201 N. Main, Moscow ID 83843, by 
depsithg in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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PetitionerlDefendant, ) 
VS. ) STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
) RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 




COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes a supplemental response to the State's earlier 
memorandum provided in support of its motion to dismiss. The supplemental information 
being provided by the State is the Memorandum Decision and Order in the Creech case 
and the Sivak case written by Fourth District Judge Ronald J. Wilper. The decisions are 
attached to this response. Judge Wilper granted the State's motion for summary judgment 
in those cases on the same issues that are before this Court. 
STATE'S S W P L E m N T a  RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
(SIVAI(/SPOT020071lD/HCR16259), Page 1 
001.96 
The State understwds that these decisions are not binding on this Court, but 
supplies them for the Court's information. The State has earlier supplied Judge Culet's 
decision in the Mawell Hoffman case, which also granted the State's motion for 
s u m a r y  judment on similar issues. 
The State is aware of a decision in State v. Porter, written by Second Judicial 
District Judge John Bradbury, which denies the State's motion to dismiss. A copy of that 
decision is also attached. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This 2 day of ,2003 .  
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
S m S C m E D  AND SWORN to be me this 1 day o ,2003 .  
i 
STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF STATEX MOTION TO DISMISS 
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002.97 
that on this 3 day of 2003, 1 served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Supplemental Response in Support of 
State's Motion to Dismiss to Joan M. Fisfrer, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal Defender's, 
201 N.  Main St., Moscow ID 83843, the following person(s) by depositing in the U.S. 
STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF STATIE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
(SNMSPOT0200711DM:GR16259), Page 3 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. SPOT 0200712D 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 









THOMAS EUGENE CREECH, 




22 ii announced by the United States Supreme Court in Rina v. ~r izona'  does not apply 
20 
21 
Creech's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus, and 
Petitioner's Motions to Correct or Vacate his sentence of death. Because the new rule 
M]EMOxcANDm DECISION 
AND ORDER - Page 1 
25 Rina v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). 
- 04/23/2003 13:39 FAX _ - - -  - -. STICT COUaT 
* a 
1 
retroactively to the Petitioner's case, the State's Motion to Dismiss the Petition is 
2 
3 
I( Habeas Corpus (Case No. SPOT-02-00712D), together with a Motion to Correct Illegal 
GMNTED and Petitioner's Motions are DENIED. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
4 
5 
/I sentence of Death and for New Sentencing Trial (Case No. HCR10252). The 
On August 2, 2002, the PetitionerIDefendant, Thomas Eugene Creech (hereinafter 
Petitloner), filed a second successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief andlor Writ of 
1 1  RespondentfPlaintiff. State of ldaho (hereinafter the State), filed a Response and a Motion 
/I to Dismiss the Petition on September 3, 2002. 
'O 1 1  Oral argument was heard on March 7, 2003. The Petitioner submitted additional 
l1 1 1  post-hearing authority in support of his argument on April 11, 2003. The State filed a 
lZ / I  Reply on April 21, 2003. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 28, 1981, the Petitioner pled guilty to Murder in the First Degree for 
11 killing a fellow inmate while the Petitioner was a prisoner in the custody of the ldaho 
17 1 1  Department of Corrections.' Petitioner was sentenced to death on January 5, 1982. He 
1 a I/ appealed and his case was eventually remanded to the district court for re~entencing.~ 
19 1 1  On April 17, 1995, the district court entered its findings and imposed the death penalty 
2 0 
1 )  under ldaho Code 8 19-251 5.'
26 1 1  NUEMORANDUM DECISION 
A 3  
24 
25 
/I AND ORDER - Page 2 
The facts regarding the offense are contained in the ldaho Supreme Court's 1983 decision, State v. 
Creech, 607 P.2d 463, 105 ldaho 362. 
"rocedural history of the remand is contained in the ldaho Supreme Court's 1998 decision, State v. 
Creech, 966 P.2d 1, 132 ldaho I (hereinafter Creech 11). 
a Petition Exhibit 2A. 




district court denied relief and the ldaho Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of 





conviction relief on August 19, l%18.~ 
The Petitioner filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief on June 1, 2000. 
The district court dismissed the successive petition. On June 6, 2002, the ldaho Supreme 






to the judge, not the jury, the duty to decide whether or not certain aggravating factors I 
The instant petition and motions are based on the United State Supreme Court's 
2002 decision in Rinq v. Arizona, supra, which overruled their 1990 decision in Walton v. 
~ r i z o n a . ~  In overruling Walton, the Supreme Court relied on their 2000 decision in 
A~prendi v. New Jersey. 8 
In Walton, the Supreme Court said Arizona's death sentence statute was 
l5 
16 
were present in capital cases, and if so, to weigh those factors against any mitigating I 
compatible with the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees 
criminal defendants the right to a trial by a jury. Specifically, the Arizona statute assigned 
fa~tors, and in this way to decide whether or not to impose the death penalty. The Court I 
in Walton said the statute did not deprive defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to I 
21 
22 
26 !I mMORANDUM DECISION A m  O m E R  - Page 3 




Creech ii, infra. 
Creech v. State, 51 ~ . 3 d  387, 137 Idaho 573 (2002). 
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
Amrendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
. 01/25/2003 13: 10-FAX 2Q83642$322* 




of a certain crime, it was the duty of the sentencing judge to decide whether or not the 
facts of the case made it a "hate crime." If so, the maximum penalty was greater than it 
In 2000, the United States Supreme Couri issued its decision in the case of 
, a "hate crime" case. In , the Supreme Court held that 
other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
4 
5 
would be if the judge determined it was not a hate crime. The Court said those factors 
- 
operate as 'Yhe hnctional equivalent of an element of a greater offense." Id, at 494, n.19. 
beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The New Jersey statute provided that once a defendant was convicted 
That being the case, the defendant had a right to have a jury decide whether those facts 
were present. I 
The Supreme Court ~ou ld  not reconcile the Walton decision with the Ag~rendi I 
decision. As a result, a divided court overruled Walton and announced a different rule in I m. The rule announced in Rinq is that aggravating factors in capital cases operate as 
the functional equivalent of elements of a greater offense. Therefore, the Sixth 
Amendment gives the defendant the right to have those facts determined by a jury, 
Idaho's death penalty statute, as it existed at the time the Petitioner was ultimately 
I sentenced to death in 1995, was essentially identical to the Arizona statute declared to be 
unconstitutional in  fin^. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this in State v. Fetterly, 52 
P.3d 874, 137 ldaho 729, (2002). "...Rim v. Arizona ... appears to invalidate the death 
penalty scheme in Idaho ..." Id. at 875. The Court vacated the death sentence in Fetterlv 
2.2 I I and remanded the case for sentencing. 
26 m M O . m U M  DECISION 
ANI) ORDER - Page 4 




5 / I  June 24, 2002. However, Creech's case was not pending on direct appeal on that date. I 
A "new rule" applies retroactively to state cases pending on direct review, or not yet 
final? The appeal in Fetterly was pending before the ldaho Supreme Court when the 
United States Supreme Court decided on June 24, 2002. Therefore, the new rule 
6 1 1  Petitioneis conviction and sentence became 'Yinai" in 1998. Creech II, supra. A state / 
conviction becomes final for the purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of I 
8 /I direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing for writ of I 
9 11 certiorari (with the United States Supreme Court) has elap~ed.'~ I 
1.0 /I Petitioner suggests the & decision is not a "newn rule of law, but the argument is I 
11. 1 1  not persuasive. A new rule is one not dictated by precedent existing at the time a I 
l2 11 judgment became final." Walton was the precedent existing at the time Creech's 
judgment became final. I 
I4 I/ Under most circumstances, a new law does not apply to cases that are already final 
when the new law is declared. This is because the State, no less than a criminal I 
defendant, has a reasonable right to rely on the law as it existed at the time the case is I 
1998. The doctrine of finality is not a novel concept. As the United States Supreme Court I 
17 
l e  
2 0  / /  said in a 1989 decision, I 
"finally" decided. In the instant case, the Petitioner pled guilty to First Degree Murder in 
1982. He was sentenced to death following Appeal in 1995. The case became '%naln in 
In many ways, the application of new rules to cases on collateral review 
may be more intrusive than enjoining of criminal prosecutions for it 
continually forces the states to marshal resources in order to keep in prison 
' Grfffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,107 S. Ct. 708 (1987). 
ld~eaaue v. Lang, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S, Ct. 1060 (1989); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227 (2000); Fetterlv v. 
State, 121 ldaho 417 (1992); Stuart v. State, 128 ldaho 436 (I 996); Butler v. State, 129 ldaho 899 (1997). 
%tier v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1890). 
mMORANDUM DECISION 
AND 0RX)IER - Page 5 
defendants whose trials and appeals conform to then existing Constitutional 
standards. Furthemore, as we recognized in , "state courts 
are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existilng 
Constitutional law only to have a federal court discover.. .new Constitutional 
demands." Teague supra. 
A new law may even apply to 'Yinal" cases in limited circumstances. The United I 
ll Slates Supreme Court may specifically hold that the new law announced in a decision 11 must be applied retroactively to other "finaln cases. The Supreme Court is the only entity I 
Ilthat can make a new rule retroactive in this manner, such that all other United States I 
8 
Ilcourts must apply the rule retroactively." The Supreme Court did not state that the 1 




The next step in determining whether a new law should be applied retroactively to a 
12 
13 
l7 11 R i n ~  refines the definition of an element of a capital offense. However, the Ninth and / 
final case is to determine whether the rule announced is a new "substantive" law, or a 





l/Tenth Circuits have recently held that Ap~rendi announced a new rule of criminal I 
law is procedural, then the Court must go through what is commonly known as the Teaaue 
analysis. supra. 
Petitioner argues that the new law created by Ring is a substantive law because 
procedure, not substantive law.I4 This Court is persuaded that s i ~ c e  Rinq is clearly an 
2 0 / I  extension of Apprendi, and since the law created in A ~ ~ r e n d i  is procedural, the new law 
21 
22 
created by F?&.J is a procedural law. 
2 4 
25 
l2 TvIer v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001). 
j3 Bouslevv. United States, 532 U.S. 614, 620 (1998). 
'' Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227 (9' Cir. 2000): Cannon v. Mullin. 297 F.3d 989 (10" Cir. 2002); and United 
States v. Mora. 293 F.3d 121 3 (1 0Ih ~ i r .  2002). 
26  mMOIRGM)m DECISION 
ANI) ORDER - Page 6 
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04/22/2003 13 : 40 FAX DISTICT COmT . __ -" -- - -- 
a 
I/ the new law created in Rinw shall not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case. 11 
1 
3 I I HABEAS CORPUS 
in Rinq is not a procedure that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Therefore, 
I/ The Writ of Habeas Corpus remedy is not availabfe. The Uniform Post-Conviction 
II Procedure Act has replaced the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of challenging the 1 1  validity of a con~iction.'~ The proper use of a petition for post-conviction relief "avoids 
11 repetaious and successive applications; eliminates confusion and yet protects the 






l4 I /  "illegal" sentence is denied. 
applicant's constitutional ric~hts."'~ 
RULE 35 MOTION 
The sentence of death was not illegal when it was imposed in 1995, nor when it 
became final in 1998. The new law announced in Rinq does not apply retroactively to 
l5 11 CONCLUSION 
l6 11 Because the new rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in R i n ~  
l7 /Idoes not apply retroactively to the Petitioner's case, the Siate's Motion to Dismiss the 
Petition is GRANTED and Petitioner's Motions are DENIED. 
26 1 I ~ M o W D U M  DECISION 
2 4 
25 
l6 McKinnev v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 133 ldaho 695 (1999). 
l7 Dionne v. State, 459 P.2d 1017, 93 ldaho 235 (1969). 
la ldaho Criminal Rule 35. 
DISTICT COmT 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
T-t, 
Dated this 2s day of April, 2003. 
'22/2003 13: 41. FAX - - - -- 
* 
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I I  CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Z 
3 
1 1  
1, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, on this ZF day of April, 2003, one copy of the 
MEMOWNDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to 
each of the a8orneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
5 
ADA COUNTY PROSECU.TOR 
VIA INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
mR'IORAMDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER - Page 10 
FEDEWL DEFENDERS OF EASTERN WASHINGTON & IDAHO 
JOAN M. FISHER 
CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
201 N. MAIN 




J, DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
HAMPTON & ELLIOT 
TERESA A. HAMPTON 
P.O. BOX 1352 
BOISE, ID 83702 
Ada County, Idaho 
, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS 
11 LACEY M. SIVAK, 
Petitioner, 









Case No. SPOT 020071 OD 
VS . 
LACEY M. SIVAK, 
17 
MEMOWNDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
' Defendant. 1 





This case came before the Court on the State's Motion to Dismiss Lacey Sivak's 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Petitioner's Motions 





United States Supreme Court in Rinq v. ~r izona'  does not apply retroactively to the 
Rinp v. Arizona. 122 S. Cf. 2428 (2002). 
26 MEM0RAM)UM DECXSXON 
AND ORDER - Page 1 
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1 1 Pe"tiioner"s case, the State's Motion to Dismiss the PeGtion is GFIPINTED and Petitionets 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
3' 
2 
1 1  On August 2 ,  2002, the PetitionertDefendant, Lacey M. Sivak (hereinafter / 
Motions are DENIED, 
5 
//Petitioner), Ried his fifth state Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas 1 
//Corpus (Case No. SPOT-02-00710D), together with a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence 
I/ of Death and for New Sentencing Trial (Case No. HCR10183A). The 1 
8 ) /  RespondentiPlaintiff. State of ldaho (hereinafter the Slate), flied a Response and a Motion 1 
11 to Dismiss the Petition on September 3, 2002. 
lo / /  Oral argument was heard on March 7, 2003. The Petitioner submitted additional I 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDUWL BACKGROUND 
11 
2 2 
l5 ( 1  Petitioner was arrested for the April 1981 robbery and murder of Dixie Wilson. I 
post-hearing authority in support of his argument on April 1 I ,  2003. The State filed a 





Petitioner's trial took place in September 1981 .2 The jury found Petitioner guilty of robbery 
and felony murder. On December 16, 1981, the district court imposed a fixed life 








The facts regarding the offense are contained in the Idaho Supreme Court's 1983 decision. State v. Sivak, 
674 P.2d 396. 105 ldaho 900 (hereinafter Sivak I). 
26 mMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER - Page 2 
2 
( 1  procedural defects.3 After Petitioneis death sentence w a s  vacated for t he  third time, t he  Z 
11 district court entered findings of fact, entered a new judgment of conviction, and re- 
The  ldaho Supreme Court vacated Petitionerfs death sen tence  three  times for 
& I1 imposed the death penalty under ldaho Coder 5 19-2515 on September  29,1992.~ On 





/ I  The  instant petition and motions a r e  based on  the  United S ta te  Supreme Court's 13 
Foilowing re-imposition of the death sentence,  Petitioner flled a second petition for 
, 
postconviction relief. On May 5, 1993, the  district court dismissed the  second petition. On 
August 18, 1995, the ldaho Supreme Court dismissed the  Petitioner's appeal  of t he  district 
/ /  2002 decision in Rinq v. Arizona, supra ,  which overruled their 1990 decision in Walton v. 
14 




compatible with the  Sixth Amendment of the United S ta tes  Constitution, which guarantees 
18 
~ r i z o n a . ~  In overruling Walton, t he  Supreme Court relied on  their 2000 decision in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey. 8 
l9 I criminal defendants the right to a trial by a jury. Specifically, t he  Arizona statute assigned 
Sivak I (delivery of sentencing findings of fact and conclusions of law without an open court hearing); Sivak 
v. State, 'l12 ldaho 197,203 (1986) (Sivak I! ) (failure to consider all of Sivak's mitigating evidence at 
sentencing hearing); State v. Sivak, 119 ldaho 320, 322 (1990) (Sivak Ill ) (improper weighing of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances and improper consideration of victim impact testimony). 
4 The procedural history of the remand is contained in the ldaho Supreme Court's 2000 decision, Sivak v; 
State, 8 P.3d 636, 134 ldaho 641. 
S t e - v .  Sivak, 901 P.2d 494. 127 Idaho 387 (1995) (Sivak IV). 
Sivak IV. -- 
is I1 Walton v. Arizona, 497 US.  639 (1 990). A ~ ~ r e n d i  v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
26 NlEMORAJYDUNI DECISION 
AND ORDER - Page 3 
to the judge, not the jury, the duty to decide whether or not certain aggravating factors 
were present in capital cases, and if so, to weigh those factors against anyi'mitigating 
factors, and in this way to decide whether or not to impose the death penafty. The Court 
in Walton said the statute did not deprive defendan& of their Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by jury because aggravating factors are sentencing considerations, not elements of 
the crime- 
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of 
Ap~rendi v. New Jersey, a "hate crime" case. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that 
other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The New Jersey statute provided that once a defendant was convicted 
of a certain crime, it was the duty of the sentencing judge to decide whether or not the 
facts of the case made it a "hate crime." If so, the maximum penalty was greater than it 
would be if the judge determined it was not a hate crime. The Court said those factors 
operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense." k, at 494, n.19. 
That being the case, the defendant had a right to have a jury decide whether those facts 
were present. 
The Supreme Court could not reconcile the Walton decision with the A~orendi 
decision. As a result, a divided court overruled Walton and announced a different rule in 
m. The rule announced in Rinq is that aggravating factors in capital cases operate as 
the functional equivalent of elements of a greater offense. Therefore, the Sixth 
Amendment gives the defendant the right to have those facts determined by a jury. 
, . .  
Idaho's death penalty statute, as it existed at the time the Petitioner was ultimately 
sentenced to death in 1992, was essentially identical to the Arizona statute declared to be 
unconstitutional in Rinq. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this in State, v. Fetterly, 52 
mMORANDUM DECISION / I  AND ORDER - Page 4 
8 I 
P.3d 874, 137 Idaho 729, (2002). ". . . ... appea r s  to invalidate t he  death 
penalty s cheme  in Idaho ..." g. at 875. T h e  Court vacated t h e  dea th  sen tence  in Fetterjv 
I / and remanded the  case for sentencing. 
A 'hew rule" applies retroactively to  s ta te  cases pending on  direct review, or  not yet 
final.' The appeal in Fenerlv was pending before the  ldaho S u p r e m e  Court when the  
United S ta tes  Supreme Court decided on J u n e  24, 2002. Therefore,  t h e  new rule 
applies to Fetterly's c a s e  and  presurnably to  all ldaho dea th  penalty cases pending on  
June  24, 2002. However, Sivak's case w a s  not pending - o n  direct appeal  o n  that date.  
Petitioner's conviction a n d  sentence  became "final" in 1995. Sivak IV, supra .  A s ta te  
conviction becomes  final for the  purposes of retroactivity analysis when the  availability of 
direct. appeal to t he  s ta te  courts h a s  been  exhausted and  t h e  time for filing for writ of 
certiorari (with the United S ta t e s  Supreme Court) h a s  elapsed.10 
Petitioner sugges ts  the  decision is not a "new" rule of law, but t h e  argument is 
not persuasive. A new rule is o n e  not dictated by precedent  existing a t  the  time a 
judgment became final." Walton w a s  the  precedent existing a t  t h e  time SivaL's judgment 
became final. 
Under most circumstances,  a new law d o e s  not apply to  cases that a r e  already final 
when the  new law is declared. This is because  t h e  State, no less than a criminal 
defendant, h a s  a reasonable right to rely on  the  law as it existed a t  t he  time the  c a s e  is 
"finally" decided. In t h e  instant case, the  Petitioner w a s  found guilty of First Degree 
Murder in 1981. He  w a s  sentenced to  dea th  following Appeal in 1992. T h e  case became  
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1 987). 
ld Teaaue v Lane, 489 US. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1 989); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227 (2000): Fetterlv v.- 
State, 121 ldaho 41 7 ('1 992); Stuart v. State, 7 28 ldaho 436 (1 996); Butler v. State. 129 ldaho 899 (1 997). 
%tier V. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990). 
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I /("final1' in 1495. The doctrine of finality is not a novel concept. As the United States I 
Supreme Court said in a 'i 989 decision, 
1 1  






11 States Supreme Court may speciiically hold that the new law announced in a decision I 
In many ways, the application of new rules to cases on collateral review 
may be more intrusive than enjoining of criminal prosecutions for it 
continually forces the states to marshal resources in order to keep in prison 
defendants whose trials and appeals conform to then existing Constitutional 
standards. Furthermore, as we recognized in Ensle v. fssac, "state courts 
are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing 
C;onstitutional law only to have a federal court discover.. .new Constitutional 
demands." Teaaue supra. 
10 I/ must be applied retroactively to other @'final7' cases. The Supreme Court is the only entity I 
that can make a new rule retroactive in this manner, such that all other United States 
12 
1 I courts must apply the rule retroa~tively.'~ The Supreme Court did not state that the 13 / I  holding in R i n ~  would be applied retroactively to final cases. 
14 I 
1 1  The next step in determining whether a new law should be applied retroactively to a 
ll final case is to determine whether the rule announced is a new "substantive" law, or a 
l7 I/ "procedural" law. If the new law is substantive, then it is applies retroa~t ivel~. '~ If the new 
18 /I law is procedural, then the Court must go through what is commonly known as the Teaaue I 
20 1 )  Petitioner argues that the new law created by Rinq is a substantive law because 
Tenth Circuits have recently held :hat Ap~rendi announced a new rule of criminal 
j3  /I 
21 
22 
refines the definition of an element of a capital offense. However, the Ninth and 
- - 
25 
l2 Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001). 
'' Bouslev v. United States, 532 U.S. 614, 620 (1998). 
26 MIERIOMNDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER - Page 6 
/I procedure, not substantive lavv.I4 This Court is penuaded that since is clearly an 
1 , '  ( 1  extension of , and since the law created in is procedural, the new law 
2 11 created by is a procedural law. 
1 1  A new procedural law is not applied retroactively to cases that have become final 
, 
prior to the  new rule being announced, unless the case fafls within one of two 
1 1  exceptions. Teague, 484 U.S.  at 305-306. It is clear that Petitioner's case was final priar 
I/ to the decision. Therefore, the decision can only be applied retroactively if the 
/ /  new procedural law falls within one of the two exceptions. 




I1 procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." The first exception is 
The first exception is that a new law shall be applied retroactively if it places 
"certain kinds of primary private individual conducf beyond the power of the criminal law- 
l4 /I not applicable to Petitioner's case because the holding in Rinq  does not place "private 
I/ individual conductl'7n this case murder, beyond the power of the criminal law to 
"6 1 1  proscribe. 
l7 /I The United States Supreme Court has held that the second exception involves / /  YWatershed rules of criminal  procedure.^^ which means "bedrock procedural elements that 






Jones v. Smith. 231 F.3d 1227 (9" Cir. 2000); Cannon V. Mullin. 297 F.3d 989 (10" Cir. 2002); and .United 
must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction." u. The procedural rule at 
issue "must implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial," and be an accuracy- 
enhancing pro~edural rule. Id. at 312-313. The Ninth Circuit has held that the new 
26 rnMORANDUM DECXSXON 
AND OWER - Page 7 
002-115 
I1 be persuasive. Since Ring is an extension of A~prendi ,  the new procedural rule created 
1 
I1 in is not a procedure that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Therefore, 
ex~eption.'~ Again, this Court finds the reasoning of the courts in those Federal cases to 
)I Procedure Act has replacedthe writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of challenging the I 
5 
6 
the new law created in Rina shall not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case. 
HABEAS CORPUS 
The Writ of Habeas Corpus remedy is not available. The Uniform Post-Conviction 
8 
9 
RULE 35 MOTION 
validity of a ~onviction.'~ The proper use of a petition for post-conviction relief "avoids 
repetitious and successive applications; eliminates confusion and yet protects the 
10 
11 
l3 11 The sentence of death was not illegal when it was imposed in 1992, nor when it 
applicant's constitutional rights."17 
l4 I1 became final in 1995. The new law announced in Rino does not apply retroactively to I 
CONCLUSION I 
1s 
Because the new rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Rinq 
19 
Petitioner's case. Therefore, the Petitioner's Rule 35 blotion" for correction of an 
l1illegajl1 sentence is denied. 
/ I  does not apply retroactively to the Petitioner's case, the State's Motion to Dismiss the 
20 
21 




States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213 (10'" Cir. 2002). 
7s United States v. Juan SanChel-Ce~antes, 282 F.3d 664. 670 (9" Cir. 2001): Jones, 231 F.3d at 1238. 
'13 McKinnev v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 133 Idaho 695 (1 999). 
j7 Dionne v. State, 459 P.2d 1017, 93 Idaho 235 (1 969). 
'' Idaho Criminal Rule 35. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
'7.- 
Dated this ar day of April, 2003. 
26 mM0RAM;)VN DECISION 
AlW ORDER - Page 9 
I 
" 04 /25 /2003  1 3 : 4 2  FAX 20838422** DISTICT COlXRT &p2% 
__ - - - - - - -  &$%>a - d *a W n ? i  
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
ll FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF EASTERN WASHINGTON & IDAHO JOAN M. FISHER 
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ti I [ CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
' I  
I ,  J. David Navarro, the undersig uthority, do hereby certify that I have 
mailed, by United States Mail, on this day of April, 2003, one copy of the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to 
each of the adomeys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
II 201 N. MAIN MOSCOW, ID 83843 
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